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The entrepreneurial ecosystem is a relatively new perspective within the field of 
entrepreneurship but is now one of the most discussed topics in that field. It emphasizes the 
role of broader framework conditions that promote or constrain entrepreneurial activity in any 
region. The supportive institutional framework (reduced number of government regulations, 
ease in compliance of taxation system and control over corruption) and physical conditions 
(ease in access to finance, developed infrastructure, stability in political environment, the 
availability of an educated workforce and reduced competition with informal sector) create an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem where entry, survival and growth of firms will be at the highest 
rate. These elements of the institutional framework and physical conditions are interactive in 
nature, therefore, policymakers around the world are trying to achieve a balance between 
these components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem.  
There is a paucity of research on the entrepreneurial ecosystems of developing 
countries, therefore, the findings of this thesis will not only be an addition to the literature but 
will also be useful for policymakers in these countries. In this study, pooled cross-sectional 
data for Pakistan and 41 low-middle income countries (LMICs) covering the period 2006-13 
have been used to identify different entrepreneurial ecosystems and explain their impact on 
the performance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The performance of SMEs has 
been measured through the annual change in sales growth, employment growth and labour 
productivity growth. 
The findings based on the analysis of the entrepreneurial ecosystems for the group of 
LMICs show that all of the identified components can have a negative effect on the 
performance of the SMEs. However, ranking of components on the basis of magnitude and 
statistical significance of effect shows that corruption has the most negative effect on firm 
performance, which warranted further examination. Therefore, we compare the firm 
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performance of the most corrupt and least corrupt LMICs through the use of propensity score 
matching (PSM) methods. The results of matching methods show that firm performance in 
the most corrupt countries is at least 10% lower than firms in the least corrupt countries. 
Thus, LMICs need to take steps to improve their control over corruption in order to achieve 
better performance of their SMEs.  
However, only the individual components of the entrepreneurial ecosystems could be 
assessed for LMICs because of the heterogeneity of the institutional frameworks and physical 
conditions of these countries. Therefore, the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan has also 
been analysed to determine its existence and composition, and its effects on the performance 
of SMEs. The entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan is examined using firm level survey data 
provided by the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) for the years 2007 and 2013. A 
cluster analysis and canonical discriminant analysis (CDA) is undertaken to identify the 
composition of the entrepreneurial ecosystem existing in Pakistan. This bottom-up approach, 
recommended in the literature, has been used to measure the interactive effects of 
components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. None of the studies in the literature 
has measured and empirically tested the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan using this 
approach. 
The findings indicate that the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan is a combination 
of elements of the institutional framework and physical conditions. Except for government 
regulations and political stability, all other components contribute negatively to the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. Thus, the aggregate effect of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem is negative on the performance of SMEs. Moreover, an index was calculated using 
the interactive weighted effect of the components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of 
Pakistan. The regression estimates based on the index values affirmed the negative effect of 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan as a system.  
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Our findings for Pakistan can be used as a guideline for policymakers in other 
developing countries with similar institutional frameworks and physical conditions. However, 
it can be inferred that there is no shortcut to create a supportive entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
The gradual improvements, with government acting as facilitator, are required to make the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems in LMICs conducive for entry, survival and growth of businesses. 
The specific recommendations for both policymakers and entrepreneurs are given at the end 




CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurship is regarded as one of the most discussed topics across the globe. The word 
was searched on Google 10 million times in January 2016 (Isenberg, 2016). The field of 
entrepreneurship has achieved new heights since the last decade of the 20
th
 century. The 
recognition of the value of entrepreneurship dates back to the seminal work of Schumpeter 
(1934), in which he labelled entrepreneurs as ‗agents of creative destruction‘ and emphasized 
their vital role in economic growth. Since 1934, this field has been widely researched and 
policymakers have been on a quest to configure the most suitable policies to promote SMEs, 
given their local conditions.  
Researchers, practitioners and policymakers have broadly agreed on the variety of 
social, economic and developmental benefits arising because of entrepreneurship, and 
developed a broad consensus that entrepreneurship is important and it matters (Acs and 
Audretsch, 1988; Acs et al., 2014; Blanchflower, 2000; Grimaldi et al., 2011; Parker, 2009; 
Terjesen and Wang, 2013). Therefore, many governments and development agencies have 
allocated substantial amounts of money for financing and training entrepreneurs. These 
initiatives have been aimed at increasing the sheer volume of entrepreneurial activity in 
different regions on the basis of the argument that all kinds of entrepreneurship will generate 
economic activity. 
Early research on entrepreneurship focused mainly on the personality traits of 
successful entrepreneurs (for a summary see Van de Ven, 1993), with the aim of finding the 
set of individual characteristics needed to be a successful entrepreneur. This aspect of 
entrepreneurship is still the focus of much research, however, later developments in the field 
shifted the focus to firm-specific factors: the skills of the employees, the geographical 
location of the firm and management practices, for instance, to find reasons for the success or 
failure of entrepreneurial ventures. The most recent perspective views entrepreneurship as 
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interactive and interdependent (Motoyama and Knowlton, 2017). This modern systematic 
view of entrepreneurship has been termed the entrepreneurial ecosystem by Daniel Isenberg. 
The entrepreneurial ecosystem has been defined as an interactive relationship between 
entrepreneurs, and institutional framework and physical conditions, for providing a thriving 
environment for businesses. The entrepreneurial ecosystem is a complex set of elements 
aimed at making the environment conducive for entry, survival and growth of 
entrepreneurship in a region. 
1.1 Entrepreneurial Ecosystems and Small and Medium Enterprises 
This idea of taking a systematic view of entrepreneurship is relatively new and 
underdeveloped, and scholars have stressed the need to empirically test the effect of 
individual and interdependent components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem on the level of 
entrepreneurship in a region (Alvedalen and Boschma, 2017; Spigel and Harrison, 2018). The 
research in this field is providing useful insights for improvements in academic (Cavallo et 
al., 2018; Stam, 2015) as well policy (Acs et al., 2014; Foster et al., 2013; Isenberg, 2010; 
Stangler and Bell-Masterson, 2015; Taich et al., 2016) understandings of this concept. The 
objective behind the use of the entrepreneurial ecosystems approach has been to create 
resilient economies which are self-regulating and self-sustaining through entrepreneurial 
activity. 
The concept of an entrepreneurial ecosystem has established itself as the most recent 
trend in the research area of entrepreneurship (Brown and Mason, 2017; Isenberg and 
Onyemah, 2016; Martin, 2015; Stam, 2018). It can be seen in Figure 1.1 below, that research 
on entrepreneurial ecosystems has increased substantially in recent years. Moreover, most 
recently an international conference held in Washington March 25-26, 2017, organized by the 
International Business Innovation Association was based on the theme of building thriving 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. The participants agreed on creating collaborative strategies to 
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create encouraging entrepreneurial ecosystems and emphasized the need for further research 
in this direction. Also, the Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy and 
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development have called for papers on entrepreneurial 
ecosystems for special issues to be published in 2019.  
Figure 1. 1: The trend of publications based on the Entrepreneurial Ecosystems (1999-2015) 
Source: Adopted from Alvedalen and Boschmaa (2017) 
 
The World Economic Forum (WEF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the World Bank have all sponsored workshops, seminars, 
conferences and published reports on the topic of entrepreneurial ecosystems in recent years. 
The Kauffman Foundation has recently started a programme to understand and explain the 
measurement and performance of entrepreneurial ecosystems (Stangler and Bell-Masterson, 
2015). Thus, entrepreneurial ecosystems can be regarded as a contemporary issue, yet there is 
18 
 
still a long way to go in developing our understanding as different aspects of this concept are 
unfolding through research in different contexts and time periods. 
The concept of the entrepreneurial ecosystem is based on the theories of 
organisational ecology, institutional theory, regional economics and a systems approach. It 
emphasises self-organizing and self-regularizing mechanisms for competitive market 
policies. The combination of formal institutions (government regulations and taxation 
system), informal institutions (corruption perception) and physical conditions (access to 
finance, supportive infrastructure, a stable political environment, a skilled labour force and a 
formal economy) are expected to create an entrepreneurial ecosystem where the entry, 
survival and growth of firms will be at its highest rate. The institutional framework and 
physical conditions will determine the health of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, and how 
supportive or constraining it is. A supportive entrepreneurial ecosystem is expected to 
promote business activity and self-regulate the market by screening out the poor performing 
firms, whilst also attracting those which challenge the status quo with differentiated and 
innovative products.  
Since most businesses start from either a small or medium scale, a high rate of SME 
formation has been used in the literature as an indicator of entrepreneurial activity. Thus, the 
role of the entrepreneurial ecosystem has been to ensure high rates of entry and survival of 
SMEs with growth potential. In supportive entrepreneurial ecosystems, the survival and 
growth of SMEs is given more importance in comparison to the entry rate. The high rate of 
survival and growth of SMEs in the USA and Europe has been accredited to their institutional 
support, facilitative physical conditions and low entry costs. On the other hand, the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems of developing countries have been blamed for a high exit rate of 
firms in their markets because the institutions here are seen to be relatively inefficient. 
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As, SMEs contribute significantly to economic growth, productivity and innovation 
(Memili et al., 2015; Schlogl, 2004); therefore, policymakers should emphasize the provision 
of a supportive environment for better economic performance. Moreover, it has been argued 
that if the encouragement and facilitation of SMEs is continued, the long-term economic 
objectives including skilled human resources, alleviating poverty, dispersing economic 
activity to deprived regions, the involvement of minorities in economic activity and the 
utilization of untapped entrepreneurial potential, can all be achieved (Beck, 2007; Bouri et 
al., 2011; Kuntchev et al., 2012; Oecd, 2005). Thus, SMEs can play a momentous role in the 
economic turnaround of any developing economy. 
The lower capital needs and labour intensive nature of SMEs give them 
unprecedented importance in the solutions to the economic problems of developing countries 
(Rodrik, 2014; Stephens et al., 2013). Moreover, unskilled and semi-skilled labour is often 
the target of the SMEs because of their usually low tech and labour intensive production 
processes. Moreover, it is believed that the sheer number, size and operational nature of 
SMEs give them an added advantage to spur endogenous growth and accelerate the economic 
development of developing countries. Their vital role in promoting domestic firm 
performance in existing and new industrial sectors to create a resilient economy in the 
contemporary competitive world is inarguable. However, apart from due recognition of their 
contributions, the challenges this sector faces should not be underestimated too, particularly 
when the widespread phenomenon of market globalization is giving added advantages to 
large firms due to their resource base. 
However, without undermining the chances of success of SMEs, it is also a bitter 
reality that many of the new firms fail during the process of entry, establishment and 
sometimes expansion. The non-exhaustive list of the reasons for failure includes: financing 
constraints, liquidity problems, inexperienced entrepreneurs or the wrong selection of the 
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market, for instance. However, the ecosystem perspective points to the constraining 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, based on inefficient institutional framework and physical 
conditions, as a reason for the high rate of failure of firms (Feld, 2012). It is argued that the 
constraining entrepreneurial ecosystem of developing countries does not allow 
entrepreneurial activity to increase beyond a certain level. Entrepreneurs are not free to 
ensure self-regulation or self-sustainability; rather their actions are tightly controlled by the 
regulators. 
So the question is what should governments in developing countries do to promote 
SMEs? The general answer is that they should ensure the provision of an environment 
conducive for the entry, survival and growth of SMEs. The indigenous entrepreneurial 
ecosystem should be gradually improved using a bottom-up approach, with the role of 
governments as facilitators rather than strictly controlling the entrepreneurial activity. 
However, governments should also allow market forces to operate to ensure the screening of 
underperforming firms, rather than intervening to save the poor performers. 
Moreover, the recent research suggests that, although there are notable contributions 
from small and new firms, only high growth firms started by ambitious entrepreneurs are 
contributing significantly to the economic development of a region (Audretsch and Belitski, 
2017; Cavallo et al., 2018; Isenberg and Onyemah, 2016; Mason and Brown, 2014; Spigel 
and Harrison, 2018; Stam, 2015; Wong et al., 2005). The earlier belief that all types of 
entrepreneurship (productive, unproductive, destructive) contribute in creating economic 
activity has been rejected by contemporary empirical findings. It has now been argued that 
the benefits of entrepreneurship can be realised in a society only if the economic benefits of 
productive entrepreneurship supersede the unproductive entrepreneurship, and this is possible 
only when the institutions are performing their role efficiently and effectively, and supportive 
physical conditions are provided to the entrepreneurs. 
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Thus, recognizing the contributions of ambitious entrepreneurs and the role of 
institutions and physical conditions in the performance of the private business sector, 
governments in developed countries have changed their policy direction. The most recent 
policy shift has been to move from pushing for increasing the number of entrepreneurs 
(quantity) to improving the quality of entrepreneurship in a region by increasing the number 
of high growth firm (Acs et al., 2018; Stam, 2007). Thus, only high growth SMEs are the 
centre of policy related attention with respect to the development of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems in developed economies. 
1.2 An Explanation of the Entrepreneurial Ecosystems of Low-Middle Income 
Countries 
The state of entrepreneurial activity and entrepreneurial ecosystems in developing and under-
developed economies has been entirely different from the developed world. It has been 
empirically demonstrated that the challenges and opportunities faced by entrepreneurs in 
developing countries have been entirely different (Acs et al., 2018; Auerswald, 2015; 
Ayyagari et al., 2014; Cavallo et al., 2018; Isenberg, 2011; Mason and Brown, 2014). The 
institutions in developing countries are not efficient, physical conditions are in poor state, and 
governments are dealing with entrepreneurs using a ‗grabbing hand model‘, rather than using 
the ‗invisible hand model‘. Government interventions are aimed at taking control of the 
economic activity to avoid market failure. These conditions do not allow the market to adopt 
self-regulation mechanisms. Thus, the entrepreneurial ecosystems of developing countries are 
different from developed countries and have been a constraint on the performance of SMEs. 
The differences between developed and developing economies are very broad and, 
apart from cultural and social diversity, the within group differences in incomes of 
developing countries are also substantial. Therefore, the income based categorization of 
countries by the World Bank—low income, low-middle income, upper-middle income, 
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middle income and high income—has been used to select a group of LMICs for an analysis 
of the effect of their entrepreneurial ecosystem on firm performance. According to the World 
Bank definition LMICs are those having Gross National Income (GNI) in the range of 
US$1,035–US$4,035. These countries are different in culture, economic conditions, social 
wellbeing, political structure and resources, but they show common characteristics being poor 
in monetary terms. Although LMICs are very diverse yet they face the same kinds of 
problems, both at the domestic level and at the international level, which sums up their 
reasons for underdevelopment. 
The economic challenges of LMICs are two-fold. Firstly, they have lost the advantage 
of low costs of production by graduating from the low income category to the next level but 
they are not yet able to compete with the advanced technology of high income countries. 
Secondly, the up-gradation to the next group of relatively better economies has resulted in 
increased income disparity and changed the consumption patterns of citizens (Easterly, 2007; 
Foster et al., 2013; Martin, 2015; Tilly, 2004). Therefore, they are in dire need of finding the 
right policies at this point in time to meet the challenges of financial and social development. 
It has been argued that a thriving private business sector could be a solution to the 
problems of these LMICs. Indeed, despite the gloomy economic circumstances of these 
countries, and the constraining institutional framework and physical conditions, the 
entrepreneurial activity is still increasing. Therefore, it is important to study the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of these countries to find answers to a range of questions: what 
type of entrepreneurial ecosystem exists? How do components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem (elements of institutional framework and physical conditions) individually and 
interactively affect the entrepreneurial activity? And how do they affect the performance of 
SMEs? No policy guidelines, based on local empirical evidence, have been available for 
these countries to improve their prevailing entrepreneurial ecosystems. Therefore, this study 
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will follow a bottom-up approach and contribute significantly to explaining the role of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem in the performance of SMEs in LMICs. Policy implications will 
also be discussed. 
The analysis of entrepreneurial ecosystems of LMICs provides a very broad macro 
level view. However, it has been argued in the literature that different entrepreneurial 
ecosystems can exist at different levels within a country, province, city and even a group of 
industries (Spigel, 2017; Stam, 2018). Therefore, it is necessary to go further to more micro-
levels and examine these ecosystems. Pakistan has been part of the LMICs group and the 
economic worries of Pakistan are not different from the other group members. The findings 
based on entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan can be used by other LMICs facing similar 
economic and business challenges. 
The assessment of the health of institutional framework and physical conditions, and 
their effect on performance of SMEs, is expected to reveal interesting and somewhat different 
findings in comparison to studies of developed countries. Just like other LMICs, the 
institutions of Pakistan are inefficient and negatively affect entrepreneurial performance. 
Adverse physical conditions add fuel to the fire and make the entrepreneurial ecosystem of 
Pakistan a constraint on performance of firms. The policies to revive the economy are 
inconsistent and to date have had short-term benefits, thus they remain unable to achieve 
economic stability for the long-term.  
Entrepreneurship has been considered as a way forward for economic stability and 
growth. This study will provide a clear picture of the existing entrepreneurial ecosystem in 
Pakistan and its impact on the performance of SMEs. This will be the first ever study of its 
kind for Pakistan and it will suggest appropriate policy guidelines for improvements in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem at national level. Therefore, this study is expected to reveal 
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valuable findings for existing as well as potential entrepreneurs and policymakers besides 
contributing to the body of knowledge on developing countries. 
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Thesis 
This thesis is aimed at measuring entrepreneurial ecosystems and explaining their effects on 
the performance of SMEs in Pakistan and a group of LMICs. The two empirical chapters 
(Chapter 4 and 5) will separately address the relevant research questions. The analysis will 
focus on explaining the individual, and interactive, roles of the components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, including the institutional framework (government regulations, 
taxation system and corruption) and physical conditions (access to finance, infrastructure, 
political stability, educated workforce and competition with the informal sector) on the 
performance of SMEs. The World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) database has been used 
for the analysis of LMICs and for Pakistan. Moreover, we use advanced statistical techniques 
to analyse these data in an attempt to find unbiased estimates of the effect of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems on the performance of SMEs. 
The main objectives of the thesis are as follows:  
 To measure the effect of the components of entrepreneurial ecosystems on the 
performance of SMEs in LMICs; 
 To identify the weakest link in entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs and test its 
effect on firm performance in LMICs; 
 To identify the composition of the entrepreneurial ecosystem existing in Pakistan 
and measure the relative importance of different components; 
  To estimate the systematic effect of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan on 
the performance of SMEs. 
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 explains in detail the literature on measurement 
of performance of SMEs and entrepreneurial ecosystems. The theoretical development of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems approach has been provided in a synthesis of the existing 
literature. Different models of entrepreneurial ecosystems and their components are explained 
in detail with reference to earlier research but with special emphasis on the limited number of 
studies on developing countries. Moreover, the measures of firm performance from both 
internal and external control perspectives are discussed in detail. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
data and the methodology used to find answers to our research questions. Different databases 
used in the literature are discussed and we justify the selection of the World Bank Enterprise 
Survey (WBES) database. The statistical methods used for analysis are discussed and their 
application in this study is explained in detail.  
Chapter 4 is the first empirical study, explaining the effect of components of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems on the performance of SMEs in LMICs. The pooled cross-
sectional data from WBES database containing firm level responses of 22,267 SMEs from 41 
LMICs for the period 2006-14 has been used for analysis in this chapter. The effect of 
individual components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem has been tested, and further 
investigation is carried out on the weakest link, corruption. The results of propensity score 
matching (PSM) methods are used to examine the differences in firm performance in the 
most corrupt and the least corrupt LMICs.  
The identification of an entrepreneurial ecosystem for all LMICs is not feasible with 
available data, due to differences in the institutional frameworks and physical conditions 
between different LMICs. Therefore, in Chapter 5 the role of the entrepreneurial ecosystem 
on the performance of SMEs in Pakistan is explained. The WBES data of 2049 SMEs from 
Pakistan, based on survey of 2007 and 2013, is used for analysis in this chapter. A cluster 
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analysis and canonical discriminant analysis (CDA) has been used for measurement and 
identification of national level entrepreneurial ecosystem in Pakistan. The cluster analysis is 
used to identify patterns in responses of firms on components of institutional framework and 
physical conditions. The relative importance of different components of institutional 
framework and physical conditions is determined through coefficients of discriminant 
functions, and an index is created to examine the interactive effect of components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan on the performance of SMEs. Finally, Chapter 6 
concludes the study by giving policy recommendations for both entrepreneurs and 





CHAPTER 2 – A REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON THE 
PERFORMANCE OF SMES AND NATURE AND DETERMINANTS OF 
ENTREPRENEURIAL ECOSYSTEMS 
In this chapter the literature related to the entrepreneurial ecosystems and performance of 
SMEs is reviewed with an emphasis on LMICs. We begin in section 2.1 with a review of the 
literature on the definition of SMEs and their contributions to the economy. Moreover, why 
contributions to the economy differ on the basis of firm performance and how it is affected by 
internal and external factors is also discussed. In sections 2.2 and 2.3 the literature on 
entrepreneurial ecosystems, and why performance of SMEs depends on them has been 
reviewed. These sections further elaborate the role of the institutional framework and 
physical conditions which are key parts of entrepreneurial ecosystems. The summary of 
literature reviewed is given in section 2.4 to facilitate the analysis of key aspects. 
2.1 A Definition of Small and Medium Enterprises 
There is a long history of research on SMEs, but yet there is no globally agreed definition of 
them due to the differences in economic, cultural, social and industrial structures of countries 
across the globe (Matlay et al., 2006). SMEs have been defined in a number of ways based on 
a variety of parameters throughout the world. All or some of the criteria, including the 
number of employees, sales volume and value of assets have been used by organizations and 
countries across the globe to define SMEs. For example, in Egypt firms having a number of 
employees between 5 and 50 are termed SMEs, while in Vietnam SMEs are defined as firms 
having between 10 and 300 employees; in contrast, firms with 50 to 500 employees are 
considered as SMEs in the USA, Canada and New Zealand (Bouri et al., 2011). According to 
the World Bank, SMEs are those firms with less than 300 employees, an annual sales volume 
of less than $15 million and total value of assets more than $15 million. Interchangeably, the 
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Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) defines SMEs as firms with less than 100 
employees and annual sales revenues of less than $3 million. 
These variations in the definition of SMEs make the cross country comparisons 
complex and practically less meaningful. These differences also pose serious questions for 
the findings of earlier cross-country comparative studies on SMEs. However, the WBES is a 
unique database which has scaled the organizations across the globe according to one 
definition of SMEs; therefore, the cross country comparative results based on this survey data 
are more valid. According to the WBES, small enterprises are those with between 5 and 19 
employees and medium enterprises are those with between 20 and 99 employees. This 
definition of SMEs by the WBES has been adopted in this study.  
2.1.1 The Contributions and Performance of SMEs 
SMEs are vital change agents in the conventional market due to their flexibility and 
innovative ability. The effect of their innovative practices is particularly visible in 
knowledge-based sectors although they are widespread in almost every sector of business 
activity. There are SMEs which are technologically advanced and fulfilling the specific needs 
of certain niches through their specialized and differentiated products and services (De 
Ferranti and Ody, 2006). Some are expanding their sphere of influence by associating 
themselves across borders through strategic alliances with other firms. Also, the increased use 
of information and communication technologies (ICT) and e-business applications has 
broadened the scope and range of benefits for them in multiple sectors. 
SMEs dominate in terms of the number of businesses in countries across the globe 
with shares ranging from 95% to 99% of all businesses in an economy (Oecd, 2005). Small 
enterprises constitute 95% of manufacturing businesses in the majority of the countries of the 
world. At the upper end of this scale, small firms constitute 99% of manufacturing firms in 
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Italy whereas, on the lower side, only 80% of manufacturing firms of USA are of a small 
size. According to the estimates, SMEs account for 95% businesses and contribute 60% of 
the private sector employment in OECD countries (Oecd, 2005). Japan is among the world 
leaders in terms of the number of SMEs with more than 99% SMEs, Australia has 96% and 
South Africa has 91%. The estimates of 27 European Union (EU) countries suggest that there 
are over 23 million SMEs which constitute 99.8% of all businesses (Wymenga et al., 2011). 
In France 99.9% of tourism business has been operated by the SMEs.  
The contributions of SMEs are equally significant in developing countries where 90% 
of the non-agriculture business is carried out by this sector. In Morocco 93% businesses are 
SMEs while in Ghana this number is 92%, which contribute 70% to the GDP of the country. 
In Pakistan 90% of non-agricultural businesses are SMEs and in India SMEs constitute 80% 
of the businesses (Abor and Quartey, 2010). Therefore SMEs are equally dominant in both 
developed and developing countries. 
SMEs are not only significant in terms of the number of businesses across the world 
economy, but they also contribute significantly in terms of productivity, employment, 
innovation and economic growth. The 23 million SMEs in European economies contribute 
67% in employment. The employment growth in SMEs in Austria was 8.1% in the period 
from 1995-2003. The contribution of SMEs to employment in Australia is over 63%. SMEs‘ 
share in employment in the manufacturing sector is more than 75% in Italy, Spain and 
Portugal (International Finance Corporation, 2013; Oecd, 2005). 
SMEs are assumed to be the engines of job creation. Their contribution in creating 
employment opportunities in both developed and developing countries have encouraged 
policy makers to implement pro-SME policies. Moreover, donor agencies, including the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, the African Development Bank and 
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United Nations Industrial Development Organization, have allocated multi-billion dollars in 
aid to support SMEs (Pires et al., 2013).  
The share of SMEs in total manufacturing output and value added is more than 50% 
for a majority of OECD countries with Italy, Spain, Japan and New Zealand being 
exceptional contributors. The average contribution of SMEs in the manufacturing value 
added is 57% for European economies (Oecd, 2005). On the other hand, in the services 
sector, SMEs dominate in terms of both the number of businesses and employment. In the 
USA, medium sized hotels share 56% of the employment in this sector, whereas in the UK 
similar sized hotels constitute 40% of the employment in this sector. However, in the research 
and development (R&D) sector, large firms dominate and constitute more than 50% of 
employment in this sector in countries including the UK, USA, Netherlands and Germany 
(Kushnir et al., 2010; Wymenga et al., 2011). 
Owing to the scale and noteworthy contributions in innovation, employment and 
economic growth in both developed and developing economies, SMEs have been extensively 
researched from multiple domains including management, leadership, marketing, finance, 
economics, entrepreneurship etc. Management researchers have looked at the role of 
management practices in the establishment, survival, trans-generation and growth of SMEs 
(Hong and Jeong, 2006; Kotey, 2005; Reuber and Fischer, 1997). The researchers from the 
field of leadership have looked at SMEs from the lens of leader/owner/manager‘s role in the 
establishment, survival and growth of firms (Matzler et al., 2008; Nicholls-Nixon, 2005; 
Smallbone et al., 1995). In the field of economics, the role of SMEs in economic growth and 
development has been widely investigated with regard to how and how much they contribute 
to employment growth, poverty reduction, social wellbeing, regional growth and sectoral 
growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Beck et al., 2005a; Kirzner, 1999; Smallbone et al., 2001). 
Researchers from the entrepreneurship domain have worked on the basic but most frequently 
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asked question of why some SMEs succeed while others fail (Islam et al., 2011; Warren and 
Hutchinson, 2000)? 
SME failures are usually considered as alarms for newcomers about something being 
wrong with either the market or the entrepreneurs. The research about factors affecting the 
performance of the entrepreneurial ventures has resulted in fruitful guidelines for potential 
entrepreneurs, investors, policy makers and aid agencies. However, the data on performance 
is difficult to obtain, moreover, the collection of comparable data has been a persistent 
problem over the years. Also, there has been lack of consensus on the use of measures of 
performance in entrepreneurial research. 
The management research in this direction has been dominated by the domains of 
organizational theory and strategic management. Historically, the empirical research 
grounded on organizational theory has used three main approaches— a goal-based approach, 
systems approach and multiple constituency approach—to measure organizational 
effectiveness. The goal-based approach proposed in this regard advocates the use of 
organizational goal achievement for measuring performance (Etzioni, 1964). The weakness 
of this approach is non-comparability, as firms can have varied and contradictory goals. The 
second approach is the systems approach, which covered some weaknesses of the earlier 
approaches by focusing on multiple generic aspects of firm performance (Georgopoulos and 
Tannenbaum, 1957; Steers, 1975; Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967). The third approach, the 
multiple constituency approach, used the achievement of goals of different stakeholders as 
the performance measure (Connolly et al., 1980; Goodman and Pennings, 1977; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 2003; Thompson, 1967). However, there has been no consensus among the 
researchers over which approach among these is the best measure of performance. 
Researchers of strategic management used three constructs—financial performance, 
operational performance and market share—either in the form of a hierarchy or individually, 
32 
 
to estimate the performance of an organization (Chakravarthy, 1986; Kaplan, 1983; Sandberg 
and Hofer, 1988). 
The dimensions of firm performance used in previous research and their measures and 
frequency of use as adopted from the review article by (Murphy et al., 1996) are described in 
Figure 2.1. The earlier research studies mostly used only one dimension with a maximum of 
four measures of performance. Studies based on resource-based views of management 
describe changes in firm performance due to internal factors only. Therefore, efficiency and 
profitability related dimensions of performance were used. However, more recent studies in 
organizational theory, strategic management and population ecology have adopted 
institutional theory and suggested research on the effect of the external environment on the 
firm performance (Ayyagari et al., 2007; Cooper, 1993; Haltiwanger et al., 2013; North, 
1991). 
Components of the business environment beyond the control of firms like business 
regulations, infrastructure, corruption, access to finance etc., can possibly affect the firms at 
any stage of the business life cycle. The growth-related dimensions of firm performance are 
more vulnerable to external environmental conditions. Also, this research is aimed at 
explaining the relationship between the entrepreneurial ecosystem and performance of SMEs 
whereas the entrepreneurial ecosystem is something external and beyond the control of any 
single industry or firm. Therefore, in this study the performance of SMEs has been measured 








Figure 2. 1: Dimensions and Measures of Firm Performance  
 
Dimensions Measure Frequency 
Efficiency  30 
Return on investment 13 
Return on equity 9 
Return on assets 9 
Return on net worth 6 
Growth  29 
Change in sales 23 
Change in employees 5 
Market share growth 2 
Labour productivity 2 
Change in net in margin 2 
Profit  26 
Return on sales 11 
Net profit margin 8 
Gross profit margin 7 
Net profit level 5 
Net operating profit 5 
Pre-tax profit 3 
Size  15 
Liquidity  9 
Success/Failure  7 
Market share  5 
Leverage   3 
 





2.2 Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 
It is only in the last decade or so that the entrepreneurial ecosystems approach has emerged 
and received significant attention of academics and policy makers around the world. The 
entrepreneurial ecosystems approach has been mostly regarded as a novel way of looking at 
development, yet it is not only consistent with the traditional economic development 
approaches through entrepreneurship rather in some aspects it complements them. 
There is no consensus on how to define an entrepreneurial ecosystem, therefore, this 
approach has usually been explained by dividing it into two parts. Firstly, ‗entrepreneurial‘ 
refers to entrepreneurship which is considered as a process through which people identify and 
select business opportunities to pursue their business creation dreams (Shane, 2009; Stam, 
2015). Entrepreneurs exploit opportunities by taking risks and allocating resources to get 
benefit by creating and selling innovative goods and services (Isenberg, 2010). Innovation is 
used in terms of either invention or radical improvement in the existing solutions or 
modification in the existing products, but it definitely adds value to society (Lester and Piore, 
2004). More recently, the focus on the quality of entrepreneurship has narrowed down 
entrepreneurship to high growth firms only (Mason and Brown, 2014; Stam, 2015). There are 
few reservations about this narrowed focus being too exclusive, but the recent literature on 
entrepreneurial ecosystems has specifically focused on this aspect, so self-employment is no 
longer used as an indicator of entrepreneurial activity (Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2014; 
Shane, 2009; Stam et al., 2011).     
The second part is ‗ecosystems‘. An ecosystem has been defined in the Oxford 
Dictionary as a biological community of interacting organisms and their physical 
environment. Thus, apart from its literal meaning, ecosystem means an interaction of 
interdependent actors related to entrepreneurial activity. This context can be encouraging—
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motivating the entrepreneur to mobilize resources—as well as discouraging—constraining 
start-up activity. 
The definition of entrepreneurial ecosystems by Stam (2015) is most widely used in 
academic research because it comprehensively covers this approach. According to Stam 
(2015: pp.5), ―... the entrepreneurial ecosystem is a set of interdependent actors and factors 
coordinated in such a way that they enable productive entrepreneurship.‖ The entrepreneurial 
ecosystem is thus about the environment in which entrepreneurship takes place, the role of 
individual and interdependent factors that enable or constrain the entrepreneurial activity. The 
complex set of elements of the entrepreneurial ecosystem help in nurturing entrepreneurship 
in a region. The entrepreneurial ecosystems approach emphasizes social context in terms of 
its role in making entrepreneurship encouraging or discouraging. Innovative aspirations and 
achievements of individual entrepreneurs depend on how ingrained entrepreneurial culture is 
in the society. 
Entrepreneurs are the focal point of an entrepreneurial ecosystem which accentuates 
the context to be conducive for entry, survival and growth of entrepreneurship. In the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, entrepreneurs are considered as leaders and the other supporting 
stakeholders, such as the government are considered as the feeders (Feld, 2012). However, to 
properly understand the entrepreneurial ecosystems approach it is necessary to understand its 
theoretical development. 
2.2.1 Theoretical Development of Entrepreneurial Ecosystems Approach 
The recent theoretical developments in this approach have drawn heavily from the literature 
on entrepreneurship, regional economics, including industrial districts and clusters, and 
innovation systems approach. These domains of knowledge have focused on 
36 
 
entrepreneurship, institutional context and location specific attributes to study the differences 
in business activity. 
The common attribute in the clusters approach and entrepreneurial ecosystems 
approach is Marshall‘s (1920) argument, that the competitive advantage of a firm is based on 
factors outside the control of an organisation and within the environment in which it operates. 
The industrial districts and clusters approach emphasizes the role of a common technology 
base shared by multiple competing and cooperating firms to determine the success or failure 
of an organisation. However, whereas the focus of the clusters approach is on increasing the 
number of firms, complementing each other in a specific location, the emphasis of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems approach has been on entrepreneurs themselves. In 
entrepreneurial ecosystems approach, entrepreneurs are not only users of the institutional and 
physical conditions, but they also feed into this system through the feedback loop mechanism 
(Spigel and Harrison, 2018). However, understanding the context in which firms operate 
plays a significant role in their survival, and growth is the common point among these 
approaches. 
The innovation systems theory took centre stage in policy making in 1990s with the 
publication of books by Lundvall (1992), Nelson (1993) and Edquist and Johnson (1996). 
Their main theoretical contribution was that the fundamental resource of every successful 
economy is knowledge, and the institutional context of any country enables that knowledge to 
convert into innovation. This approach emphasized the systematic view of innovative activity 
based on the assumption that knowledge is power, and supportive framework conditions for 
use of knowledge can result in innovative outcomes. Hence, the capacity of any economy to 
produce innovative outcomes is embedded into the structure of its institutions. It was 
assumed that innovation system failure happens as a result of weaknesses of institutional 
elements (lack of information about financing sources or other sources of knowledge), or due 
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to lack of interaction of the agents (institutions and firms). Therefore, it is the institutional 
framework (rather than individual R&D efforts and individual entrepreneurs) that triggers 
innovation in any country. The shortcoming of this innovation systems approach is its 
emphasis on institutions and firms, while the role of individual entrepreneurs remained a 
―black box‖. This is despite the fact that this idea of innovation systems theory was based on 
the work of Schumpeter.  
While research on innovation systems theory was at its peak, research on 
entrepreneurship was entirely individual focused (i.e. the personality traits of entrepreneurs) 
and never looked at the relationship of entrepreneurs with the broader economic framework 
(Cavallo et al., 2018). The researchers in this domain tended to ignore the effect of external 
environment (context) on the entrepreneurs. However, literature on regional development 
focused on the impact of context and concepts like industrial districts, clusters and innovation 
systems started to gain importance (Acs et al., 2017a; Acs et al., 2017b). 
Thus, taking an institutional and regional context is common in the entrepreneurial 
ecosystems approach, as well as in the regional development approaches (industrial districts, 
industrial clusters and innovation systems approach). However, in contrast to these regional 
development approaches, the literature on the entrepreneurial ecosystems gives central 
position to entrepreneurs, as it is the judgement and action of an individual which triggers 
entrepreneurial activity. The mere existence of business opportunities is useless unless an 
entrepreneur conjectures the existence of opportunity and tries to exploit it, thinking it 
feasible and profitable (Autio et al., 2013; Mcmullen and Shepherd, 2006). Therefore, the 
shift from an innovation systems approach, and industrial districts and clusters approaches, to 
an entrepreneurial ecosystems approach emphasizes the interaction between the entrepreneurs 
and institutional structures in determining the entrepreneurial output. The entrepreneurial 
ecosystems approach adopts an evolutionary approach and takes into account the mutual 
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learning of institutions and entrepreneurs as result of this interactive process. It has shifted 
the unitary and individual focused research on entrepreneurship to a more institutional and 
interactive level (Stam and Spigel, 2016). 
The entrepreneurial ecosystems approach is in a developmental phase, and it has not 
yet strictly demarcated itself by explaining all the conceptual questions. It is still not clear 
how to measure the entrepreneurial ecosystems. Therefore, it is important to undertake a 
constructive synthesis of literature in this domain to understand the components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems contributed by different earlier studies. Moreover, the 
entrepreneurship development from regional context can help in developing a framework for 
measurement of the entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
2.2.2 A Synthesis of Literature on the Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 
Isenberg (2010) and Feld (2012) are the pioneers of the entrepreneurial ecosystems approach. 
They suggested to policymakers that culture and community play a significant role in 
determining the success of entrepreneurship at any place (Cavallo et al., 2018; Spigel, 2017; 
Stam and Spigel, 2016). As a result, a number of studies tried to investigate the concept of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. The recent literature on this approach has resulted in several 
different lists of factors contributing to explain different combinations of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems. 
Isenberg (2010) argued that there is no exact combination of factors to create a 
successful entrepreneurial ecosystem, but policy makers should focus on understanding the 
local conditions and their value in gradually creating an entrepreneurial ecosystem. Isenberg 
(2011) suggested a bottom-up process for devising any entrepreneurial ecosystem and 
propose the model of entrepreneurial ecosystem as shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2. 2: Isenberg’s model of an Entrepreneurship Ecosystem 
  
Source: Adopted from Isenberg (2011). 
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These six domains of Isenberg‘s model are not only too generic in nature but also 
there is a very long list of elements to measure the effect of each domain. Moreover, the 
indicators of these dimensions interact and are interdependent with each other in hundreds of 
idiosyncratic and extremely complex ways. Therefore, finding a causal link is not only 
extremely difficult, and even if achieved, is of limited value because of complex interactions. 
However, his emphasis on the value of context, and the argument that each entrepreneurial 
ecosystem emerges and matures in a unique balance of conditions is a significant contribution 
to this approach. 
Another model developed to measure entrepreneurial ecosystems was proposed by 
Feld (2012). Figure 2.3 adopted from Feld (2012) shows that nine factors play an important 
role in the success of an entrepreneurial ecosystem. The emphasis on access to resources and 
the supportive role of the government and context, besides the interaction of entrepreneurs 
and the entrepreneurial ecosystem, are the central points of this Feld model. However, the 
interdependence of these components still remained unaddressed. 
The ideas of Isenberg (2011) and Feld (2012) were adopted by the World Economic 
Forum (WEF), the Kaffman Foundation and the OECD. These groups developed models with 
lists of indicators to measure entrepreneurial ecosystems. A wave of research followed this 
approach in an effort to examine the characteristics of entrepreneurial ecosystems and their 
effect on entrepreneurial activity (Acs et al., 2014; Alvedalen and Boschma, 2017; Audretsch 
and Belitski, 2017; Auerswald, 2015; Mack and Mayer, 2016; Qian, 2017; Spigel, 2017; 




















Source: Adopted from Feld (2012 pp.186-187) 
 
The list of eights pillars of an entrepreneurial ecosystem by the World Economic 
Forum (2013) is shown in Figure 2.4. It is largely an overlap of attributes of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems mentioned by Feld (2012) and the Babson entrepreneurship 
ecosystems model by Isenberg (2011). These pillars of entrepreneurial ecosystems focused on 
access to resources in the form of access to finance and human resources, and role of formal 




Figure 2. 4: Entrepreneurial ecosystems pillars and their components 
Source: Adopted from WEF (2013, pp. 6-7) 
 
The common attribute of all these models is a shift in the traditional economic 
understanding about entrepreneurship in general, and the role of entrepreneurs and their 
interaction with institutions. Moreover, the entrepreneurial outcome is achieved using 
different modes of governance and the institutional context allows or restricts 
entrepreneurship. However, there is a general consensus in the field that entrepreneurial 
activity is the outcome of different combinations of social, institutional and economic factors. 
Moreover, the varying combinations of these factors are expected to create entrepreneurial 
ecosystems which vary from place to place (Brown and Mason, 2017; Spigel, 2017; Stam and 
Spigel, 2016; Stangler and Bell-Masterson, 2015). 
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The models of entrepreneurial ecosystems developed by different organizations can 
be seen below in Figure 2.5. These frameworks vary in their scope, level and comparability. 
For example the Entrepreneurship Measurement Framework by the OECD, ICT 
Entrepreneurship by GSM Association, the Doing Business Global Ranking by the World 
Bank, and Global Entrepreneurship and Development Index by George Mason University 
have been developed to assess the entrepreneurial ecosystem at national level, and to perform 
cross-country comparisons. However, these frameworks mostly emphasise the 
entrepreneurial environment and policy domains, and their implementation is severely 
affected by scarcity of comparable data.  
The OECD framework is considered the most comprehensive model yet developed 
for analysing the entrepreneurial ecosystem of different countries because it focuses on 
including all the domains that can possibly affect the entrepreneurial activity, directly or 
indirectly. However, it is unknown how these factors are interdependent on each other in 
different regions at different time periods. Moreover, what are the key mechanisms which 
will work to make an ecosystem successful is yet unknown? 
In contrast to these national level measurement models, the Asset Mapping Roadmap, 
Babson Model and the Innovation Rainforest Blueprint frameworks are focused more at 
assessment of local ecosystems while ignoring cross-country comparison. Moreover, they are 
more theoretical and conceptual and lack the common set of variables for comparing different 
regions in terms of their entrepreneurial ecosystems. In addition, it is important to note that 







Figure 2. 5: The assessment of Entrepreneurial Ecosystems frameworks 
Source: Adopted from the Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs (2013) 
 
More recently, Stam (2015) used innovation systems theory and an entrepreneurship 
geography-based approach to suggest that entrepreneurial ecosystems are based on the 
interactive nature of entrepreneurial outcomes, entrepreneurial output, systematic conditions 
and framework conditions. The model given in Figure 2.6 shows that systematic conditions 
and framework conditions affect the entrepreneurial output (productive entrepreneurship), 
which in turn contributes to value creation in society at large. Also, a feedback loop is added 
to show the effect of entrepreneurial activity on the systematic and framework conditions. 
However, this model is inherently linear in nature as it does not account for the interactive 
nature of indicators of systematic and framework conditions. 
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Source: Adopted from Stam (2015, pp.1765) 
 
It can be concluded that the entrepreneurial ecosystems approach is still 
underdeveloped and very few studies have tried to explore its systematic nature (Acs et al., 
2014; Brown and Mason, 2017; Cavallo et al., 2018; Spigel, 2017; Stam and Spigel, 2016; 
Stangler and Bell-Masterson, 2015). According to Stam (2015), the under-theorisation of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems concept has led to the approach of policy focus leading to 
theoretical development rather than the other way round. This practice has affected the 
richness of this field with a number of potential aspects still needing further development and 
understanding. The review of gaps in the literature, identified through an explanation of 
theoretical development, as well as a synthesis of the literature on the entrepreneurial 
ecosystems approach, is explained in the following section.  
2.2.3 Gaps in the Literature 
The entrepreneurial ecosystems approach has been popular in policy circles.  Indeed, the 
more recent research in this domain is more theoretical and discursive in nature and mainly 
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targets practitioners and policy makers. There is a scarcity of empirical research in this 
domain.  
Moreover, as of today, the research in this domain has produced long lists of factors, 
without consistently finding a cause and effect relationship between entrepreneurial 
ecosystems and their outcomes (Stam, 2015). These factors and their combinations provide 
useful information but their coherent and interdependent nature has not yet been confirmed. It 
also lacks causal depth and the empirical evidence is extremely limited. Aside from 
developing countries, where data limitations are always a problem, this approach has not yet 
been rigorously tested in many developed countries.   
Existing frameworks also provide a static view of components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystems while ignoring their evolutionary nature (Alvedalen and Boschma, 2017). Ideally, 
all the components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem should be measured continuously over 
time, tracking their development. However, data limitations hamper such measurement 
efforts (Brown and Mason, 2017; Cavallo et al., 2018; Stam, 2018; Stam and Spigel, 2016; 
Stangler and Bell-Masterson, 2015). It is suggested that data should be collected annually, 
and if possible semi-annually and quarterly at different geographical levels. 
Moreover, it is not clear as what the unit of analysis should be using this approach 
(Stam, 2015). Should it follow geographical boundaries to determine different entrepreneurial 
ecosystems across different regions, countries, cities or sectors and groups of firms? It is 
assumed that the entrepreneurial ecosystem can be different at a national level and a sub-
national level. At the local level there might be different ecosystems for different sectors and 
different sets of entrepreneurs—serial entrepreneurs, established, emerging and nascent 
entrepreneurs—(Napier and Hansen, 2011; Spigel, 2017). 
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There is no limit to determining what could be the minimum and maximum scale of 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem. It could encompass cities, different geographical regions 
within a country, a country, or even a group of countries (Brown and Mason, 2017; Feld, 
2012; Saxenian, 1996; Senor and Singer, 2011). Moreover, all scales can be related to each 
other and can be nested to make the larger scales in the way that cities collectively will make 
a national scale system, and some countries can be nested to make multi-country 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. For example, some researchers perceive Europe as one 
entrepreneurial ecosystem due to several interconnected cities in different countries (Stam, 
2014). 
Isenberg (2011) suggested that a ‗one-size-fits-all approach‘ for developing an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem is not practical, because the different contexts bring different sets 
of challenges and opportunities.  Therefore, the entrepreneurial ecosystems can be different at 
different geographical locations and a bottom-up approach is the right way to proceed. 
Lastly, the empirical studies to date have focused only developed countries, and 
entrepreneurs in developing countries facing an altogether different set of challenges and 
opportunities, are least discussed in the literature. Thus, in the context of developing 
countries, it seems plausible that finding the effect of individual components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems on firm performance will be a contribution in the body of 
knowledge. According to Taich et al. (2016), estimation of the effect of individual 
components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem will help in identification of the weakest and 
strongest components. These findings can guide policymakers about where to start their work 
to improve the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Moreover, Cavallo et al. (2018) argued that for less 
studied regions, even identification of weak and strong links in the entrepreneurial 




In this thesis, the effect of components of the entrepreneurial ecosystems in LMICs is 
measured and weak links are identified. Moreover, interactive effect of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem in Pakistan is measured in a systematic manner to explain its effect of performance 
of SMEs. These are significant contributions to the body of knowledge because no study in 
the literature has measured the entrepreneurial ecosystem of any LMIC. Moreover, the 
findings can be compared with other countries having entrepreneurial ecosystems similar to 
Pakistan. 
2.3 Entrepreneurial Ecosystems of Low-Middle Income Countries 
The shift of developing countries from centrally controlled or mixed economies to market-
based economies have changed their economic landscape (Acs et al., 2018). The 
entrepreneurs in these countries are gaining more importance. Previously developing 
countries built their economies on the advantages of low cost labour, but now they are 
competing with the developed economies in terms of innovation. Therefore, apart from 
further theoretical and conceptual development, the scope of this approach should also be 
explored and tested in the context of developing countries as well. 
The probability of increasing wealth and reducing poverty in low and LMICs has 
been directly related with the level of entrepreneurship in these economies. The existence of 
entrepreneurship in abundance in any country can play an important role in employment 
generation, increasing productivity, competitiveness and innovation, reducing poverty and 
promoting economic growth. All of these are desired possible practical outcomes of 
entrepreneurship, which are ambitiously pursued in developing countries. Unfortunately, 
entrepreneurship in these countries is the least studied area. This study is aimed at partially 
filling this gap by empirically investigating the entrepreneurial ecosystems of LMICs. 
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The existing literature on entrepreneurship in developing countries has focused 
mainly on the types of entrepreneurial initiatives, rather than investigating the framework 
which policy makers should devise for the establishment, survival and growth of 
entrepreneurship. The existing models of entrepreneurship are based on the data collected 
from developed economies which cannot necessarily explain what entrepreneurial ventures 
are facing in developing countries.  
Entrepreneurship in developing countries has been relatively less studied as earlier 
practitioners and scholars either presumed that it is the same in both developed and 
developing economies, or the data was not available (Aterido et al., 2011). However, recent 
research studies based on WBES and Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) databases 
have posed questions which challenge these assumptions, and found that entrepreneurial 
ventures in developing countries are diverse. Here, entrepreneurs survive and grow in entirely 
different environments and face a unique set of challenges that businesses in the developed 
world never face.  
However, these studies on developed countries can be used as a guide to develop a 
bottom-up approach for examining the health of existing entrepreneurial ecosystems in 
LMICs. Although there is no common definition of entrepreneurial ecosystems, the widely 
shared theme in the literature shows that economic and social conditions are common areas of 
interest for development of a supportive entrepreneurial ecosystem (Spigel, 2017; Spigel and 
Harrison, 2018). Moreover, there is yet no consensus on what elements collectively makes an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, however, the existing literature does show that the output of an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem should be measured through the performance of existing firms. 
The higher growth rates of the firms indicate the existence of a supportive entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. Moreover, drawing on existing models, it can be argued that the success of 
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entrepreneurs depends on the institutional framework and other physical conditions necessary 
for entrepreneurial ventures.  
According to North (1990), institutions decide the rules of the game in a society. 
These formal and informal institutions target reductions in uncertainty and decide the costs of 
production and profit for the entrepreneurial activity. The institutions not only directly affect 
the entrepreneurs through compliance but also indirectly by changing the values, culture and 
mindset of the general population (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2002; Tonoyan et al., 2010). 
The efficiency of institutions depends on the interplay of formal and informal 
institutions (Williams and Vorley, 2017). The efficient institutions reduce transaction costs 
for the business and provide an enabling environment to existing and new ventures (Fritsch 
and Storey, 2014; Welter and Smallbone, 2011; Williams and Vorley, 2015). The 
development and stability of the institutions ensures a stable and low risk environment for the 
entrepreneurial activity. On the other hand, inefficient institutional structures create barriers 
to entrepreneurial activity. Thus, entrepreneurial activity is negatively affected by the 
inefficient functioning of formal institutions and widespread corruption (Vorley and 
Williams, 2016).  
The congruence of formal and informal institutions will synergize the positive effect 
of policy reforms, and asymmetry will undermine the effects of reforms in formal institutions 
(Williams and Vorley, 2015). Thus, it is important for policy makers to look at both formal 
and informal institutional framework conditions to foster entrepreneurship. Government 
regulations, and the taxation system have been used as indicators of formal institutions, 
whereas corruption, perceived or not, has been used as an indicator of informal institutions. 
However, it is not enough for the entrepreneurs to have a supportive formal and 
informal institutional framework, they also need supportive physical conditions from which 
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they will gather their resources to start a business. These physical conditions are the 
backbone for the success of an entrepreneurial ecosystem (Stam, 2018). The presence of 
these conditions and their interactive effect is expected to play a crucial role in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. For example, entrepreneurs need finances and a skilled workforce 
to start business. Higher proportions of skilled labour and ease in obtaining finance are 
expected to have positive effects on the performance of entrepreneurs. The accessibility to 
low cost formal financing is an important determinant of the survival and growth of new 
firms (Beck et al., 2008). Basic infrastructural support facilities are required right from the 
beginning. Thus, resources including infrastructural support, access to finance, an educated 
workforce, stable political conditions and a competitive market can be called a group of 
physical conditions necessary for entrepreneurial activity. Thus, regions rich in these physical 
conditions are expected to attract and retain more entrepreneurs as compared to others 
requiring investment in these non-productive areas for a new business (Kenney and Patton, 
2005). 
The interaction of the institutional framework and physical conditions create an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem which is shown in the Figure 2.7. The insights from previous 
literature are used to determine different components of the entrepreneurial ecosystems, and 
more importantly, it provides a causal path for understanding how the institutional framework 
and physical conditions are related to each other and affect performance. It is important to 
note that these components are used as a starting point. Other researchers are expected to 
contribute a revised list of components and their interactions. Moreover, entrepreneurial 
ecosystems can be different in different regions, therefore, it is important to look for different 
compositions.  
The path diagram in Figure 2.7 shows the effect of the institutional framework and 
physical conditions on the entrepreneurial performance, and a feedback mechanism is shown 
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through the effect of entrepreneurial performance on the entrepreneurial ecosystem. The 
measurement of the feedback mechanism is, however, beyond the scope of this study, as no 
such data is yet available. 
 
Figure 2. 7: Entrepreneurial Ecosystem of LMICs 
 
The effect and significance of these factors is expected to be different in developed 
and developing countries, and so will be the priorities of the governments. Thus, it is 
important to at first acknowledge that entrepreneurship is different in developing countries 
due to difference in the environment in which they operate. Therefore, studying the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs will reveal interesting, and possibly contrasting findings 
in comparison to research studies carried out in the developed world. The discussion on how 
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these components contribute to explain the entrepreneurial ecosystems and what are findings 
of existing studies about these components is given in the following sections. 
2.3.1 Institutional Framework 
The effect of the institutional environment is substantially higher on new entrepreneurs as 
compared the established firms. Weak institutions compel the entrepreneurs to engage in 
corrupt practices for survival in the market (Vorley and Williams, 2016).  Perception about 
the efficiency of formal institutions is shared quickly among other members of a society. The 
entrepreneurs in societies with a shared belief about the efficient functioning of formal 
institutions have a higher probability of taking risks and implementing their innovative ideas 
than their counterparts (Aoyama, 2009). 
An economy with a weak institutional framework, not only significantly affects the 
existing entrepreneurs, but also affects the investment decisions of prospective entrepreneurs 
(Sautet, 2013). Weak institutional framework conditions make it difficult for entrepreneurs to 
exploit the business opportunities due to the risk of ex-post transaction costs through 
uncertain taxation or corruption (Sautet, 2013). Ukraine is an example of a country where 
institutional reforms have proved inefficient and turbulent, and constrained entrepreneurial 
activity (Smallbone et al., 2010).  
However, it has now been argued that entrepreneurs do not merely follow the rules of 
game but also evade them and use political entrepreneurship to control the institutions. 
Henrekson and Sanandaji (2011) found that entrepreneurs are not only the recipients of 
institutional reforms but also perpetrators. Their findings also suggest that entrepreneurs 
abide, evade or alter the institutional requirements. Therefore, institutional change happens as 
a result of an interaction between entrepreneurs and institutions. 
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According to Henrekson and Sanandaji (2011) the ―abiding‖ entrepreneurs adapt to 
the exogenous institutional requirements. They tend to change the institutions through 
creative destruction, for example by introducing new technology. On the other hand, 
―evading‖ entrepreneurs do not alter the existing rules of the game, but rather innovatively 
use the imperfections of the institutions. The most common illegal forms of such behaviour 
include tax evasion. One form of evasion is when entrepreneurs shift some of their business 
activity to the shadow economy to avoid compliance with frequent changes in tax policy 
(Smallbone and Welter, 2001). These evading entrepreneurs follow Burt‘s structural hole 
theory, to use institutional inefficiencies to their benefit. For example, they use their contacts 
or trace the right official and produce the right amount of bribe to get the work done (Burt, 
1995). The third type of entrepreneurs are the ―altering‖ entrepreneurs; they use lobbying and 
their political connections to bring about institutional amendments in their favour (Henrekson 
and Sanandaji, 2011). These behavioural responses suggest that it is the interaction of the 
entrepreneurs and institutions that will develop framework conditions for the entrepreneurial 
activity. 
The effect of institutional framework conditions has been divided into formal and 
informal institutions. Formal institutions are measured through government regulations and 
taxation system, whereas informal institutions are measured through perception about 
corruption. The details about these components are given in following sections. 
a) The Effect of Government Regulations on Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 
Regulations have been introduced by successive governments to improve productivity while 
keeping the macroeconomic stability and removing the barriers to market efficiency in the 
microeconomic domain. The effect of market regulations can be both positive and negative. 
The positive effect of regulations comes through protection of property rights or protection 
from market failure, which is an indicator of improved economic performance. The negative 
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effect of regulations is that entrepreneurs have to spend money on compliance costs rather 
than investing in other productive areas. 
According to the public interest theory of regulation by Pigou (1938), markets which 
are regulated by governments are less vulnerable to failure due to externalities but are prone 
to becoming monopolistic. Government regulations are meant for nothing else but protecting 
the public from market failures. The objective of government regulations is to ensure the 
maximum survival of eligible entrepreneurs, registered after screening for certain 
standardized entry requirements. It is assumed that these formally registered businesses have 
gained the confidence of the public and other business entities by fulfilling those public needs 
for which they were registered (Van Stel et al., 2007). Therefore, public interest theory 
implies a higher rate of survival, growth and maturity of businesses in a market through 
supportive government regulations (Djankov et al., 2002a). 
In contrast to public interest theory, Tullock (1967) favoured public choice theory and 
presented an opposite perspective on the role of government regulations. He portrayed them 
as a means of reducing the efficiency of a social welfare process. According to him, 
regulations are not introduced to correct market failures, but for rent seeking and are 
negatively related with economic growth. In economics, regulations are considered as a 
source of achievement of social benefits, such as employee health, safety and access to 
products and competition in markets. The proponents of this view argue that the regulations 
are used for rent seeking, votes and bribes. The permits and other formal business registration 
requirements are only there to provide the legal power to the regulators, so that they can 
collect bribes for those issuing permits (Mcchesney, 1987; Murphy et al., 1993). 
The positive side of this rent seeking approach is that bribes in exchange for permits 
can make the process of registration very efficient. This is referred to as the greasing the 
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wheel hypothesis. According to Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett (2015), compliance of the 
prescribed procedure to get a driving licence can take a long time. However, if you could hire 
an agent, you can get it the next day, without even going to the testing centre. However, 
practically this is quite different for firms because at every step the toll collectors (politicians 
and/or bureaucrats) have different demands which make the process costly and inefficient. In 
addition, these toll collections do not go to government revenues and thus serve no purpose to 
the general public. 
Stigler (1971) was among the early economists to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of 
government regulations. According to his theory of regulatory capture, the government is 
influenced by the industry to make business regulations and industry primarily initiates only 
those suggestions which are beneficial to them. The industry incumbents follow a rent 
seeking approach and usually the regulations are promoted to increase entry barriers for 
controlling competition in the market and increasing the profit of the existing businesses. 
Thus, most of the regulations align with the famous ―red tape‖ theory of Bozeman (2000). 
According to red tape theory, administrators introduce excessive and unjustified regulations 
to ensure their power and manipulation. These regulatory burdens constrain business 
performance.  
Djankov et al. (2002a) reported that in Italy entrepreneurs are required to pay 
US$3,946 and it takes almost 62 days in fulfilling the 16 procedures required for registration 
of a formal business. In Mozambique, it takes US$256 and at least 149 days to complete the 
19 different regulatory requirements to register a formal business. In contrast, Canadian 
entrepreneurs are required to complete only two procedures and it takes two days and cost 
only US$280 to start a new formal business. According to the Doing Business Survey (2015), 
starting a business in OECD countries takes 9.2 days; in contrast, it will take 27 days on 
average in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, an application to obtain a construction permit takes 
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around 199 days in South Asia. Procedural delays and their compliance costs in developing 
countries make it difficult to follow the government regulations. 
Eifert, Gelb and Ramachandran (2008) investigated the effect of indirect costs on the 
performance of manufacturing firms of African countries. The findings of the study 
suggested a statistically significant negative effect of compliance cost on firm performance of 
all sizes and ages. The study of Mexico by Bruhn (2011), showed a statistically significant 
positive effect of business regulation reforms on the level of entrepreneurial activity. The 
reforms in the package named Rapid Business Opening System, over the period 2002-06 for 
103 municipalities, reduced the unnecessary regulatory burdens and the number days required 
to start a business from 30 to 2. In addition, a 1% improvement in the regulatory reforms is 
expected to increase the new business entry rate by 3% and the chance of an employee 
starting a new business by 6%. Thus, regulatory reforms are expected to help in removing the 
barriers to entry for new entrepreneurs. 
Eifert (2009) investigated the impact of business regulations reforms in India from 
2003-07. The findings of the study show a statistically significant positive effect on the 
contract enforcement and days required to register a business. A 10% improvement in 
government regulations is expected to decrease the contract enforcement period by 15 days 
and business registration period by 21 days. Thus, regulatory reforms not only make it easy to 
start a business but also reduce the compliance costs. 
The study by Klapper et al. (2006) found that excessive firm entry regulations 
increase the cost of start-up and significantly reduce the number of new entrants especially in 
high entry rate sectors; they show that a 1% increase in entry costs is expected to decrease the 
rate of entry by 17%. Also, the performance of young SMEs decreases by 4% when the free 
market entry is prevented. Figure 2.8 shows that firms in Italy (with higher entry cost) start as 
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large in the early years, but their growth is much slower than firms in the UK (with low entry 
cost), where firm growth is twice as compared to Italian firms after 10 years in business. 
Figure 2. 8: Age and growth of firms in Italy and the UK 
 
Source: Adopted from Klapper et al. (2006) 
 
Busse and Groizard (2008) used indicators from the World Bank Doing Business 
Survey for measurement of the government regulations and found that foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is significantly positively associated with GDP growth. The estimates 
suggest that 1% additional FDI due to improved business entry regulations is expected to 
increase GDP growth by 5.6%. However, 2.5% of that effect is eaten up by poor market entry 
regulations. Therefore, constraining market regulations not only nullify the direct positive 
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effects of FDI on economic growth, but also slow down the frequency of knowledge 
spillovers and technology transfers, thus negatively affecting economic growth.  
The cost of regulations is born by both the public sector and the private sector. The 
bureaucracy has to bear the administrative cost of development, administration and 
implementation of market regulations. The private sector has to bear the financial as well as 
structural cost of regulations. This cost is sometimes in the form of capital investment when 
regulations require investment in fixed assets like ICT. Such costs of complying with 
business regulations by the private sector are labelled compliance costs (De Jong and Van 
Witteloostuijn, 2015).  
The study by De Jong and Van Witteloostuijn (2015) used firm level data for 530 
private enterprises in the Netherlands—a country which is often acknowledged for its better 
business regulations (Linschoten et al., 2009)—and measured their effect using the 
perception of managers. The findings showed that all three types of regulatory burden, 
including regulatory cost, regulation change and regulation inconsistency, exhibit statistically 
significant negative impacts on firm performance. Moreover, a 1% increase in regulatory 
burden disproportionately negatively affects the sales growth of medium sized firms by 15%, 
and young firms by 11%. Moreover, a 1% increase in inconsistency of government 
regulations is expected to disrupt market efficiency and reduces sales growth by 6%.  
Regulatory burden also affects the ability of a firm to invest in R&D and innovative 
activities, because substantial amounts of resource are invested in compliance with 
regulations and other non-developmental administrative functions. Griffith et al. (2010) 
studied the effect of market deregulation on the profitability of firms in the EU. The findings 
pointed out that a 10% increase in deregulation is expected to increase competition in the 
market and reduced profitability of the firms by 25% and increase investment in R&D by 6%, 
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making it an attractive option for firms. Thus, it can be argued that if product market 
regulations are introduced in a perfectly competitive market to reduce the level of 
competition without making it closer to a monopoly, then it can increase the profitability of 
firms, and allow them to invest in innovative activities.  
It can thus be concluded that regulations are an important component of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. Regulatory burden can play a significant role in the location 
decision of entrepreneurs as a relaxed regulatory framework attracts them. However, 
relatively few studies have tested the effect of regulations on firm performance in developing 
countries. Moreover, the LMICs vary in regulatory burden; therefore, it will be interesting to 
see how regulations contribute to their entrepreneurial ecosystems.  
b) The Importance of Taxation in the Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 
Every government relies on different types of taxes—property tax, income tax, consumption 
tax, corporate tax—for generating revenues. Since tax collections of different types from 
different sectors of the economy have different effects on growth, it is of utmost importance 
to choose the right mix. In the literature different tax reforms have been acknowledged for 
their different, but long-lasting, effects on economic growth. 
Countries introduce changes in different types of taxes to have direct and indirect 
effects on economic growth. In knowledge-based economies, the changes in tax policies have 
been implemented for the promotion of innovation and the creation of entrepreneurship. In 
contrast, in newly industrialized LMICs, governments have changed corporate taxes to attract 
local and foreign investors.  
The study by Giroud and Rauh (2015) investigated the effect of state business 
taxation policy on the investment decisions of firms operating in more than one state of the 
US. The data used in the study was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau‘s Longitudinal 
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Business Database, the Census of Manufactures and the Annual Survey of Manufactures. The 
data regarding state taxation policy was obtained from the Michigan Tax Database and Tax 
Foundation. The findings showed that a 1% increase in the corporate tax rate is expected to 
reduce the level of investment by 3% for each firm. Moreover, due to increases in taxes, 
business owners shifted their investment to the other states with relatively lower tax rates. 
However, there is also a possibility that high taxation will allow governments to invest more 
in the welfare of the region, which improves the overall business climate and makes it more 
attractive for business activity. 
Policy makers also use tax incentives as a tool to attract investors. Developed 
economies have introduced targeted tax incentives for definite time periods, usually through 
reduction in income tax. On the other hand, developing countries offer tax incentives for both 
targeted and general reasons. The outcomes of these incentives have been mixed. Therefore, 
some countries have curtailed their programmes whereas others have reintroduced them (Zee 
et al., 2002). However, generally speaking, developing countries are today engaged in intense 
competition with each other in seeking to lure foreign firms through tax privileges. It is 
argued that despite potential reduction in tax revenues, for instance, due to tax rebates to the 
foreign firms, the FDI through this activity still offers benefit to developing countries. 
The findings of the study by Hajkova et al. (2007) showed that labour taxes have a 
statistically significant negative impact on FDI, when compared to different types of 
corporate taxes. A 1% increase in labour taxes is expected to decrease the FDI by 4%. It is 
argued that labour taxes increase the costs of labour which discourages foreign investors 
looking for the benefits of low cost labour. Djankov et al. (2010), studied the effect of an 
effective corporate income tax rate on investment, R&D and entrepreneurship in 85 countries. 
The findings of the study showed that corporate income tax has a statistically significant 
negative effect on investment in the private sector, FDI and on the level of entrepreneurship 
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in a country. A 10% increase in the average of effective corporate tax rate in the last five 
years will decrease the investment, FDI and entrepreneurial activity by 25%, 22% and 20%, 
respectively. The results are robust when control variables for value added tax, sales tax and 
property tax are introduced to the model. Further analysis indicates that a 10% increase in the 
statutory corporate tax rate will result in a 2% decrease in investment as a percentage of 
GDP. 
According to Johansson et al. (2010), corporate taxes can decrease TFP for the 
following reasons: 1) higher corporate taxes hinder the firms from investment in productive 
sectors and lead to a re-allocation of resources to non-corporate sectors with less productivity. 
2) the complexity in corporate taxes can increase compliance costs, which deters firms from 
investing in productive activities, thus reducing the efficiency and productivity. It also 
increases the administrative workload of the government; 3) the high corporate tax rates 
discourage investment in R&D activities, since the financial benefits after tax payments will 
possibly be unattractive; and 4) the transfer of the latest technology and knowledge spillover 
from foreign to domestic firms is affected by high corporate tax rates as it discourages FDI. 
Moreover, the rise of globalisation and increased capital mobility in today‘s digital 
age has increased the effect of taxation on the location decisions of foreign firms (Da Rin et 
al., 2011). Studies have shown that taxation systems can influence the investment decision 
due to the difference in pre-tax and post-tax profits. Firms need to invest time and money for 
compliance with tax policies, in addition to what they have to pay as tax on profit, because 
the tax policies are usually complicated. Therefore, an overall tax cost can stifle the level of 
entrepreneurship (Braunerhjelm and Eklund, 2014; Reynolds and Rohlin, 2014). However, 
due to uncertainty about the tax differences, the response of firms has been mixed (De Mooij 
and Ederveen, 2003; Devereux and Freeman, 1995; Hines, 1999). 
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Cullen and Gordon (2007) used individual tax return data to investigate the effect of 
taxation on the general behaviour of individuals, and on entrepreneurial risk-taking behaviour 
in particular. The study focused on how differences in income tax and business income tax, 
as well as other aspects of tax policy, affected individual behavioural outcomes. The findings 
showed that increases in tax rates had a negative effect on entrepreneurial risk-taking 
behaviour of individuals and decreased it by 6%. Thus, increases in taxes can negatively 
affect the level of entrepreneurship in a country. 
Johansson et al. (2010) have investigated the effect of taxation on firm performance 
and economic growth in OECD countries. The findings based on country, year and industry 
fixed effects indicated that a 10% increase in corporate tax reduced the investment by young 
medium sized firms by 40%, which is relatively high as compared to a 34% reduction in 
investment by small firms. Similarly, a 10% increase in corporate tax rate will decrease the 
investment by medium sized older firms by 10% which is marginally higher than the 8% 
reduction in investment by small old firms. Also, increase in corporate tax reduces the 
productivity of medium sized young firms by 2.8% and medium sized old ones by 3.6%. 
Thus, it can be concluded on the basis of these findings that corporate tax has a statistically 
significant negative effect on all firms but it is more challenging for the medium sized and 
old firms. 
Mayende (2013) found statistically significant positive effects of tax incentives on the 
performance of firms enjoying tax incentives in Uganda. A panel data of manufacturing firms 
was analysed using generalized least squares regression estimation. The results showed that 
tax incentives have improved both sales and manufacturing value added by 8%. The effect of 
tax incentives was greater on the sales of large firms which improved by 8.5% as compared 
to a 4.5% improvement in sales for medium sized firms. Thus, the tax incentives had a 
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positive and statistically significant effect on the performance of all firms, but large firms 
derived the most advantage. 
In summary, studies of the effect of taxation on entrepreneurship and economic 
growth have presented mixed findings but generally endorsed the negative effect of taxation. 
However, the findings of these studies were based on either a small sample of countries, or 
most importantly, ignored the impact of the overall business environment within a country. 
Omitting these variables is likely to result in biased estimates and an exaggerated effect of tax 
on investment decision making. The investment decision is usually based on a mix of 
different structural and policy factors. Although tax is an important component of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, it is only one component. Therefore, it is important to see the 
effect of all the components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in tandem as well as 
individually. 
c) The Importance of Control over Corruption in Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 
Corruption has been a widely discussed topic in the literature. It is considered as both positive 
and negative. The positive side of corruption is proposed as a ―greasing agent‖ in the rigid 
and inefficient bureaucratic procedures or as a ―substitute price‖ for efficient allocation of 
market resources (Huntington, 1968). It is perceived to be negative when considered as 
unofficial taxes which never reach the government revenues. However, in reality it is much 
worse than that. Corruption not only deprives a government from important revenues but it 
also results in uncertain, unethical and often illegal contracts with high transaction costs, 
which cannot be pursued by the public in the courts (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Therefore, 




Corruption has been defined in a number of ways by academics, practitioners, 
regulators, development agencies and donors. Most of these definitions are very broad in 
nature and some are also very vague. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) defined corruption as ―the 
sale by government officials of government property for personal gain‖ (p.108). 
Transparency International defines corruption as ―the misuse of entrusted power for private 
gain‖. The World Bank has broadly defined corruption as ―the abuse of public office for 
private gain‖. Due to its widespread incidence and perceived importance, a number of 
measures of corruption have been devised including the Corruption Index by the World Bank, 
Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International and the Ethics and Corruption 
Index as part of the Global Competitiveness Index produced by the WEF.  
Corruption can be differentiated on the basis of purpose and breadth of corruption. 
State level corruption could be intentional, by bribing for changes in the content of laws and 
rules. The informal payments made to public officials and bureaucrats for taxes, licenses, 
permits, customs and other public services is called administrative corruption (World Bank, 
2000). In this form of corruption, the officials who are gate keepers of government property 
like permits, licenses, etc. sell them for their personal benefits. In most cases the permissions 
are of the kind that without which business activity cannot be started (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993). The most common form of corruption is bribery in which the public official demands 
informal monetary or non-monetary payments to perform a legal or illegal task (De Rosa et 
al., 2010). 
The study by Gonzalez et al. (2007) used firm level survey data of 33 African and 
Latin American countries to measure the incidence of corruption. Despite variability in the 
response of firms within each region, there is a 3% greater probability for a firm in Africa to 
be asked for a bribe as compared to a firm in Latin America. In addition, a 10% increase in 
ease of doing business is expected to decrease the demand for bribes by 6.5%. In his study on 
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Asian firms, Wu (2009) found corruption playing a significant role in determining the success 
of the organization. The results of this probit model suggested that small firms are 38% more 
likely to bribe officials as compared to larger firms. Also, a 10% increase in the competition 
in the market increases the probability of offering bribes by 7.3%. In cases of intensified 
bidding wars, firms are not only victims of high rates of corruption but they are also 
perpetrators of the corruption because of their high involvement in bribing the officials. 
A more recent study by Blagojević and Damijan (2013) investigated the impact of 
corruption on firm performance in Central and Eastern Europe. The study used the Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for the period of 2002-09 for 27 
transition economies. The results showed that with the improvement in government control 
over corruption after 2004, the involvement of firms in corrupt practices reduced sharply and 
firm performance improved by 6%.  
Corruption could be widespread at the local government level in a country where it is 
strictly controlled at the central government level and vice versa. The US and India are good 
examples of widespread corruption at the local level, combined with efficient control at the 
central government level (Knack, 2007). Many Asian and African countries have been rated 
high in terms of corruption by Transparency International. Bangladesh, Myanmar and 
Somalia are among the most corrupt countries. This high level of corruption poses a serious 
threat to their economic growth by reducing FDI, distrust of people in government, lack of 
funds for public welfare and the retarded development of political institutions (Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2002; Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000). 
Corruption negatively affects business activities in two ways. Firstly, corruption 
payments increase the cost incurred on the production and selling of goods and services. 
Secondly, due to the additional bribe payments, the financial cost increases along with the 
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uncertainty about how much to pay (Fisman and Svensson, 2007). In countries where 
corruption is pervasive at grass root level, firms may have to pay bribes by all means if they 
want to get what they are even legally entitled to, and this is often the case in many LMICs. 
Here, firms believe that their bids for projects will not be opened on merit, and thus bribe the 
relevant officials to win the project and become part of the vicious circle of corruption. 
The rate of involvement in corruption is the same for both small and large firms in 
countries with high level of corruption. However, the effect felt by the small firms is much 
higher and deeper as compared to large firms as the amount of bribes paid in proportion to 
the revenue is higher for small firms than large firms. Large firms have better political 
connections to avoid the bribe payments, whereas, small firms are considered as easy targets 
by corrupt officials (Svensson, 2003). Also large firms have well established procedures to 
avoid any fraud while small firms usually lack such internal protocols. Therefore, small firms 
usually have to be corrupt to keep themselves in line with the operating requirements in the 
market. 
The study by Aterido et al. (2007) empirically tested the impact of investment climate 
variables on firm performance in 107 countries. The results of this study showed that 
corruption significantly affects the performance of SMEs. A 10% increase in corruption is 
expected to decrease the performance of medium sized firms by 26% and small firms by 
13%. Analysis of the subset of exporter firms only showed that a 10% increase in corruption 
is expected to decrease the performance of exporters by 22%. Fisman and Svensson (2007) 
used firm level survey data to investigate the effect of corruption on the growth of firms in 
Uganda. The measure of corruption was aggregated with respect to location of industry to 
avoid the problem of endogeneity and measurement error. The findings indicated that a 10% 
increase in bribe payments in the region was expected to reduce the growth of all firms by 
33% and foreign owned firms by 22%. 
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The study by De Rosa et al. (2010) used the BEEPS to investigate the effect of 
corruption on productivity of firms in 28 low income, low-middle income, higher middle 
income and high income countries. The results showed that a 1% increase in bribes is 
expected to reduce the productivity of all firms by 6% and medium sized firms by 5%. The 
negative effect of corruption on the productivity of medium sized firms was substantially 
higher than the 2.4% reduction in productivity of the large firms. The results were statistically 
insignificant with respect to the age of firm. 
Governments and entrepreneurs need to play an important role in combating the 
daunting challenge of corruption through reforming institutions. Four models of interaction 
between entrepreneurs and government institutions have been proposed by Frye and Shleifer 
(1997). The first one, the ‗invisible-hand model‘, suggested governments should have a lower 
involvement in decisions regarding the allocation of resources, and provide only law and 
order and legal services. It allows the entrepreneurial system to be sustained by learning on 
its own. This model is most favoured for the entrepreneurial ecosystem. The ‗helping-hand 
model‘ on the other hand suggests some involvement of the government in regulating the 
markets and institutions to help nurture the entrepreneurial environment. The politicians and 
bureaucrats in this system have some powers and can possibly use it for limited and 
organized corruption. It is argued that politically well-connected large firms usually exploit 
this model for their own benefits. Also, this model is more suitable to politically mature and 
established economies. The extreme version of this is called ‗the iron-hand model‘, which the 
authors suggest is used in Korea and Singapore. A fourth model is called ‗the grabbing-hand 
model‘, which suggests a rent seeking approach of the government and bureaucrats. It 
indicates the massive government regulations allowing politicians and bureaucrats to do large 
and disorganized corruption. The legal system becomes corrupt and contract enforcement is 
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done privately by mafias. The role of government is perceived as oppressive in this model. 
This model usually prevails in politically unstable and least developed countries. 
Corruption reflects the conditions of economic, political, cultural and legal institutions 
of a country (Svensson, 2005). It can be described as an outcome of a bundle of useful or 
harmful rules. Widespread corruption has thwarted the ambitious efforts of LMICs to provide 
enabling environments for new ventures. However, some emerging economies from this 
group have tasted success as well. 
The earlier research efforts investigating the effect of corruption on firm performance 
have been affected by the lack of credible information on the incidence of corruption. The 
measures of corruption used in studies have been mostly based on aggregation of multiple 
macroeconomic indicators. The cross country survey databases are either based on opinion of 
a limited number of experts or households only, which do not truly reflect both the level of 
corruption and firms‘ experience of corruption (Gonzalez et al., 2007). Moreover, the study 
by Knack (2007) critically reviewed the aggregate macro level corruption measures and 
suggested the use of a single index and single source measure of corruption for 
methodologically accurate results. He has further suggested that studies investigating the 
effect of corruption on firms should prefer firm level responses over aggregate measures of 
corruption. Therefore, it is expected that our analysis using firm level data on corruption and 
its effect on the firm performance in LMICs will reveal interesting findings. 
2.3.2 Physical Conditions 
The physical conditions play a central role in making the entrepreneurial ecosystem 
encouraging for entrepreneurs. The success of any entrepreneurial ecosystem largely depends 
on the existence and interdependence of elements of physical conditions (Stam, 2015). For 
example, access to finance from formal financial institutions plays a crucial role in securing 
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investment for long-term projects with risk and uncertainty, and it plays an important role in 
the success of a promising entrepreneurial venture (Kerr and Nanda, 2009). Similarly, the 
availability of a skilled workforce is another important component for the success of an 
entrepreneurial venture. The presence of an educated workforce with diversity in skill-set not 
only improves the performance of existing firms, but also creates more business opportunities 
(Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005; Lee et al., 2004). 
Moreover, infrastructural support plays a pivotal role in attracting new entrepreneurs 
and improving efficiency of existing firms especially in developing countries. The lack of 
infrastructural facilities necessary for doing business leads to non-productive investment in 
business, which increases both start-up cost and operating cost for business. Therefore, the 
existence of such support facilities is important for making an entrepreneurial ecosystem 
encouraging for entrepreneurs. Moreover, political stability and existence of informal sector 
are crucial for developing the trust of entrepreneurs. The consistency of policies and 
existence of formal economy enables the effective distribution of resources and flow of 
information related to business environment. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to focus on 
providing physical conditions for the success of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. The role of 
components related to physical conditions in the success of the entrepreneurial ecosystem is 
explained in the following sections. 
a) The Role of Access to Finance in Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 
There is long theoretical literature on the relationship between access to finance and firm 
performance. A number of studies have investigated the impact of financial constraints on the 
performance and growth of firms (Beck et al., 2005b; Cowling et al., 2016; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1998; Galindo and Micco, 2007; Oliveira and Fortunato, 2006; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998). One of the earliest studies in this area was carried out by Butters and Lintner 
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(1945). They found that small firms rely on internal financing for growth opportunities as it is 
extremely difficult for them to get external financing on favourable terms. 
A more recent study by Ayyagari et al. (2008) used the WBES database and found the 
effect of access to finance on growth of firms to be the most robust among finance, crime and 
political instability. A 10% improvement in access to finance, crime and political instability 
was estimated to improve firm growth by 34%, 33% and 22% respectively. The study further 
investigated the effect of these components on firms in LMICs. The findings show that access 
to finance and political instability are a significant problem for these firms, with a negative 
effect of 4% and 5%, respectively on firm performance. 
In the literature, the effect of access to finance has been further investigated with 
respect to sizes and age of firms. The effects of financial constraints on the growth of firms 
are expected to be more severe for small firms in comparison to large firms (Angelini and 
Generale, 2008; Beck, 2007; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Beck et al., 2005b; Kuntchev 
et al., 2012). Beck et al. (2005b) found that the effect of limited access to finance on firm 
growth is statistically significant for all firms but higher in magnitude for SMEs as compared 
to large firms. It was estimated that a 1% improvement in access to finance will improve the 
growth of SMEs by 3.4% and 3.1%, but improvements in the growth of large firms will be 
2.3%. Similarly, findings of Ayyagari et al. (2008), show that medium sized and small sized 
firms have exhibited 6% and 4% additional growth in comparison to large firms, with 
improvement in access to finance. According to Beck (2007), the probability of a small firm 
reporting finance as a major constraint on growth is 39%, whereas for large firms it is 32%.  
Moreover, developed and developing countries have been compared for the effect of 
access to finance on firm performance, in a study by Aterido et al. (2007). This study used the 
WBES database to investigate the effect of the business climate on firm performance 
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covering the period 2002-06. The findings show that access to finance is a relatively more 
significant obstacle for the performance of small firms as compared to medium sized firms. A 
1% increase in access to finance as an obstacle is expected to decrease the employment 
growth of small firms by 11% whereas for medium sized firms this decrease is 8%. 
Moreover, the estimates suggested that a 1% increase in obstacles to access to finance will 
reduces the employment growth of older firms by 4%. 
Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido (2007) compared Africa with the rest of the world by 
using the WBES database to investigate the effect of access to finance, infrastructure and 
corruption on employment growth. They used both objective and subjective measures of 
access to finance, including the percentage of working capital financing by banks and the 
perception of owners on access to finance as an obstacle to doing business. The overall effect 
of improvement in access to finance was higher in the rest of the world when compared to 
Africa. A 10% increase in investment in private business activity is estimated to improve 
employment growth by 7% in the rest of the world, with only a 4% increase in Africa. 
However, their findings also showed that the comparative effect of improved access to 
finance is greater for small firms in Africa than the rest of the world. The further analysis 
showed that a 10% increase in financing through bank loans will decrease the employment 
growth of small firms in Africa by 3%, whereas the effect on small firms in rest of the world 
is statistically insignificant.  
Subsidies have also been used as a tool for improvement in access to finance. There 
are however, mixed results on the success of this approach in developing countries. Oliveira 
and Fortunato (2006) in their study using unbalanced pooled data for Portuguese 
manufacturing firms for the period 1990-2001 found that small firms exhibit higher growth 
than medium and large firms when credit constraints are eased by the regulatory bodies 
through use of subsidized lending. A reduction in financing constraints by 1% is expected to 
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improve the growth of small firms by 4% and medium sized firms by 2%. Thus, state 
subsidies helped in softening the budget deficit by subsequently improving growth prospects. 
Zia (2008) studied the effect of the export finance scheme on textile firms in Pakistan 
using pre subsidy and post subsidy data of firms. The findings pointed out that ineligibility 
for subsidized export credit negatively affected the sales of small firms. On the contrary, 
Banerjee and Duflo (2014) analysed the effect of financial subsidy policy by the Indian 
government, on small, medium and large sized firms in the period 1996-2002. The findings 
show that bank loan percentage for small firms decreased from 11% to 7%, whereas it 
increased for medium sized firms from 4% to 11%. The policy was later changed because of 
failure to achieve the desired increase in financing for small firms. 
One of the reasons behind the mixed outcomes of subsidized financing has been the 
under-developed financial markets of developing countries. The financial institutions require 
high value collateral for granting loans, whereas the small firms extensively rely on 
intangible assets and this makes it difficult for them to secure loans, whereas medium and 
large size firms are in a relatively better position to secure loans in such circumstances due to 
possession of valuable physical assets. Moreover, large firms are well connected to 
administrative and political institutions and support any reform in the financial system that 
increases the fixed cost for firms and negatively affects the small firms‘ access to external 
finance (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Haber et al., 2003). The large firms are even 
against the reforms ensuring equal access to finance for all firms, because such reforms will 
diminish their competitive advantage over the small firms. The better access to finance 
improves the market since firms can compete on an equal footing.  
Therefore, rather than providing subsidies to small firms, the efforts should be 
directed towards improving the financial system of the country to improve the survival and 
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growth of small firms. The financial development of a country improves the ability of small 
firms to secure loans. Beck et al. (2005b) investigated the effect of developed financial 
institutions on the access to finance for small, medium and large firms. The findings show 
that small firms gain the most advantage from the development of financial markets. Beck et 
al. (2008) indicated that development in financial systems has a disproportionately positive 
effect on small firms with improvement in their performance being 43% with a 10% 
improvement in credit to private business. This study is, however, based on the data of 
developed countries only. 
It is the responsibility of institutions to reform the inefficient financial markets of 
LMICs. Due to inefficient financial institutions in LMICs, small firms have to excessively 
rely on internal financing, borrowing from friends and family, and private moneylenders 
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). The findings of studies by Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) 
and Ayyagari et al. (2008) as reported earlier, indicated that financial constraints inhibit the 
growth of small firms in developed countries but more so in developing countries. Also, the 
studies by Rand (2007) on Vietnam, Paulson and Townsend (2004) on Thailand and Banerjee 
and Duflo (2014) on India found severe financial constraints faced by SMEs. 
This constraining financial environment is destructive to the entrepreneurial activity. 
The limited access to finance is proving to be discouraging for not only the nascent 
entrepreneurs but also for the huge number of household businesses, which are often started 
in the face of necessity (Mazumdar and Sarkar, 2008). If these household businesses 
successfully expand they can significantly increase their productivity, and employ more 
skilled and trained labour from outside the family (Breman, 2010). However, the rate of 
transition from informal household business to a formal small and later large scale business is 
very low in developing countries, owing to the poor financial system. Therefore, it is of 
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significant importance that financial systems be improved to make the context supportive for 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
b) The Importance of Infrastructure in the Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 
There have been a number of studies indicating the multi-pronged effect of infrastructure 
quality on different economic aspects of a country (Escribano and Guasch, 2005; Guasch, 
2004; Reinikka and Svensson, 1999). Huge government investments and funding by aid 
agencies have been witnessed in recent decades for improvements in hard infrastructure 
including roads, ports and railways to reduce the logistics cost and improve connectivity. The 
World Bank in collaboration with the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and 
International Finance Corporation have spent more than US$50 billion in the past decade on 
the development of the transport sector, and this investment is close to 12% of its overall 
expenditure in this period (Sequeira, 2013). The poor quality of infrastructure—roads, 
railways, communications, information technology (IT), electricity, water and sanitation and 
trade services—negatively affects business by increasing the transaction costs and reducing 
the competitiveness of the products. It also limits the access of the people to the market and 
supply of products to the people in distant markets. 
However, the generalisability of the role of infrastructure in economic performance 
has been affected by ambiguous and sometimes contradictory results with little robustness. 
The reason behind these contradictory results has been endogeneity from three sources: 1) the 
use of proxies for infrastructure measurement; 2) omitted variables bias; there might be 
unobserved variables which are affecting the relationship between infrastructure and 
economic performance; and 3) the correlation between economic performance and 
infrastructure as improvement in economic conditions provides an opportunity for 
governments to increase spending on infrastructure.  
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Multiple studies have tried to resolve these methodological issues. Calderón and 
Servén (2004) have tried to control for endogeneity bias by using generalized method of 
moments (GMM) on panel data, and reported improved results. Fedderke et al. (2006) found 
that infrastructure investment and its outcomes happened simultaneously for South Africa. 
Fedderke and Bogetić (2009) controlled for endogeneity and undertook robustness analysis 
and found that infrastructure capital has a positive impact on the economic growth. 
More recently, studies have reported that the quality of infrastructure not only affects 
the overall economic performance of the country but also firm performance. The positive 
effects of access to means of transportation on trade and income generation are comparatively 
more significant for developing countries (Atkin and Donaldson, 2012; Sequeira, 2013). 
Studies on Brazil, Mexico and Chile have found that improvements in infrastructure can 
result in improved firm productivity and exports (Escribano et al., 2009). 
Mitra et al. (2002) used fixed effect regression models and found that government 
investment in infrastructure, including roads, railways and electricity has significantly 
positive effects on the total factor productivity (TFP) of all manufacturing firms of India, 
especially on those in food products, wood and furniture products and metal products. It has 
been estimated that an additional 10% investment in infrastructure is expected to improve 
TFP of Indian manufacturing firms in food products by 21%, metal products and parts by 
39% and wood and furniture firms by 43%. The study used macro level indicators for the 
measurement of different components of infrastructure e.g. per capita industrial electricity 
consumption, length of road networks. 
The study by Estache et al. (2005) used the World Bank indicators for the period of 
1976 to 2001 for 41 Sub-Saharan African countries to investigate the effect of infrastructure 
on economic growth. They used the data from different sources of the Private Sector 
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Development and Infrastructure Vice Presidency of the World Bank to develop measures of 
infrastructure. The findings showed that existing infrastructural facilities have a negative 
effect on the total factor productivity (TFP) of firms, although recent investments in 
electricity generation, the extension of road networks and water supply have significantly 
positive effects on economic growth. 
The LMICs lag far behind in all infrastructural facilities, which not only increases the 
cost of doing business but also negatively affects the competitiveness of firms. However, a 
number of studies have reported shortage of electricity and road/railway networks as the most 
significant issues affecting firm performance in LMICs. Fjose et al. (2010) found electricity 
to be the most significant obstacle in doing business, with more than 50% of businesses 
reporting it to be the most significant problem in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In a further study of African countries Escribano et al. (2010) also found that among 
infrastructure elements, electricity supply has a strong and statistically significant, negative, 
impact on firm performance. The contribution of electricity to average productivity of 
Zambia and Eritrea was found to be 68% and 49% respectively. Similarly, Moyo (2012) has 
found that power outages have negatively affected the productivity of Nigerian firms. It has 
been estimated that a 10% increase in hours of power outage is expected to reduce the 
productivity of all firms (small, medium and large) by 3.2%. The further analysis in this study 
compared small firms with large firms and found that a 10% increase in power outages 
duration (hours) is expected to reduce the productivity of small firms by 4%, whereas the 
effect is insignificant for large firms, probably due to their own power generation 
arrangements. 
Kirubi et al. (2009) reported that the availability of electricity can increase the output 
of carpenters and tailors of rural Kenya by 100-200%. However, the study was based on a 
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sample of only 12 carpenter shops and 5 tailor shops, which could lead to biased results. 
Grimm et al. (2012) collected data from the informal tailors of Burkina Faso to investigate 
the effect of electricity use on productivity. The findings of the study suggested that tailors 
using electricity have 51% higher revenues than those with no access to electricity. However, 
the findings of the study are limited to the effect of using electric machines for sewing. It 
does not explain the effect of improved access to electricity or power outages on the 
productivity of tailors already using electric sewing machines. 
The study by Scott et al. (2014) investigated the effect of electricity provision on TFP 
and per worker output for Bangladesh Nepal, Pakistan, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda by 
using the WBES database. The measure of the electricity infrastructure was the number of 
power outages in a month. The findings of the study show that power outages have 
statistically significant negative effects on the TFP of all the countries but the magnitude of 
this effect was highest for Uganda, Pakistan and Bangladesh. A 10% increase in power 
outages per month was expected to reduce the TFP of SMEs by 42%, 22% and 14%, 
respectively. Moreover, per worker output of SMEs was most significantly negatively 
affected in Nepal, Uganda and Bangladesh, where a 10% increase in the number of power 
outages per month was estimated to reduce output per worker by 28%, 13% and 9%, 
respectively. Thus, shortages of energy have a significantly negative effect on the 
performance of SMEs. It can be argued on the basis of these findings that improved 
infrastructural facilities reduce the logistics costs of business and allow businesses to invest 
in the latest machinery and advanced technology rather than investing in relatively 
unproductive assets like generators. 
However, it is difficult to establish causality between electricity supply and firm 
performance due to the effect of many exogenous factors. In a review article, Attigah and 
Mayer-Tasch (2013) concluded that the use of electricity will not automatically result in 
79 
 
improved performance. However, if the pre-conditions, like access to the markets and 
improved infrastructure are met, then it may deliver the intended outcomes. The study by 
Bernard (2010) on micro-enterprises has reported the effect of electrification to be small but 
significant. The study by Scott et al. (2014) as mentioned above, found the overall negative 
relationship between electricity shortages and firm performance in Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Nigeria, Nepal, Tanzania and Uganda. The manufacturing SMEs suffered significantly due to 
the poor energy situation in these regions. In contrast, the study of Senegal by Cissokho and 
Seck (2013) reported counter-intuitive results. They collected survey data from the firms 
regarding the scale efficiency and technical efficiency of the firms and power outages. Their 
findings show that performance of SMEs was significantly positively related with the power 
disruptions with a regression coefficient of β= .043. The authors argue that this situation 
could be the result of efficient resource management practices in the face of prevailing energy 
crises and the exit of non-competitive, inefficient firms from the market. However, the results 
could be different due to the use of different variables and measurement mechanisms. They 
constructed the measure of firm performance using a data envelopment approach on scale 
efficiency and technical efficiency.  
The railway network is another important element of infrastructure. It has been 
considered the safest and cheapest long distance goods transport source for businesses. 
However, the impact of access to railways on economic performance is not conclusive. 
Banerjee et al. (2012) have found in a study of Chinese firms that the effect of railways on 
growth has been significantly positive but the magnitude of this effect is very small. A 10% 
improvement in railway networks is expected to increase the firm performance by only 2%. 
On the other hand, Donaldson (2010) and Jedwab and Moradi (2013) found that railways 
have not only significantly decreased the logistics cost of trade, but have also improved trade 
between different states within India as well as Ghana. Similarly, Sequeira (2013) conducted 
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a study of the effect of access to railway transportation, as a measure of infrastructure, on 
firm performance in South Africa. She used a difference-in-difference modelling approach 
and found limited gains for the firms that had access to a railway. A 1% improvement in 
access to railways is expected to improve firm performance by 5%. 
The study by Escribano et al. (2010) on 26 counties in the African region used the 
Business Climate Survey database for the period of 1999-2005, and found that infrastructure 
problems including electricity and transportation are relatively important for firms in low 
income countries. In contrast, the firms in comparatively high income countries of the region 
are more severely affected by the customs and import and export problems. 
To the best of my knowledge, most of the studies to date have focused on the direct 
effect of infrastructure investments on the economic performance of a country. There are very 
few studies which investigate the relationship between infrastructure and firm performance. 
Theoretically speaking, the improved infrastructure will be beneficial for firms. It will reduce 
the logistics cost, increase access to markets, increase access to highly skilled labour in other 
locations and increase competition (Datta, 2012; Graham, 2007; Holl, 2006; Kremer et al., 
2013; Murphy et al., 1988). Thus, it can be concluded that infrastructure is likely to be a very 
important component of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Good quality infrastructure improves 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem and makes it attractive for not only the new entrepreneur and 
high growth firms, but also generates other externalities that are beneficial for the 
entrepreneurial activity. 
c) The Effect of Political Environment on Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 
Economists and political scientists consider political instability as a factor that severely 
hampers the economic growth of a country. It results in rapid change or even discontinuation 
of long-term macroeconomic policies, hence providing sub-optimal economic outcomes. The 
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uncertainty caused by political instability plays a crucial role in investment by the private 
business sector. In the face of political instability investors prefer short-term investments with 
quick and high profits because long-term investments have a high probability of being held 
hostage with the change in the ruling party. 
The findings of studies by Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Alesina et al. (1996) 
suggest that political instability negatively affects investment and hence decreases the share 
of investment in GDP. Alesina and Perotti (1996) used data on the socio-political instability 
of seventy countries for the period 1960-85 to investigate the effect of political instability on 
investment and ultimately income inequality. They found that Asia and Africa are the most 
politically unstable regions, whereas OECD member countries are politically the most stable 
economies. The regression estimates for the effect of political instability on investment in the 
private sector suggest that a 10% increase in socio-political instability of a country or region 
is expected to reduce investment in business activity by 45%.  
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) conducted a study on the Basque region to investigate 
the comparative economic growth of the region under terrorist activities and used a peaceful 
region as a control. The findings suggested that, as a result of increased terrorist activities, the 
excess return over the risk free rate of return was 13% lower than the control regions, which 
were unaffected by terrorist activities. 
Short-term speculative businesses dominate in countries exhibiting high levels of 
political instability through regime shifts. Business investors tend to decrease their fixed 
investments in machinery, equipment and land and prefer to keep their savings in some stable 
foreign currency, or in gold, for instance, which could retain its value (Aisen and Veiga, 
2013; De Haan, 2007; Feng, 2001). Therefore, high exit rates are expected in politically 
vulnerable conditions. Collier and Duponchel (2013) used an employer survey conducted by 
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the World Bank in 2007 to investigate the effect of conflict and violence on the survival rate 
of firms in Sierra Leone. The findings showed that conflict and violence has significantly 
negatively affected the region with a 53% exit rate of firms during the period of conflict. 
Camacho and Rodriguez (2013) studied the relationship between armed conflicts and 
firms‘ exit rate in Columbia. They obtained panel data of firms for the period 1993-2004 
from the census of Columbian manufacturing industries, and measured conflicts using the 
rate of terrorist attacks per 100,000 of civilian population. The results of a fixed effect 
regression model indicated that the productivity of manufacturing firms decreased by 3% due 
to these armed conflicts. Moreover, a 1% increase in the number of attacks is expected to 
increase the exit rate of manufacturing firms by 5.2%.  
Africa is rated as politically the most unstable region in the world. The political 
instability of the African region has proved to be a significant impediment to its economic 
growth (Jedwab and Moradi, 2013; Sequeira, 2013). The qualitative studies by Fosu (1992) 
and Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor (1996) have shown that political instability of the Sub-
Saharan region has resulted in diminishing investment and economic growth. However the 
increasing investment of Shell in Nigeria has presented a new puzzle for researchers, given 
that Nigeria has been described as a country most difficult to do business in due to high levels 
of political instability. The study by Frynas (1998) pointed out that the increase in investment 
by Shell has been based on three different firm specific aspects of political instability. Firstly, 
Nigeria has been the most profitable place for Shell with the first mover advantage and 
dominant market position. The political instability of Nigeria has discouraged other oil 
companies from investment which has indirectly helped Shell to maintain its position in the 
market. Secondly, Shell has well established structural ties with all the political parties of the 
region. Thirdly, the strategic approach of Shell makes it neutral to the political instability in 
the external business environment of Nigeria.  
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Political Instability directly affects savings and investment patterns of both 
individuals and businesses, which are determinants of sustainable economic growth. In times 
of unstable political conditions, individuals tend to reduce their savings because in this 
uncertain environment their savings can possibly lose value with a change in government. 
Thus, there will be a decrease in demand for investment and the supply of financial capital 
will fall. Moreover, businesses are expected to face a decrease in profitability. 
Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) have studied the effect of the ending of a civil war in 
Angola in 2002 on its diamond mining firms. The findings of the study indicated that during 
the conflict period the regression coefficient for market return was β= 0.004, whereas after 
the end of the war the regression coefficient for market return decreased to β= -0.003, which 
means that the end to conflict resulted in 1.75% decrease in market returns for the firms. The 
sample however, consisted of firms enjoying concessions from the Angolan government 
during the political instability, and an unstable law and order situation. Therefore, with the 
improvement in security conditions, the government removed that concession, which 
negatively affected the market returns, rather than these being a direct effect of political 
instability per se. It can further be argued that instability can be beneficial to some well-
connected firms. 
Besides affecting the overall economy of a country, political instability also poses 
serious threats to the performance of the private business sector. It not only significantly 
negatively affects the decisions about future investment in the private sector but also 
decreases the performance of existing firms. The growth in revenues, access to finance, 
technology adaptability, the skill set of the labour force and the productivity of firms is 
severely affected by activities related to political instability. 
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Cerra and Saxena (2008) investigated the effect of financial and political crises on the 
productivity of firms in 190 countries for the period 1960-2001. They measured political 
crises through civil war and quality of governance. The data were obtained from the World 
Bank Economic Indicators, Polity International and Correlates of Interstate War Data. Using 
a fixed effect regression model their results indicated that war decreased the productivity of 
firms by 6% but the firms were able to recover from that loss after four years. The analysis of 
a subset consisting of LMICs indicated that the productivity loss due to civil war was 5%, but 
the firms were able to recover only 1% with a 4% loss sustained after the end of civil war due 
to the poor quality of governance. 
Klapper et al. (2013) studied the effect of political instability on firms operating in 
Côte d'Ivoire in the period of 1998-2003. The data for the population of registered firms was 
obtained from the National Statistics Institute of Cote d'Ivoire, and armed conflict was 
measured using number of armed conflicts per 100,000 civilians. A fixed effect regression 
model by controlling for region, year and industry was used in this study. The findings show 
that political instability and unrest decreased the overall productivity of firms by 11% and the 
productivity decreased by a further 5%, if there were foreign employees in the firm. This 
political instability also significantly reduced the size of the market by 30%.  
The most threatening form of political instability is civil war and terrorist activities. 
Collier and Duponchel (2013) found that during times of conflict and violence in Sierra 
Leone the revenues of firms decreased by 6%. The persistent violence and conflicts also 
affected the skill development of the labour. The findings however, covered only those firms 
that survived the war. It is logical to expect that many firms would have left the market due to 
the war. Therefore, the absence of data on those firms can create potential bias in the results. 
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Petracco and Schweiger (2012) studied the effect of armed conflicts on firm 
performance in the face of conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008. The WBES data on 
firms for before and after the conflict period were used. The first round of the survey took 
place in 2008 and finished just a few days before Georgian troops were deployed to South 
Ossetia and Russia initiated bombardment on Tbilisi. The second round was started in 2009 
and the participating firms were then able to indicate the effect of conflict on their 
performance. A difference-in-difference model was used to analyse the effect of armed 
conflict on the firms‘ performance in the affected cities. The data were divided into different 
panels to separately test the effect on firms of different sizes and ages. The estimates 
suggested that sales of all firms decreased by at least $24,595 due to this conflict. The sales 
of large firms had the larger decrease, with a reduction of at least $1,530,169, whereas for 
SMEs the effect was insignificant. The conflict decreased the exports of young firms by at 
least $65,070. The sales growth of small and old firms was unaffected by the conflict. The 
effect of conflict significantly negatively reduced the employment growth of large firms by 
decreasing 2 employees per firm on average. Thus, it can be argued that medium and large 
sized young firms were most significantly affected by the political conflict. 
On the basis of the studies above it can be concluded that political conditions of a 
country play an important role in determining the nature and level of entrepreneurship. The 
studies on the impact of political instability on firm performance have in general found a 
negative effect on the productivity and growth with the exception of firms that have good 
political connections. Since SMEs are usually less politically connected, they are expected to 
face negative consequences rather than benefits.  
d) The Impact of Workforce Education on the Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 
The skill enhancement of the labour force has historically remained, and will continue to be, 
a central point in government policies across the globe. According to Neave (1989), after 
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World War II western governments invested heavily in education, on the assumption that it 
can significantly reduce social inequalities and improve economic performance. This thinking 
gave rise to the trend called the ―social paradigm of education‖. 
In early studies by Schultz (1961), Becker (1962) and Mincer (1962) the positive 
correlations between education and economic growth were demonstrated empirically. 
However, later studies by Arrow (1973) and Cain (1976) showed that this relationship was 
statistically insignificant, and in some instances improved human capital could lead to 
economic problems, such as a high percentage of educated but unemployed workers. 
Therefore, the level of government investment in education continues to remain 
controversial. 
Nevertheless, with the emergence of endogenous growth theory in the 1980s the 
importance of human capital as a determinant of economic growth was reaffirmed. This 
theory proposed an endogenous effect of education and technology on the productivity and 
performance of employees. Studies based on endogenous growth theory later empirically 
demonstrated a positive relationship between education and economic performance 
(Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Blundell et al., 1999). 
Early studies focused more on the macroeconomic effects of education. However, 
more recent ones have pointed out that education not only affects economic growth, but it is 
also positively associated with firm performance (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). It has 
also been argued that improvements in human capital can offset the competitive advantage 
gained through physical assets (Griffith et al., 2004; Youndt et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, institutional theorists have investigated the effect of education at the 
regional level, and they show that a more literate population is positively correlated with the 
level of entrepreneurship. Areas with high literacy rates have a higher proportion of their 
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labour force as entrepreneurs (Doms et al., 2010). In addition, educated entrepreneurs are 
more likely to survive, earn higher profits and succeed in competitive markets. Therefore 
education plays a significant role in entrepreneurial success.  
The study by Bosma et al. (2004) investigated the effect of investments in human 
capital on firm performance. They use longitudinal data for 1994 and 1997, based on a 
questionnaire completed by Dutch entrepreneurs. Firm performance was measured in terms 
of survival, profitability and employment growth, whereas human capital was measured in 
terms of education level. The findings of the study show that a higher level of education of 
entrepreneurs is expected to increase the profitability of firm by 2.5%. Moreover, for 
entrepreneurs with a higher level of education and greater experience in the industry, the 
chance of survival of the firm increases by 5%, profitability by 6.2% and employment growth 
by 4.9%.   
The studies focusing on the effect of the educational level of employees on firms 
adopted a resource based view of strategic management, which proposes that organizations 
are a mix of valuable resources (Barney, 1991). Among these bundles of resources, human 
capital is unique, valuable, scarce and non-substitutable, which helps organizations in 
retaining their competitive position (Lado and Wilson, 1994). The theory of human capital 
suggests that knowledge, skills and abilities possessed by individual employees are unique, 
scarce and have economic value for the organization (Tsang, 1987). The non-substitutability 
of these abilities and skills requires organizations to spend considerable resources on 
acquiring, development and retention of these human resources (Mahoney and Pandian, 
1992).  
Alvarez and Lopez (2005) analysed the effect of skilled labour on the possibility of 
SMEs to start exporting. They used the data of SMEs in manufacturing from the Annual 
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National Industrial Survey of Chile for the period 1990-96. The findings showed that an 
increase in labour skills has a statistically significant positive effect on the possibility of a 
firm to start exporting. A 10% increase in skill-level of the labour force is expected to 
increase chances of firms starting exporting by 27%. Moreover, the improvement in the skill-
level of the labour force has also a positive effect on the TFP of firms. 
Doms et al. (2010) used panel data for 4000 newly established US firms to investigate 
the impact of workforce education on the performance of entrepreneurial ventures started 
after 2004. The findings of the study showed that with the addition of one more graduate 
worker the revenues and profit of the firms increased by 5%, and an additional employee with 
a college degree resulted in a 4% increase in revenues and profit. Similarly adding an 
employee with a college degree, or a graduate, increased the chance of survival of the firm by 
20%. These findings also suggested that educated entrepreneurs prefer to start their business 
in metropolitan areas, with a higher percentage of skilled workers, and the rate of success of 
such entrepreneurs is higher than those starting a business in a region with low literacy levels. 
Technology has become more skill biased since the 1970s. Rapid technological 
developments, due to industrialization, have increased the demand for skilled workers (Falk 
and Seim, 2001). However, lack of skills to operate the technology has resulted in lower 
productivity of workers in developing countries, as compared to those in developed countries 
with better human capital (Goldin and Katz, 2009). Therefore, it is now more than ever 
important to start a business in areas of LMICs, with a readily accessible educated workforce. 
Hence, besides being educated themselves, entrepreneurs will benefit more if the local 
workforce is also skilled and educated. 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lal (2006) investigated the technology adoption of 
workforces of SMEs in Nigeria, Uganda and India. The findings of the study suggested that 
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informal and on the job self-learning of new technology was preferred by the workforce, 
however, formal training overseas has also a statistically significant positive effect on 
technology adoption of the workforce. Moreover, self-learning by searching from the internet 
is expected to increase the understanding of management information systems by 7%.  
The study by Banker et al. (2008) investigated the effect of workforce education on 
the profitability of firms in the IT sector of Taiwan. The findings showed that the level of 
education of a firm‘s employees and investment in R&D activities have significant positive 
effects on the profitability of IT firms. It was estimated that a 10% increase in the level of 
education of the workforce will improve the profitability by 10%, whereby a 10% increase in 
investment in R&D activities will result in a 4% increase in profitability. Moreover, the 
interaction effect between education and R&D investment indicated that firms investing in 
training and development of employees are 18% more profitable by taking advantage of their 
investment in R&D activities.   
Galindo-Rueda and Haskel (2005) combined data obtained from the Annual Business 
Inquiry and Employers Skill Survey for businesses in the UK to investigate the effect of 
education on the productivity of firms. The results showed that the addition of an employee 
with a graduate or high-vocational qualification is expected to improve the productivity of the 
firm by 3.1%, but this is especially beneficial for manufacturing firms, with an improvement 
in productivity being 6%. The further analysis revealed that individuals with these 
qualifications and working in the services industry earn 6.2% more than equally qualified 
individuals working in the manufacturing industry. The study further argued that education 
level of the workforce has directly benefited both workers and the organizations, and 
indirectly it improves the regional development prospects. 
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The workers acquire skills through training and education which increases their wages 
and improves productivity of the organization. The interaction of educated workers, 
competitors and customers raises the level of competition among organizations of that area. 
In addition, it also increases the organization‘s technology adaptability. On the other hand, 
the higher ratio of educated workforce in a region increases the chance and frequency of 
knowledge spillovers. Such externalities play a significant role in individual and social 
wellbeing and improve organizational performance. Thus, level of education of a region plays 
a significant role in providing a supportive environment to entrepreneurs for their survival 
and growth. In developing countries, there is a dire need of human capital development, 
especially in areas with fewer educational opportunities to avoid saturation in already 
developed areas. 
e) The Role of Competition with the Informal Sector in the Entrepreneurial 
Ecosystems 
In the literature, formal and informal businesses have been defined in multiple ways and the 
debate is yet not concluded. However, the most common component of all the definitions of 
informal businesses is that they are non-registered. Therefore, only registered firms are 
considered as formal businesses and non-registered ones are considered as informal in this 
study. 
Moreover, it is very difficult to obtain representative samples of data for the informal 
economy. For example, in a recent effort to collect data about the number of enterprises in 
132 countries, only 16 countries were able to share estimates about the informal economy and 
accuracy of data is doubted by the researchers (Kushnir et al., 2010). Moreover, the 
differences in the definition of the informal economy make it extremely difficult to include 
the informal sector in any analysis. Nevertheless, the considerable employment contributions 
of the informal sector in many countries cannot be ignored e.g. in India there are 26 million 
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informal micro SMEs  (MSMEs) as compared to 1.6 million registered ones (Kushnir et al., 
2010). Hemmer and Mannel (1989) found that informal businesses trained more individuals 
than the apprenticeship schemes of the government and formal education system in 
developing countries. 
Some neutral observers have assessed the value of the global informal economy to be 
more than $9 trillion, and around 4 billion people are associated with it. In some countries the 
informal economy is as large as 70% of GDP e.g. Nigeria, Egypt and Thailand (Schneider, 
2005), while in some others it is more than 50% of GDP e.g. Mexico (Eilat and Zinnes, 
2002). The most frustrating fact is that, despite rigorous reforms in the business environment 
across the globe, the informal economy is growing every year (Loayza and Rigolini, 2006; 
Schneider, 2005). This has not only affected states‘ abilities to control poverty and 
unemployment but also tax revenues are lost, which has then impinged on the provision of 
services to the general public. The findings of a study by Besley and Persson (2014) suggest 
that high income countries have 17.4 percentage point higher share of tax in their GDP in 
comparison to low income countries. 
The losses in revenues have forced the number of LMICs to depend on loan and aid 
provided by development agencies despite having made commendable efforts to improve 
their business environment in the last decades. They have introduced a number of reforms in 
this regard. However, they have yet to resolve several daunting challenges, with formalizing 
the informal economy being the most important among them. The majority of micro-level 
businesses in these countries are reluctant to formally register themselves as a business entity 
or a tax payer, and prefer to operate in the informal economy. However, firms operating in 
the informal economy remain unable to achieve their maximum economic potential because 
they cannot use legal, financial and marketing benefits offered by the formal economic 
system (Zinnes, 2009).  
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The study by Williams et al. (2017) investigated the impact of experience of firms in 
the informal economy on their performance after registration. The firm level data for 127 
developing countries were obtained from the WBES. The findings showed that sales growth 
of registered firms which started as unregistered was 14.5% higher than those that had started 
upfront as registered firms. Moreover, the employment growth of these firms was 31.6% 
higher than firms that had started out as a registered business. 
In a similar study on Turkish firms by Williams and Kedir (2017b), the findings 
suggested that formal businesses with experience of the informal economy had 13% higher 
sales growth as compared to formal businesses with no experience of being informal. Thus, 
experience of the firm in the informal economy in the beginning of a business contributed 
positively to performance as a formally registered business. 
Also, the existence of a large informal economy encourages new entrants to stay 
outside of the regulations of government, which hinders the ability of the government to 
shape a macroeconomic environment through policy reforms. As reported by Maloney 
(2004), the informal economy of newly industrialized countries is an entry point for unskilled 
youths who can establish informal small businesses. However, policies should be aimed at 
getting these informal firms into the formal economy after learning in the early years, 
otherwise they cannot grow. 
The study by McCann and Bahl (2017) analysed the effect of competition with the 
informal sector on the new product development by registered firms. The data of 30 East 
European and Central Asian countries from the BEEP survey by the World Bank was used 
for analysis. The findings suggest that a 1% increase in competition with the informal sector 




Figure 2.9 describes the typology and kinds of businesses based on the degree of 
informality (see Djankov et al., 2002b). According to this model, the business owners in the 
subsistence enterprise group usually lack skills, education and capital, therefore, there are 
slim chances of their growth. This raises very important policy questions for the regulators of 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem; can this group of business owners be ignored or can special 
policies be introduced to bring them into the formal network? 
 
Figure 2. 9: Typology of the degree of enterprise informality 
 
Source: Adopted from Djankov et al. (2002b:p.4) 
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The structural holes in the institutions allow registered large firms to hide a proportion 
of their sales and mis-report the size of their permanent workforce. These irregularities can be 
countered through neutral external auditing processes. The middle group consists of SME 
owners who are more educated and skilled than subsistence enterprise owners. This group of 
business owners consist of contractors, small manufacturers to whom large firms outsource 
their activities. This group of entrepreneurs has maximum potential compared to the rest of 
the firms in the informal economy.  
The decision-making regarding the choice between the formal or informal business 
options is affected by three things. Firstly, the presupposition that being formal is an option 
indicates the weakness of the legal framework conditions of the business environment of the 
country. Secondly, the quality of information possessed by the decision makers affects the 
choice they make. In regions where information about registration requirements is not 
properly advertised and entrepreneurs mostly depend on hearsay information, the decision to 
be formal or not will be biased. Thirdly, the decision to formalize depends heavily on the 
household structure of the entrepreneurs because usually it is a mix of agents from business 
and family that makes this decision.  
A study of Nicaragua by Sutter et al. (2017) used the data of 1800 dairy farmers, who 
had transitioned from informal businesses to formal registration. The findings of the study 
suggested that successful transition depends on the facilitation of the formal institutions 
responsible for registration. These institutions should play a facilitative role to attract 
entrepreneurs from the informal economy. However, this change in the approach can happen 
only through reforms in entry regulations. 
There are a number of implicit costs of formalization, however, the explicit cost of 
registration include taxes, labour market regulations and production and product regulations. 
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Also, there are costs of specific licenses and permits imposed by the sub-national 
governments. Most of these registration costs are fixed and more taxing for small firms as 
compared to large ones. Therefore, most of the small enterprises intentionally underperform 
to remain undetected by the inspection teams and tax collectors.  
The benefits of formally registering a business and following regulations include 
improved access to external financing, protection of ownership and property rights and access 
to markets and services. The tax rebates and government subsidized funding for small 
businesses usually require them to be registered. Also, more relaxed financial terms and 
conditions are offered by the banks to facilitate registered SMEs (Zinnes, 2009). Therefore, 
instead of relying only on family and friends for investment in business, the formalization can 
expand their financing opportunities. Training and business development programs funded by 
governments, development agencies and international donors are also targeted at registered 
businesses. Registered firms enjoy security of their property rights, which enables them to 
protect their trademarks, licenses and contracts, and helps them in dispute resolution through 
a judicial system within country. 
Nevertheless, the formal business sector presents important benefits to both society 
and enterprises. The taxes and fees paid by firms in the formal economy to the local 
government and national authorities can be used for development purposes. On the other 
hand, as mentioned, formally registered firms have better access to finance, import/export 
markets and legal protection. Therefore, cost-benefit analysis to aid decision-making enables 
policy makers to highlight those features of formalization that can play a significant role in 
motivating business owners towards formal registration. The entrepreneurial ecosystem 
reforms should be aimed at reducing the costs associated with the registration of a business 
and also other further compliance of government regulations. The benefits of business 
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registration should be increased through protection of property rights, access to finance, legal 
protection and dispute resolution. 
2.4 Summary of Literature Review 
The literature related to performance of SMEs and the entrepreneurial ecosystem and its 
components has been reviewed in this chapter. The findings of the literature review are 
summarized below: 
 The definition of SMEs by the WBES has been adopted in this study—firms with 5-
19 employees are defined as small firms and firms with 20-99 employees are 
considered as medium sized firms. 
 The growth of SMEs is dependent on both internal (resource based view) and external 
factors (institutional theory). This study follows the most recent approach by 
analysing the firm performance from external environment perspective called the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem approach. 
 There are different measures of firm performance including profitability, efficiency 
and growth. However, the growth dimension is most relevant to the research based on 
the effect of the external environment on firm performance. The growth dimensions 
including annual sales growth, annual employment growth and annual labour 
productivity growth have been used in this study to measure firm performance. 
 The entrepreneurial ecosystem is an environment in which entrepreneurship takes 
place and its individual and interdependent factors enable or constrain the 
entrepreneurial activity. This approach draws from entrepreneurship theory, 
institutional theory, innovation systems theory, industrial clusters and districts and 
regional economic geography.  
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 According to institutional theory, institutions (formal and informal) decide the rules of 
the game and make the environment constraining or conducive for the entrepreneurs. 
The role of institutional framework conditions in an entrepreneurial ecosystem is 
assessed through government regulations, taxation system and corruption. 
 Physical conditions are the backbone for the success of any entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. The effect of physical conditions is examined using access to finance, 
infrastructure, political stability, informal sector and workforce education. 
 The interaction and interdependence of components of institutional framework 
conditions and physical conditions make the entrepreneurial ecosystem. The 
entrepreneurial ecosystem can vary across time and space, therefore, bottom-up 
approach suggested by Daniel Isenberg is most appropriate for assessment and 
improvement in existing entrepreneurial ecosystems.  
 The local entrepreneurial ecosystem is not just meant for local interactions; rather its 
interconnectivity with other regional and national entrepreneurial ecosystems is 
essential for promoting it. Thus, the success of the entrepreneurial ecosystem 
approach relies heavily on how governance structures allow the flexible 
recombination of the already existing resources for promoting entrepreneurship. 
 The entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs is different from that of developed 
countries. The physical conditions and institutions of LMICs are under-developed, 
and inefficient, thus present different sets of challenges and opportunities for 
entrepreneurs and policy makers.  
 The effect of the entrepreneurial ecosystem is different for firms of different size and 
age. A component of the entrepreneurial ecosystem significantly affecting 
performance of young firms can be insignificant for older firms due to their 
adaptability to the system and vice versa. Therefore, firm size and age are important 
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determinants for analysing difference of effect of the components of an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
 The existing studies have methodological as well as measurement problems. The 
aggregate measures and proxies have been used to measure the components of an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem which cannot truly reflect the problems faced by firms, 
especially SMEs. In this study responses of owners/managers of SMEs have been 
used, which is methodologically more appropriate than country level aggregate 
measures.  
 Most of the studies have followed a linear approach to measure entrepreneurial 
ecosystems and ignored the systematic, interactive and interdependent nature of 
relationship of these components. Therefore, future research should be aimed at 






Table 2. 1: Literature Reviewed on Entrepreneurial Ecosystem and its Components 
Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 





Data Methodology Findings 













Institutional change in Ukraine resulted 
in institutional deficiencies and 
triggered new opportunities for small 
firms in the emerging business services 
sector.  




Institutions  Existing studies 
and examples from 
history 
Concept paper Entrepreneurial response to the 
institutions could be abide, evade, or 
alter. Like business entrepreneurship, 
innovative political activity may be 
productive or unproductive, depending 
on the incentives facing entrepreneurs. 




Institutions Earlier studies Conceptual 
Analysis 
Emerging market and transition 
economies have uncertain, ambiguous 
and turbulent institutional framework. 
Institutions not only influence 
entrepreneurs but entrepreneurs may 
also influence institutional 
development by contributing to 
institutional change. 









Conceptual paper The development of entrepreneurship 
as a systematic phenomenon is 
discussed and its theoretical link with 
regional economics and national 
systems of innovation is explained. The 
computation of GEDI has been used to 
account for interactive effects of 
components of a national system of 
entrepreneurship. The quality of 









 Interviews and 
survey of 
entrepreneurs in  
150 metropolitan 
areas in the US  
Factor analysis, 
multiple regression 
The Stangler and Bell-Masterson 
model is used to measure the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. The 
estimations are used to measure the 
health of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. The effects of individual 
components show the bottlenecks in 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem. It is 
important to understand the health of 
an existing entrepreneurial ecosystem 
before introducing any reforms, 
however, data limitations affect the 
measurement of systematic nature of 
effect of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
6 2016 Isenberg Entrepreneurial 
Ecosystem 
 Analysis of 
literature 
Concept paper There have been five mistakes in the 
definition of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem using the ecosystem 
metaphor. These mistakes include the 
creation mistake, the centralized 
control mistake, the geography 
mistake, the intention mistake, and the 
entrepreneur-centrality mistake. The 
concept of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem should therefore be further 
empirically tested. 




 Existing research Review of existing 
literature 
The findings based on a review of 
existing literature on the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem suggested 
that the concept is still in the 
developing phase. The analytical 
framework is not yet clear and theories 
including network theory can further 
explain the interdependence of 
different components of entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. 





 Existing research Critical 
review and 
conceptualisation 
of the ecosystems 
concept 
The entrepreneurial ecosystems vary 
across time and space and need 
evaluation of local conditions for 
developing bespoke policy 
interventions by governments. 
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The cultural, social and material 
attributes of different regions affect the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems, which can 
then significantly affect the entry and 
exit rate of the firms in a specific 
region. The need for further research in 
different regions has been stressed for 
further explanation of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem and its 
outcomes. 




 Data on 
components of an 
entrepreneurial 
ecosystem of  









to estimate its 
effect on high 
growth firms 
Data on indicators of framework 
conditions and systematic conditions is 
used to develop an additive index for 
measurement of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem of provinces in the 
Netherlands. A feedback loop 
mechanism is introduced to indicate 
how entrepreneurs can feed into the 
system. The measurement is linear in 
nature and ignores the weighted effect 
of different components, and their 
interactions. 
Firm Performance 





Data Methodology Findings 
        
1 1993 Cooper Predictors of 
entrepreneurial 
performance  
 Survey of earlier 
research 
Critical evaluation More theory driven empirical research 
required. Research on the effect of 
external factors needs to be carried out 
& more variety in methodologies is 
needed to better understand this field. 
2 1996 Murphy, 
Trailer & Hill 
Performance 
measurement 
 Survey of existing 
studies 
Factor Analysis The performance dimensions should be 
carefully chosen. It is possible that an 
independent variable is strongly related 
to one dimension while insignificant 
for others. 





Size of SME 
sector 
SME250 (an 





The contribution of SMEs in high 
income countries is 57.24% and in low 
income countries it is 17.56%. The 





SME data from 
different sources 
for different 
countries for any 
time period after 
1990s. 
income countries whereas for low 
income countries it is 15.56%. 
SME250 means the share of the SME 
sector in the total formal labour force 
in manufacturing when 250 is taken as 
a cut-off point for the number of 
employees in the definition of a SME. 
4 2005 Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt 
& Levine 
Poverty, GDP Size of SME 
sector 
Sample of 45 
countries from 
SME250 database 
for the period 
1990-2000 
OLS Regression  In OLS regression the effect of the 
SME sector on GDP was significantly 
positive (β= 2.197 p-value.000) but not 
robust because when the instrumental 
variable was added the effect becomes 
insignificant. There is no evidence 
found for the role of SMEs in poverty 
alleviation. 
5 2013 Haltiwanger, 
Jarmin & 
Miranda 












The findings suggested a negative 
relationship between firm size and 
employment growth. However, when 
controlled for age, then no systematic 
relationship has been found. 






Firm size and 
age 
 
WBES database OLS Regression Small firms (<20 employees) have the 
smallest share of aggregate 
employment, the SME sector‘s (<100 
employees) contribution is comparable 
to that of large firms. Small firms have 
the largest shares of job creation and 
highest sales growth and employment 
growth, even after controlling for firm 
age. Large firms, however, have higher 
productivity growth. Conditional on 
size, young firms are the fastest 
growing, and large mature firms have 
the largest employment shares but 







Impact of Government Regulations on Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 





Data Methodology Findings 
1 1997 Frye & Shleifer Entrepreneurship Legal and 
regulatory 
environment 
Survey of 105 
small shops 
owners/managers 






Neither government is an ideal type, 
the evidence points to the relatively 
greater relevance of the invisible-hand 
model to describe Poland and of the 
grabbing-hand model to describe 
Russia. The law-enforcement and 
regulatory evidence in particular shows 
that Polish local governments are more 
supportive of business. 













and cost of start-up 
in country‘s largest 





agencies such as 
the World Bank, 
USAID and 
government web 
pages on the 
internet. 
OLS regression Countries with heavier regulation of 
entry have higher corruption and larger 
unofficial economies, but not better 
quality of public or private goods. 
Countries with more democratic and 
limited government interventions have 
lighter regulation for entry. Entry 
regulations benefit politicians and 
bureaucrats. 
3 2006 Klappera, 
Laevena  & 
Rajan 
Entry rate, size 




Djankov et al 
(2002) data and 
2001 edition of 
Amadeus database 





Costly regulations hamper the creation 
of new firms and cause incumbent 
firms in naturally high-entry industries 
to grow more slowly 
4 2007 Ayyagari, Beck 
& Demirguc-
Kunt 










Survey by World 
Bank and SME250 
database developed 





Variation in entry costs explains 
variation of 51.7% and credit 
information sharing explains 32% (p-
value .000) of the variation in SME250, 
whereas contract enforcement costs and 







Kunt, 2003 insignificant effect. 

















The condition of minimum capital 
required to start a business lowers the 
entrepreneurship rates across countries, 
as do labour market regulations. 
However the administrative 
considerations of starting a business—
such as the time, the cost, or the 
number of procedures required—are 
unrelated to the formation rate of either 
nascent or young businesses. 
















The administrative entry cost can 
explain around one third of TFP 
differences. The productivity difference 
arises because entry costs reduce 
competition and the incentive to adopt 
more advanced technologies. The 
effects of entry costs are even larger 
when the labour market is not 
competitive. 





growth in firms 
Business 
environment 
WBES OLS Regression  The coefficients on firm size categories 
indicate that employment growth 
declines monotonically with firm size. 
There is a positive effect of increased 
access to finance on the employment 
growth of medium and large firms and 
no significant effect among micro and 
small enterprises. Business regulations 
do not appear to affect the growth of 
larger firms. Corruption has adverse 
effects on medium-sized firms. 
Infrastructure bottlenecks negatively 
affect the growth of medium and large 
firms but positively affect the growth 
of small firms. 










Corporate entities reduce the number of 
establishments per state and the 










capital per plant when state tax rates 
increase, and around half of these 
responses are due to reallocation of 
business activity to lower-tax states. 
9 2015 De Jong & Van 
Witteloostuijn 
Firm performance Regulatory red 
tape 
survey data of 530 




Regulation cost, inconsistency and 
change limits sales turnover growth 
and regulation changes hamper market 
competition performance. 
Impact of Tax Rate and Administration on Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 





Data Methodology Findings 
1 2006 Hajkova, 
Nicoletti, 
Vartia & Yoo 




tax rate and the 
average effective 
tax rate (AETR) as 






Focusing only on taxation in home and 
host countries and omitting other 
policies or diversion effects leads to a 
serious overestimation of tax elasticity 
and its relevance for policy. The effects 
of taxation on FDI are quantitatively 
much less relevant than the effects of 
other policies that contribute to make a 
location attractive to international 
investors, such as openness, labour 
costs and regulatory hurdles. 








WBES of 102 
developing 
countries for the 
period 2000-2006 
OLS Regression Micro and small firms have less access 
to formal finance, pay more in bribes 
than do the larger firms and face 
greater interruptions in infrastructure 
services. Larger firms spend 
significantly more time in dealing with 
officials and red tape. Restricted access 
to finance and burdensome business 
regulations reduce the employment 
growth of all firms, particularly micro 
and small firms. Corruption and poor 
infrastructure reduces employment 
growth by affecting the growth of 
medium sized and large firms. 
3 2010 Johansson, 
Heady, Arnold, 
Brys & Vartia 
Firm performance Tax structure  Fixed effect 
regression 
Corporate taxes are found to be most 
harmful for growth, followed by 
personal income taxes and then 
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consumption taxes. Recurrent taxes on 
immovable property appear to be the 
best for growth. Practical tax reforms 
require a balance between the aims of 
growth, equity, simplicity and revenue. 
4 2010 Kushnir, 
Mirmulstein & 
Ramalho 





Graphs and tables 
of descriptive 
statistics 
Electricity and access to finance are the 
two most-cited obstacles by businesses 
in developing countries. In addition, 
Competition from the informal sector 
and corruption among government 
officials has also been reported as 
significant challenges for firms. 
5 2011 Da Rin, Di 
Giacomo & 
Sembenelli 







Executive by Ernst 








Corporate income tax has a significant 
negative effect on entry rates. The 
effect is concave and suggests that tax 
reductions affect entry rates only below 
a certain threshold tax level. 




Taxes and tax 
administrative 
burdens 
World Bank Group 
Entrepreneurship 
Snapshots and 





with time effects 
and Fixed effects 
model with year 
effects 
The tax administration burden imposes 
a significant cost for new firms and 
reduces the rate at which new firms are 
formed. The elasticity of the tax 
administrative burden with respect to 
the entry rate is approximately −0.3. 
7 2014 Reynolds & 
Rohlin 







Zone Program for 
1990 and 2000 





Tax incentives offered by the program 
notably enhance the quality of the 
business environment for firms in the 
area while modestly improving the 
quality of life for the individuals living 
there. 
Impact of Control over Corruption on Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 





Data Methodology Findings 








Critical analysis of 
official documents 
Political instability does not hinder 
Shell from operating in Nigeria due to 
higher profits, dominance in market 
and first mover advantage. Also Shell 
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is interconnected with state structures 
in Nigeria. 




Corruption Existing literature Conceptual 
analysis of 
corruption 
The structure of government 
institutions and the political process is 
an important determinant of the level of 
corruption. Weak governments that do 
not control their agencies experience 
very high corruption levels. The 
illegality of corruption and the need for 
secrecy make it much more costly than 
its sister activity, taxation. Defence and 
infrastructure offer better opportunities 
for secret corruption. 
3 2003 Svensson Firm level 
outcomes 
Bribe payment 









Firms‘ ability to pay and firms‘ refusal 
power can explain a large part of the 
variation in bribes across graft-
reporting firms. The results suggest that 
public officials act as price (bribe) 
discriminators and prices of public 
services are partly determined in order 
to extract bribes. 
4 2004 Clarke & Xu Corruption in 
industry 
Characteristics 



















Bribe takers are more likely to take 
bribes in countries with greater 
constraints on utility capacity, lower 
levels of competition in the utility 
sector, and where utilities are state-
owned. Bribe paying enterprises are 
more likely to pay bribes when they are 
more profitable and have greater 
overdue payment to utilities. 
5 2007 Fisman & 
Svensson 








averages used to 
avoid endogeneity 
 
A 1% increase in the bribery rate is 
associated with a reduction in firm 
growth by 3%. The effect is about three 
times greater than that of taxation. 




 Existing measures 




Critical analysis of 
measures of 
corruption  
The state capture and administrative 
corruption are different. Single source 
and single dimension indexes should be 
used as different sources to define and 
measure corruption differently 
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BEEPS,  therefore aggregating from different 
sources is methodologically incorrect.  









African firms are three times as likely 
to be asked for bribes as are firms in 
Latin America. Graft is more prevalent 
in countries with excessive regulations 
and where democracy is weak. The 
incidence of graft in Africa would fall 
by approximately 85%if countries in 
the region had levels of democracy and 
regulation similar to those that exist in 
Latin America. 










OLS Regression Asian firms are more likely to bribe 
when faced with fierce market 
competition, corrupt court systems, 
convoluted licensing requirements, 
burdensome regulations, inefficient 
government service delivery and high 
taxes. 
9 2010 De Rosa, 
Gooroochurn & 
Görg 
Productivity Corruption  EBRD and BEEPS 
for Central and 







Bribing does not emerge as a second 
best option to achieve higher 
productivity by helping circumvent 
cumbersome bureaucratic 
requirements. The bribe tax is more 
harmful in non-EU countries. In 
countries where corruption is more 
prevalent and the legal framework is 
weaker, bribery is more harmful for 
firm-level productivity. 

















Domestic and foreign-owned private 
firms are more involved in both 
informal payments and state capture. 
Foreign-owned firms benefit more 
from corrupt practices as compared to 
domestic ones. State-owned firms 
experience the negative effects of 





Impact of Access to Finance on Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 





Data Methodology Findings 
1 2002 Becchetti & 
Trovato 




database sample of 




OLS Regression  Growth is significantly affected not 
only by firm size and age, but also by 
state subsidies, export capacity and 
credit rationing. Small surviving firms 
have higher than average growth 
potential. This potential is constrained 
by the non-availability of favourable 
external finance and lack of access to 
foreign markets. 
2 2002 Carpenter & 
Petersen 
Firm growth Internal finance Panel from the 
annual Compustat 






The growth of most small firms is 
constrained by internal finance, 
together with a small leverage effect. In 
contrast, the small fraction of firms 
making heavy use of new share issues 
exhibit growth rates far above what can 
be supported by internal finance. 
3 2005 Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt 
& Maksimovic 
Firm growth Access to 
finance, legal 
constraints, 
corruption,  and 
the role of firm 
size 
WBES OLS Regression  Financial and institutional development 
weakens the constraining effects of 
financial, legal and corruption 
obstacles and small firms benefit the 
most. The effect of perception about 
courts on the firm growth is weak. 
4 2006 Beck & 
Demirguc-Kunt 




on access to 
finance and firm 
growth 
Content analysis Specific financing tools such as leasing 
and factoring are useful in facilitating 
greater access to finance even in the 
absence of well-developed institutions. 
A similar role is played by the system 
of credit information sharing and a 
more competitive banking structure 




Firm Growth  Firm size, 
financial 
development 
U.S. Census of 
firms 
OLS Regression  The distributional effect of financial 
development exerts a 
disproportionately positive effect on 
small firms.  
6 2008 Musso & 
Schiavo 










In the short run, the financial 
constraints are positively related to the 




firms from EAE 
survey and the 
DIANE database 
long run access to finance has a 
negative effect on the sales, capital 
stock and employment growth of firms. 
7 2008 Ayyagari, 
Demirguc-Kunt 
& Maksimovic 
Firm growth Financing 
constraints 







Financial constraints significantly 
negatively affect the growth of firms 
and results are robust. Therefore, 
financial sector reforms should be the 
priority. The relaxed financing 
constraints are likely to be the most 
effective route to promote firm growth. 
8 2008 Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt 
& Maksimovic 
Financing in large 




WBES Fixed effect 
interval regression 
model 
Small firms and firms in countries with 
poor institutions use less external 
finance, especially bank finance. 
Protection of property rights increases 
external financing of small firms 
significantly more than that of large 
firms, mainly due to its effect on bank 
finance. Larger firms more easily 
expand external financing when they 
are constrained than small firms. 
9 2015 Ferrando & 
Martinez-
Carrascal 
Firm growth Financing 
obstacles 
Euro Area firms 
from WBES 1999-
2000 and balance 
sheet data from 
AMADEUS 








Being young increases the probability 
of facing a financial obstacle by 16%, 
while being small increases it by about 
13%. Therefore reforms should focus 
on facilitating access to finance for 
small young firms. There is also 
sectoral divergence, with firms in the 
construction sector being more affected 
by these obstacles. 
10 2016 Cowling, Liu & 
Zhang 






conducted in UK 
by BDRC 
Continental 
Probit regression Female entrepreneurs are less likely to 
apply for bank financing as compared 
to their male counterparts. The older 
firms with financial delinquency are 
denied credit more often. The credit 
provision to small firms has improved 





Impact of Infrastructure on Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 





Data Methodology Findings 




Existing literature Critical review of 
literature 
Transport improvements can provide 
opportunities for logistic 
reorganization, market expansion and 











countries from the 
WBES 
OLS Regression Employment growth is relatively 
concentrated in the smallest firms, with 
medium and large firms growing less 
rapidly. Unreliable infrastructure not 
only lowers the growth of large firms, 
it encourages the growth of micro-
firms in Africa. Improved access to 
finance and public services is less 
beneficial in Africa, particular for 
micro-firms. 
3 2008 Busse & 
Groizard 








The more regulated economies are less 
able to take advantage of the presence 
of multinational companies. Any 
attempts by government to attract 
capital in the form of FDI by offering 
special tax breaks are not likely to yield 
the expected beneficial effects if the 
regulatory quality is low. 
4 2009 Escribano, 









Infrastructure quality has a low impact 
on TFP in high income African 
countries and a highly negative impact 
in low income countries. Poor‐quality 
electricity provision affects mainly 
poor countries, whereas the problem of 
dealing with customs while importing 
or exporting affects mainly 
faster‐growing countries. 
5 2012 Datta Firm performance Access to 
Highway 
WBES for India Difference-in-
difference 
estimation 
Firms in cities affected by the Golden 
Quadrilateral highway project reduced 
their average stock of input inventories 
by between 6 and 12 days‘ worth of 
production. Firms in cities where road 
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quality did not improve showed no 
significant changes. Firms on the 
improved highways reported decreased 
transportation obstacles to production, 
while firms in control cities reported no 
such change. 
6 2012 Moyo Firm Productivity  Power cuts World Bank‘s 
Investment Climate 
Survey 
OLS and Tobit 
regression models 
Power outages have negative and 
significant effects on productivity of 
firms, particularly small firms. 
7 2012 Grimm, 
Hartwig & Lay 
Performance of 




Micro dataset of 





Access to different infrastructure 
services has no significant effect on 
firm performance when all sectors were 
kept in the model. However, a 
homogenous sample of tailors indicated 
a positive effect of access to electricity 
on performance. 
8 2012 Banerjee, Duflo 
& Qian 











Proximity to transportation networks 
have a moderate positive causal effect 
on per capita GDP levels across 
sectors, but no effect on per capita 
GDP growth. The results are consistent 
with factor mobility playing an 
important role in determining the 
economic benefits of infrastructure 
development. 
9 2013 Sequeira Firm performance Access to a 
railway 
Survey data of  900 




In the short run, limited firm-level 
gains from access to the railway have 
been found. Extending the analysis to a 
longitudinal study remains an 
important area of future research. 
10 2014 Scott, Darko, 














OLS regression The impact of electricity insecurity on 
SMEs can be mitigated by ensuring 
that outages are planned and by 
facilitating access to alternative 
supplies of electricity, including 






Impact of Political Instability on Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 





Data Methodology Findings 















OLS Regression  Political freedom promotes private 
investment, through the channel of 
improving human capital formation. 
Political instability has a negative 
effect and policy uncertainty adversely 
affects private investment. 
2 2007 De Haan Economic growth Political 
institutions 




Critical review of 
literature 
The outcomes are sensitive to model 
specification, sample heterogeneity, 
measurement of political variables and 
the treatment of the time dimension. 









from Lexis- Nexis 
and several Web 
sources 
Augmented market 
model, event study 
approach 
The findings show that the end of the 
conflict, as represented by the death of 
the rebel leader and by the official 
cease-fire, decreased the abnormal 
stock returns for mining companies 
holding concessions in the country. 
This effect is sizeable and statistically 
significant. The firms benefited from 
instability created by the civil war 
which constituted barrier to entry and 
reduced the bargaining power of 
government. 
4 2012 Petracco & 
Schweiger 
Firm performance Armed conflict BEEPS Difference-in-
differences 
estimation 
Armed conflicts had a significant and 
negative impact on exports, sales and 
employment. Young firms experienced 
a scarring effect, which could lead 
them to closing down prematurely 
5 2013 Camacho & 
Rodriguez 








One SD increase in the number of 
guerrilla and paramilitary attacks in a 
municipality increases the probability 
of plant exit by 5.5%. This effect is 
stronger for younger manufacturing 
plants, with a smaller number of 
workers and low levels of capital. 
6 2013 Aisen & Veiga Economic growth Political Penn World Table System-GMM Political instability adversely affects 
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instability Version 6.2, World 
Development 
Indicators, Polity 
IV Database and 
State Failure Task 
Force database 
estimator the growth by lowering the rates of 
productivity growth and, to a smaller 
degree, physical and human capital 
accumulation. 
7 2013 Klapper, 
Richmond & 
Tran 
Firm performance Civil conflict Census of all 
registered firms in 
Côte d'Ivoire for 
the years 1998–
2003 
Year, industry and 
firm size fixed 
effect regression 
model 
The conflict led to an average 16–23% 
drop in the firm TFP and the decline is 
5–10%larger for firms that are owned 
by or employing foreigners. Therefore, 
the firms have responded by hiring 
fewer foreign workers. 
Impact of Workforce Education on Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 





Data Methodology Findings 
1 2004 Bosma, van-
Praag, Thurik,  
& de-Wit 









OLS regression The education level of entrepreneurs 
plays a significant role in the success of 
a new business. Entrepreneurs with a 
high education level and industrial 
experience are expected to survive in 
the market and earn higher profits.  









of Chile for the 
period 1990-96 
Probit regression The findings suggested a statistically 
significant positive effect of skill 
development of employees on the 
possibility of starting to export and 








Data from firms of 
Uganda, Nigeria, 
and India collected 
through semi-
structure interviews 
OLS regression Informal on the job learning has been 
preferred by SMEs and it has 
statistically significant positive effect 
on the adoption of new technologies. 
Overseas training is a strong predictor 
of a firm‘s ability to adopt new 
technologies. 
4 2008 Banker, Wattal, 
Liu & Ou 










The education of employees and 
investment in R&D has a significant 
positive effect on the profitability of 
firms. Moreover, firms with an 
educated workforce and investing in 




5 2010 Doms, Lewis & 
Robb 
Creation and 
success of new 
businesses 
Education and 
skill level of 











More educated entrepreneurs tend to be 
located in metropolitan areas with more 
educated workforces. Moreover, highly 
educated areas have above average 
entrepreneurship rates. The level of 
education of entrepreneurs is strongly 
related with positive business 
outcomes. 
Impact of Competition with Informal Sector on Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 





Data Methodology Findings 






 Previous literature Critical review of 
existing literature 
The currency demand, the physical 
input measure and the model approach 
can be used to measure the size and 
development of the shadow economy. 
An increasing burden of taxation and 
social security payments, combined 
with rising state regulatory activities 
and labour market restrictions are the 
major driving forces for the size and 
growth of the shadow economy. 










The informal sector in developing 
countries primarily is an unregulated 
micro-entrepreneurial sector and not a 
disadvantaged residual of segmented 
labour markets. 






The average size of the shadow 
economy in 1999–2000 in developing 
countries was 41%, in transition 
countries 38% and in OECD countries 
17%. If the shadow economy increases 
by 1%, the growth rate of the official 
GDP of developing countries decreases 
by 0.6%, while in developed and 
transition economies the shadow 
economy respectively increases by 
0.8% and 1.0%. 








After controlling for firm-level, sector 
and country-specific effects, the 
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& Desai and correlation 
estimates 
findings suggest formal registration of 
a firm is positively correlated with 
perceptions regarding the availability 
of electricity supply, access to finance 
and access to land and negatively 
correlated with the rate of taxation and 
corruption. 
5 2017 Williams, 
Martinez-Perez,  
& Kedir 
Firm Performance Impact of 
starting as 
unregistered 
WBES Linear multi-level 
regression 
Firm performance that started as 
unregistered has been significantly 
better than those firms who started 
upfront as registered firms. 
6 2017 Williams &  
Kedir 
Firm performance Starting as 
unregistered 
WBES for Turkey Heckman selection 
model 
Firm performance with experience of 
the informal economy is 13% higher 
than those with no experience. 
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CHAPTER 3 – DATA, MEASUREMENT AND METHODS 
Initially, research on entrepreneurial ecosystems focused on the development of theoretical 
models of those ecosystems, which produced discursive and descriptive research. However, later 
the effects of different components of entrepreneurial ecosystems were tested using both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. The case studies on the effects of different components of 
the entrepreneurial ecosystems, including access to finance, corruption, the informal economy, 
entry regulations and political instability, etc. have mostly used qualitative methods to examine 
the issue of interest (Alvedalen and Boschma, 2017; Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2011; Spigel, 
2017; Stam, 2015). On the other hand, a quantitative approach has also been used to estimate the 
effects of components of the entrepreneurial ecosystems on the level of entrepreneurial activity 
and performance of firms in different parts of the world (Acs et al., 2014; Aterido et al., 2011; 
Coluzzi et al., 2015; Stam, 2018). Most of these studies have estimated the linear relationship 
between components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem and entrepreneurial performance. 
However, the systematic nature of effect of the entrepreneurial ecosystems is yet missing in these 
empirical studies. Ignoring the interdependence of components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem 
is contradictory to the conceptualization of the entrepreneurial ecosystems approach. 
In this chapter, the research and statistical methodology used in this thesis is explained. 
Moreover, different datasets and their limitations are critically evaluated, and selection of the 
World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) database for this study has been explained, along with 
measurement of variables. The research methodology adopted in this thesis is based on statistical 
techniques used in existing research on entrepreneurship in general and specifically from the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems perspective.  
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The details of how and why a particular quantitative approach is adopted, is explained in 
section 3.1. A discussion is carried out in section 3.2 of the different datasets available for the 
analysis of entrepreneurial ecosystems in LMICs. Moreover, the details of the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey (WBES) used in this study are explained in Section 3.2.1. The measurement of 
variables used in this study is explained in section 3.3, whereas in section 3.4 the statistical 
methods selected for data analysis are explained with respect to what, why and how of adopted 
statistical techniques.  
3.1 Quantitative Methods for Measurement of Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 
The choice of methodology is based on the ontological and epistemological assumptions about 
the reality to be studied. The ontological assumptions refer to the belief of the researcher about 
the reality (topic of research). The reality lying out there is objectively verifiable, or it is socially 
constructed and needs exploration of those social mechanisms to understand the reality as to how 
it came into existence. On the other hand, epistemological assumptions are about the nature of 
knowledge that exists about reality and who is the source for providing that knowledge. How 
reliable that source of knowledge is and how one possesses that knowledge. Thus, epistemology 
focuses on the nature of objectivity or subjectivity of the knowledge. 
The concept of the entrepreneurial ecosystem has been discussed in such a way that it 
exists out there as a tangible reality and it is beyond the control of any single stakeholder. The 
objective of the study is to at first identify different significant components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem and then test the health of the entrepreneurial ecosystem using the magnitude and 
significance of their effects on the performance of firms operating within it. The existence of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems as an objective reality, independent of the interest of researchers, fits 
119 
 
into a positivist ontology. Moreover, the concept of entrepreneurial ecosystems is measurable 
and has been broken down into different components, as already discussed in Chapter 2. In 
addition, it is possible to measure the entrepreneurial ecosystem itself and its effects on the 
SMEs with some degree of confidence. Therefore, keeping in view these ontological 
assumptions about the entrepreneurial ecosystems, it can be argued that it is in line with the 
positivist ontology.  
Since the existence of entrepreneurial ecosystem can be objectively measured, the job of 
the researcher is to find the right data, or data gathering tools or instruments, in an effort to find 
data closely depicting the reality. Moreover statements about the effects of individual 
components of entrepreneurial ecosystems, and their collective effect on the performance of 
SMEs, are empirically testable, and can be supported or rejected using appropriate statistical 
estimates. Also, the correlational and causal nature of the effect of the entrepreneurial ecosystem 
can be tested through suitable data. The purpose of this study is to estimate the health of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems of LMICs and identify the composition of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem of Pakistan, and estimate its interactive effect on the performance of SMEs. 
Thus, ontological and epistemological assumptions about the concept of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems in the context of this research lead to the use of the quantitative research design of 
positivism. The operational definitions of variable are provided and results produced are 
verifiable and can be replicated by anyone else in a similar context using a similar approach. The 
instruments for data collection in quantitative approach include questionnaires, observation and 
experiments, however, questionnaires are the most frequently used instrument. Therefore, to 
achieve neutrality and objectivity, questionnaire-based data has been used in this study.  
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3.2 Popular Datasets on Entrepreneurship 
The most widely used datasets for predicting entrepreneurial activity at the local level and cross-
country comparisons include: Adult Population Survey (APS) by Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM), Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank, the Global 
Entrepreneurship and Development Index (GEDI) provided by the Global Entrepreneurship and 
Development Institute, the Doing Business Survey by the World Bank, the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey (WBES) by the World Bank and Entrepreneurship at a Glance by the OECD 
under Entrepreneurship Indicators Program. 
The choice of dataset is based on the scope and objectives of the study and the 
availability of data for the target population (LMICs and Pakistan in this case). The BEEP survey 
by the EBRD and the World Bank and Entrepreneurship at a Glance by the OECD are limited to 
a few countries only. The BEEP survey is conducted in 28 countries in East European and 
Central Asia only, whereas Entrepreneurship at a Glance was initiated in 2011 and provides 
information on the level of entrepreneurship in OECD member countries only. Therefore, these 
databases cannot be used to analyze LMICs. However, BEEPS is similar to WBES as it 
measures the firm level data on their business environment and performance. The BEEPS dataset 
has been used by different studies on European countries for examining the effects of different 
components of entrepreneurial ecosystems (Blagojević and Damijan, 2013; De Rosa et al., 2010; 
Petracco and Schweiger, 2012). 
Most of the cross-country comparison studies examining the effect of entrepreneurship 
on economic growth have preferred macroeconomic indicators of entrepreneurship including, the 
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Global Entrepreneurship and Development Index, the Global Competitiveness Index by the WEF 
and the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International (Acs et al., 2014; Acs et al., 
2008; Audretsch and Belitski, 2017; Knack, 2007; Schneider, 2005). There are methodological 
issues with respect to the use of macroeconomic datasets in the context of this study. For 
example, the GEDI index is a calculated using data from GEM surveys, Global Competitiveness 
Index by the WEF, Doing Business Index by the World Bank and other data obtained from the 
UNO, the OECD and the Industrial Development Organization. The sources from which data for 
the GEDI is obtained are, mostly, macroeconomic measures and are composed of different 
variables and measures. Thus, a measure based on pooling of different other macroeconomic 
datasets ignores the microeconomic conditions. In addition to these methodological issues, there 
is no measure of the performance of firms to check the effect of different macroeconomic 
indicators. 
On the other hand, the World Bank Doing Business Survey ranks countries with respect 
to the ease of doing business for SMEs in the country. However, the data is not based on the 
feedback or response of SMEs, rather it is based on a small sample of experts, mostly lawyers 
and management professionals, who are asked to rate the business environment of their country 
on different parameters related to regulations and the rule of law. The index is developed on the 
basis of subjective and objective opinions of this sub-sample of experts. It has been used in 
different studies but a lack of reliability and scientific rigour of this dataset makes it less suitable 
for empirical research. It has usually been used as supporting evidence in descriptive statistics 
only. Moreover, this ease of doing business rating also ignores the firm performance 
measurement. Therefore, this dataset does not fulfil the demands of our study. 
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In the literature, a number of studies have used firm level survey based data, collected by 
the World Bank, at the international level under the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) 
project, to estimate the effects of components of the entrepreneurial ecosystems on 
entrepreneurial activity (Aterido et al., 2011; Ayyagari et al., 2014; Beck et al., 2008; Beck et al., 
2005b; Coluzzi et al., 2015; Datta, 2012; Williams and Kedir, 2017a; Williams et al., 2017). This 
is the only firm-level survey-based database which provides information on components of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems and firm performance in all parts of the world in different years. The 
data on firm performance (sales growth, employment growth and labour productivity growth), 
and the perception of firms‘ on components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem (institutional 
framework and physical conditions) has been used in this study to estimate how firms perceive 
the institutional framework and physical conditions and how the entrepreneurial ecosystem 
affects the entrepreneurial performance. The details of the WBES database, and its data 
collection process and methods, are given in the next section. 
3.2.1 The World Bank Enterprise Survey Data 
The WBES database has been used in this study. It is a unique database because it provides firm-
level responses on components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, firm characteristics and 
performance of firms—annual sales growth, annual employment growth and annual labour 
productivity growth—for 135 countries around the world (Enterprise Survey, 2006-14). The 
enterprise surveys have been conducted using both a global and non-global methodology. For the 
global methodology, standardized questionnaires have been used for collecting data regarding 
the business environment from the owners and top managers of small, medium and large firms. 
The global methodology based survey data has been used in this study. The details specific to the 
data, including number of firms, countries and survey years are given Chapter 4 and 5. The 
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following sub-sections explain how the World Bank Enterprise Surveys have been conducted 
over the years. 
Sampling Technique in WBES: The WBES followed a stratified random sampling approach for 
selecting the sample of firms. All non-agriculture private registered firms are included in the 
sampling frame. The stratification was done using size, activity and the geographical location of 
the firm. Stratification on the basis of size has divided the firms into small (5-19 employees), 
medium (20-99 employees) and large (100 or more employees) sized firms. The non-agricultural 
activity hubs of each country are used for stratification on the basis of geographical location. It is 
intended to keep similar industries from all countries to yield data suitable for cross country 
comparisons. Proportional allocation of the sample size for all strata was used to select 
representative samples from each country. The data can produce results with a 5% and 7.5% 
precision, and 90% confidence intervals. The non-response on items of the questionnaire has 
been dealt with in the sampling methodology, and up to 25% non-response on items in a stratum 
is deemed acceptable to derive valid results. 
Data Collection and Quality of Data: The data collection teams and their supervisor were given 
training before starting the field work. The questionnaires were personally administered to 
enhance the response rate and quality of responses. The completed questionnaires were checked 
at four levels: first, immediately after interview to check for missing responses; secondly, by the 
field supervisor for the legibility of answers; thirdly, by the data entry operator; and lastly, by 
random checking of the entered data for any irregularities by the supervisor. The daily data entry 
reports were also used to identify outliers and cross verification from the respondent. For some 
countries a double blind review process was also adopted by entering the survey response of 
each firm twice without mentioning the name and then matching the responses to check for 
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mistakes. However, this approach could not be implemented in all countries due to time and cost 
factors for such a large survey. The quality control measures adopted in this survey suggest that 
data quality is ensured at the highest possible standard. 
Pilot Testing: The preliminary version of the questionnaire was pilot tested by selecting a small, 
representative, sample and checking for wording, proper translation and understanding of the 
target population. The final version of the questionnaire was used after minor changes on the 
basis of results of pilot testing. 
Ethical Considerations: The World Bank Enterprise Survey was widely publicized before it was 
officially launched. The government officials of the country also vouched for the survey to be 
administered by the World Bank group. Newspaper advertisements and launch parties with local 
business leaders were covered by the press to gain the support of the local industry. These tactics 
enhanced the rate of participation of firms in the survey. Once the survey was appropriately 
publicized and launched, the firms selected in the sample were sent emails and letters and later 
contacted via phone by the representatives of data collection teams for an interview appointment 
and participation in the survey.  
The sampled firms were informed in writing that participation in this survey was 
voluntary, and every respondent had the right to withdraw at any stage; anonymity and 
confidentiality of their personal data was also ensured. Non-willing respondents were, however, 
replaced with other willing firms from the sampling frame. This substitution has improved the 
response rate and data availability. 
Permission to use Database: The WBES database is publically available and online for the use 
of researchers upon submission of a research proposal with aims to the Enterprise Analysis Unit. 
After registration as an external user, access is provided to the database. 
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3.3 Measurement of Variables 
The institutional framework covers both formal and informal institutions. The effect of formal 
institutions is estimated through government regulations and the taxation system, whereas 
informal institutions are measured through corruption perception. The subjective measure of 
government regulations is the percentage of firms in each province reporting government 
regulations as a significant obstacle in doing business. The objective measure of the effect of 
government regulations refer to the time spent by top management in meeting government 
regulations. The more time spent in meeting government regulations, and the higher percentage 
of owners reporting government regulations as an obstacle in doing business, indicates this 
component as a weak link in the entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
The response of each firm on tax rates and administration as the most significant obstacle 
in doing business is used to calculate the percentage of respondents in a province where this is an 
obstacle in each survey year. This aggregated measure is then used for examining the role of the 
taxation system in the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs. Similarly, corruption is measured by 
an owners/managers‘ perception of it as the most significant obstacle in doing business. The firm 
responses are aggregated at province level and used for determining the contribution of 
corruption in explaining the impact of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs. 
The elements of physical conditions include access to finance, infrastructure, political 
stability, an educated workforce and the informal sector. Access to finance is measured as the 
percentage of working capital financing from banks by a firm, and the responses of firms on 
perception about access to finance are aggregated at province level. The objective measure of 
infrastructure is the number of power outages in a month. The higher number of power outages 
indicates poor infrastructure conditions. The subjective measure of infrastructure is the 
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percentage of respondents reporting infrastructure as the most significant obstacle in doing 
business. 
Political stability is measured through responses on firms on security cost as percentage 
of sales and the percentage of firm owner/managers in a province indicating unstable political 
conditions as the most significant obstacle in doing business. The aggregated value of perception 
of owner/managers is used for analysis. The percentage of respondents in a province who 
selected the non-availability of an educated workforce as a significant obstacle in doing business 
was used as an indicator of the presence of an educated workforce. The effect of competition 
with the informal sector is measured using the number of years a firm has operated in the 
informal economy before registration. Moreover, the aggregated values of perception of 
owners/managers about competition with the informal sector are also used to measure the impact 
of informal sector. The detailed definitions and measurement of these indicators is given below 
in Table 3.1. 
 








 Estimate of firm‘s employment growth over the past 3 years by WBES 
Annual labour 
productivity growth 





 The average number of hours spent in a week by the higher management in 
meeting government regulations. The higher time spent indicates higher 
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regulatory burden on firms. 
 Percentage of owners/managers in a province reporting government 
regulations as the most significant obstacle in doing business for the firm. 
Tax rate and 
administration 
 Number of visits of tax officials. The higher number indicates the 
complexity of the taxation system. 
 Percentage of owners/managers in a province reporting tax rate and 
administration as the most significant obstacle in doing business for the 
firm. 
Corruption  Percentage of owners/managers in a province reporting corruption as the 
most significant obstacle in doing business for the firm. 
Physical Conditions 
Access to finance  Percentage of working capital financed through banks. Higher percentages 
shows ease in accessing financing from banks. 
 Percentage of owners/managers in a province reporting access to finance as 
the most significant obstacle in doing business for the firm. 
Infrastructure  Number of power outages in a month and value lost as percentage of sales 
due to power outages. The higher number of power outages and higher 
value lost due to power outages, shows poor infrastructure facilities. 
 Percentage of owners/managers in a province reporting infrastructure as the 
most significant obstacle in doing business for the firm. 
Political instability  Security cost as percentage of sales has been used to measure political 
instability, the higher percentage of security cost indicating more political 
instability in the country. 
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 Percentage of owners/managers in a province reporting political instability 




 Percentage of owners/managers in a province reporting non-availability of 
educated workforce as the most significant obstacle in doing business for 
the firm. 
Competition with 
the informal sector 
 Years operated before registration. The higher number represents the 
higher likelihood of firms preferring to operate in the informal economy. 
 Percentage of owners/managers in a province reporting competition with 
the informal sector as the most significant obstacle in doing business for 
the firm. 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm characteristics  Years of experience of top manager in the firm 
 Firms of small size (5-19 employees) and medium size (20-99 employees) 
 Exporters (selling in the foreign market) and non-exporter (selling in the 
domestic market) 
 Firm age (young, equal to or less than 5 years, and old, more than 5 years) 
 
3.4 Statistical Methods of Analysis 
Three econometric methods including multiple regression methods, propensity score matching 
(PSM) methods, cluster analysis and canonical discriminant analysis have been used in the 
analysis of the impact of entrepreneurial ecosystems on the performance of SMEs in LMICs. 
The multiple regression method is used in chapter 4 for measurement of the impact of 
individual components of the entrepreneurial ecosystems on the performance of SMEs in 
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LMICs. These findings are important because it leads towards determining the factors which 
need immediate attention, or improvement, which will result in maximum benefit for SMEs. 
Further analysis of the effect of the most significant factor—corruption—is carried out using 
matching methods (so comparing like with like). Matching methods help in determining the 
effect of treatment on the treated by comparing them with a counterfactual group. 
3.4.1 Multiple Regression Methods 
A simple regression model which pools firms for all LMICs assumes that the intercept terms for 
those countries are all the same. It will thus ignore the differential effect of the ecosystem of each 
country on firm performance. However, the components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem differ 
according to country and therefore the response of firms can be drastically different. This 
variation in components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem across different countries is expected 
to significantly affect the regression estimates. Therefore, the intercept of the regression equation 
for each country is expected to be different so a country dummy variable is used to account for 
country difference, but the effect is absorbed. 
The objective measures as well as perception based data on the components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem are included in the model. The regression equations estimating the 
effect of components of the entrepreneurial ecosystems on the performance of SMEs using 
country dummies can be specified as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑿𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑬𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖     3.1 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑿𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑬𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖    3.2 




In the above equations, i refers to firm, X is a vector for components of the institutional 
framework and, E is a vector for components of physical conditions as part of entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, D refers to firm size, age and industry dummy variables and u refers to the error term. 
The components of the institutional framework represented by a vector X include government 
regulations, tax rate and administration and control over corruption.  The components of physical 
conditions represented by a vector E include access to finance, infrastructure, political 
instability, the non-availability of an educated workforce and competition with the informal 
sector. 
3.4.2 Matching Methods 
It is important to know whether policy interventions have been successful in terms of 
achievement of the desired outcomes. Policy interventions can be regarded as a treatment and are 
designed to improve outcomes, be it educational, health or firm performance.  
The major challenge, however, in the evaluation of the impact of interventions is to find a 
comparable counterfactual group, to explain what the outcomes would have been had the 
intervention not been introduced. The developments in matching methods have enabled the 
estimation of counterfactual evidence. In this context, matching methods have been most 
frequently used by scholars and policymakers to implement and evaluate different policy 
projects. 
Initially, matching methods were designed and used for randomized experimental studies 
only. In randomized experimental designs, it is assured that the treatment assignment is random 
and the only difference between the control group and experimental group is the treatment. 
Therefore, the outcomes of the control group have been used as counterfactual evidence. 
However, there are cases when random assignment to treatment is not possible, despite its 
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extraordinary value in estimation. For example, in the case of testing the causal link between 
smoking and lung cancer, random assignment to treatment is not possible. This limitation, 
however, stimulated the developments in matching methods and allowed its use in observational 
studies. The use of matching methods in observational studies is conditional on well-defined 
criteria for assignment of observations to the treatment and the control groups. 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
Among the variety of matching methods for observation studies, PSM is now the most widely 
used method. PSM has been widely used in studies evaluating impacts in the labour market, such 
as, the effect of: training programmes on income, electoral reforms on corruption, R&D 
subsidies, school specialization on pupil performance and teachers‘ performance on students‘ 
achievements (Bradley et al., 2013; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Lavy, 2002; Moser, 2005; 
Persson et al., 2003; Smith and Todd, 2005). 
In its simplest form, matching methods compare the outcomes of those individuals from 
the treated and control group which are similar on observable characteristics. It is easier to find 
similar individuals from treated and control groups if they differ on only one observable 
characteristic. However, if there are a number of covariates then selecting similar individuals 
becomes difficult using this simple method. However, the use of propensity scores in matching 
methods to find similar individuals from the treated and control groups has simplified this 
complexity. The propensity score is defined as the probability of an individual receiving 
treatment from a group of treated and control individuals, conditional on the set of observable 
characteristics. 
𝑝 𝑍 = 𝑃 𝐷 = 1 𝑍      3.4 
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The dependent binary variable Z refers to corruption, where D=1 for the treated and D=0 
for the absence of treatment. Similar units on the basis of propensity scores are selected from the 
treated and control groups to compare outcomes. Statistically, the impact of treatment denoted by 
δi on a respondent i is the difference between the outcome in the presence and absence of 
treatment: 
𝛿𝑖 = 𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖       3.5 
Here 𝑌1𝑖  refers to the outcome of the i
th
 observation in the treated group and 𝑌0𝑖  refers to the 
outcome of i
th
 observation in the control group. The outcome Y is written as follows: 
𝑌 =  1 − 𝐷 𝑌0 + 𝐷𝑌1     3.6 
Where D represents the treatment status. Thus, the observed outcome for a treated group will be: 
𝑌 =  1 − 1 𝑌0 + 1. 𝑌1 = 0. 𝑌0 + 1. 𝑌1 = 𝑌1  3.7 
Therefore, in case of treated observations the observed outcome will be 𝑌1, and 𝑌0 will be the 
counterfactual evidence, whereas for the control group observations the outcome will be 𝑌0, and 
𝑌1 will be the counterfactual evidence.  
Usually the evaluation of the effect of treatment requires the average effect of treatment 
on all the participants, which is obtained by estimating the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT). The effect of treatment on one treated individual is written as follows: 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸 𝑌1 − 𝑌0 𝐷 = 1      3.8 
However, the average effect of treatment on all the treated individuals is expressed as the 
difference in the averages. The higher average value of this difference indicates the level of 
effect of the treatment on the treated. Therefore, the equation for average treatment effect on 
treated (ATT) can be written as: 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝑌1 𝑌1 − 𝑌0 𝐷 = 1 − 𝐸𝑌0 𝑌1 − 𝑌0 𝐷 = 1   3.9 
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The application of PSM, after treatment assignment, can be divided into three steps: 
Firstly, propensity scores are estimated by including all observable characteristics in the model 
and choosing an appropriate matching algorithm. Secondly, the relevant assumptions of hidden 
bias, balancing, and common support and overlap are tested, and thirdly, the robustness of the 
results are tested. 
Propensity Scores Estimation 
The probit model and the logit model are the two most widely acknowledged methods for 
estimating propensity scores, with no advantage of one over the other (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983a). In this study, the probit model has been used to estimate propensity scores.
1
 
The model specification to estimate propensity scores is extremely important, because 
missing any variable significantly related to the outcome, or treatment assignment, will produce 
biased results. The vectors X and E mentioned in equation 3.1 have been used for estimating the 
propensity scores.  
The Matching Algorithm 
After estimating propensity scores using the appropriate model by including all observable 
characteristics the next step is to choose a suitable matching algorithm. Different matching 
algorithms use propensity scores differently to match the outcomes of treated and controlled 
units. The nearest neighbour matching algorithm is one of the most used and straight forward. 
The most similar units from the control group are matched with units from the treated group with 
closest propensity score i.e. those who have the most similar observable characteristics. 
                                                          




Nearest neighbour matching can be implemented using both ‗with replacement‘ and 
‗without replacement‘ of units. If the ‗without replacement‘ option is used then only one unit 
from the control group can be compared with only one unit in the treated group. If there are few 
observations in the control group, or there is less overlap in the propensity score values, then 
‗without replacement‘ will result in biased outcome, because units in the treated group will be 
matched with relatively poor matches from the control group (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). On the 
other hand, if the ‗with replacement‘ approach is used then one unit from the control group can 
be used for comparison with many units in the treated group, provided the propensity scores are 
close. This over representation of a unit from the control group can potentially result in a 
sampling error, however, the benefit of getting the closest, and the most similar matches, 
outweighs such drawbacks. Therefore, ‗with replacement‘ matching has been used in this study.2 
Assumptions for PSM 
Before interpreting the matching estimates, it is important to ensure that basic assumptions of 
this approach are satisfied, and results are, therefore, not biased. The assumptions of hidden bias, 
balanced samples, common support and the overlap condition should be tested for unbiased 
estimation of ATT. 
Hidden Bias 
This assumption is satisfied when all the observable covariates are included in the 
estimation of the propensity scores, and the estimates are robust for any unobserved confounder. 
Rosenbaum bounds are a sensitivity analysis test for measuring whether hidden bias is a problem 
in the estimation of ATT when the nearest neighbour matching algorithm has been used 
                                                          
2
Stata is the most frequently and reliably used statistical program for using PSM method and psmatch2 routine 
developed by (Leuven and Sianesi, 2014) is the most advanced form of program written for this purpose. The latest 
version of psmatch2 program has been used for the analysis. The options of nearest neighbour matching, with 





 The assumption behind Rosenbaum bounds is that after controlling for the 
covariates, the outcome will be independent of treatment status: 
(𝑌1,𝑌0) ⊥ 𝐷|𝑍      3.10 
Rosenbaum bounds estimate Gamma, Γ, value which is an odds ratio, and used as a 
sensitivity parameter. It measures the degree to which random assignment of treatment has been 
followed. The odds ratio of receiving treatment for two units similar on covariates differs by 
value of Γ. For Γ=2, if the two units are matched on observed covariate, it indicates that the 
likelihood of receiving treatment is double for one unit over the other.  
The sensitivity analysis for non-binary variables uses the Wilcoxon sign rank test and the 
Hodges-Lehmann point estimate for the sign rank test. In social sciences, for any value of Γ up to 
2, if the value of statistical significance of the upper bound of the Wilcoxon sign rank test 
reaches above 0.05, or the confidence interval of Hodges-Lehmann point estimate includes zero, 
the hidden bias assumption is considered to have been violated (Rosenbaum, 2002). 
Balancing Property 
The balancing property ensures the quality of matching. The balancing assumption is based on 
whether or not the treatment assignment is independent after including observable characteristics 
in the model. If the propensity scores obtained using observable covariates are adequately 
balanced in the treated and the control groups then the balancing property is satisfied.
4
 
𝐷 ⊥ 𝒁|𝑝(𝒁)       3.11 
Here Z represents the set of covariates and equation 3.11 shows that after calculation of p(Z) 
through specification of a probit or a logit model, there is no other variable that needs to be 
                                                          
3
The rbounds routine written by Gangl (2004) has been used to implement Rosenbaum bounds to test the presence 
of hidden bias. 
4
In psmatch2 program there is command of pstest for testing the balancing property through t-test, percentage bias 
and shows graphically. This command has been used to test the balancing property. The biasness level of less than 
15% is considered acceptable for observational studies in social sciences domain. 
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included to enhance the estimation. If, after matching, the balancing test shows that differences 
between the treated and control groups have been eliminated, or become statistically 
insignificant, then the matching estimates are considered unbiased. However, if the differences 
are not eliminated then either model specified for propensity score estimation needs refinement, 
or some other matching method should be used.  
Common Support and Overlap Condition 
In order to get the ATT units, there should be a positive probability of getting at least one 
comparable unit from the control group as a counterfactual evidence for each unit in the treated 
group. 
0 < 𝑃 𝐷 = 1 𝒁 < 1      3.12 
This means that for every value of Z, the probability of receiving treatment lies between 0 and 1 
and the same applies for not having received the treatment. 
If there are some units in the treated group for which there is no close match available in 
the control group then the counterfactual evidence for such units cannot be established. This 
condition is called the common support condition.
5
 The use of this condition in the matching 
algorithm ensures that the effect of treatment on the treated has been measured using only those 
units for which close matches were available in the control group. The units in the treated group 
with no matching units in the control group are considered as off the common support region. 
The treatment assignment is attributed as strongly ignorable when the conditions of common 
support and overlap are satisfied (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983b). 
                                                          
5
The commands of psgraph and kernel density graph of propensity scores both before and after matching have been 
used from psmatch2 program. 
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Testing for Robustness 
The robustness of the matching estimates is checked by implementing alternative matching 
algorithms. If the results remain consistent, then they can be considered robust with respect to 
any relevant matching method. In the data analysis, other matching algorithms including K-
nearest neighbour matching (k=10) and kernel matching have been used to check the robustness 
of the results. 
3.5 Statistical Methods of Analysis in Chapter 5 
In chapter 5 cluster analysis and canonical discriminant analysis are used to identify 
‗entrepreneurial ecosystems‘ through patterns in the response of firms on components of their 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. The firms are grouped through cluster analysis and later these groups 
are used to determine statistically significantly different entrepreneurial ecosystems operating in 
Pakistan. What these econometric methods are, why and how they have been used in this study, 
is explained in following two sub-sections. 
3.5.1 Cluster Analysis 
Cluster analysis helps in picking out the natural trends in the data. It groups like with like on the 
basis of selected attributes. The grouping of firms with similar perceptions about the components 
of the entrepreneurial ecosystem will help in identifying different ecosystems existing in 
Pakistan. These entrepreneurial ecosystems will then be used for assessing their differential 
effect on firm performance operating within those clusters. 
A wide range of clustering techniques and procedures has been developed over the last 
four decades. These are divided into two major groups, named hierarchical clustering methods 
and disjoint clustering methods (Li et al., 2015). Other than statistical differences, the major 
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difference between these two methods is that in hierarchical clustering the decision about the 
optimal number of groups can be made after employing the relevant clustering approach, 
whereas in disjoint clustering methods the number of groups is to be decided beforehand. 
Moreover, the hierarchical cluster analysis ensures minimum intra-group variations and 
maximum inter-group variation (Everitt et al., 2011; Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 2008). 
Given that our objective is to identify the patterns existing in the responses of the firms 
about components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan, and so to determine the optimal 
number of groups (i.e. ecosystems), it is impossible to decide this in advance. Therefore, 
hierarchical clustering methods have been adopted for the classification of the data. This method 
is further classified into agglomerative and divisive methods on the basis of the way to make 
groups. The agglomerative methods start by considering each firm as a separate group then 
gradually making larger groups of similar firms, and ending with all the firms in one main group. 
Alternatively,  the divisive methods starts from treating all firms in one main group and then 
keeps on refining the groups by excluding firms with dissimilar characteristics, and ends with 
each firm being in a separate group. Agglomerative methods have been more commonly used in 
recent research studies, and are used for this chapter. 
The response of the firms on the components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem including  
government regulations, tax rates, corruption, access to finance, infrastructure, political 
instability, competition with informal sector, the non-availability of an educated workforce, and 
electricity supply have been used as covariates to determine the clusters in the data. The next 
step is to decide the similarity or dissimilarity measures, so that closely related firms are 
clustered. These measures vary for continuous, categorical and mixed data. 
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Since our data on the components of the entrepreneurial ecosystems is categorical in 
nature, one similarity measure from a number of methods can be used. Those methods include 
the Matching method, the Jaccard method, the Russell method and the DICE method. How these 
similarity measure work can be explained through a simple example. Table 3.2, below, 
represents the binary responses of two firms i and j on a covariate of interest. The rows represent 
a certain set of characteristics being present or absent (1,0) in firm i. Similarly, the columns 
represent the presence or absence (1,0) of a certain set of characteristics in firm j. The cell value 
‗a‘ indicates the presence of some characteristic in both firms i and j. The cell values ‗b‘ and ‗c‘ 
indicate the characteristic being present in either firm i or j. The cell value ‗d‘ indicates that this 
characteristic is not common in both i and j. 
 
Table 3. 2: A 2x2 response table 
 Firm j 
Firm i 1 0 
1 a b 
0 c d 
 
The Russell method calculates the distance between firm i and j by taking the proportion 
of cases in which both traits were present, as shown in equation 3.13 
1
𝑎+𝑏+𝑐+𝑑
    3.13 
The Jaccard method is similar to the Russell method but it excludes the cases in which 
both firms have dissimilar characteristics like ‗d‘. The calculation in the Jaccard method is 
shown in equation 3.14. 
𝑎
𝑎+𝑏+𝑐
     3.14 
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The matching method is another variation on the Jaccard method. It includes both totally 
matched (a) and totally unmatched (d) cases in calculating the distance. The calculation 
according to the matching method is given below in equation 3.15. 
𝑎+𝑑
𝑎+𝑏+𝑐+𝑑
    3.15 
The DICE coefficient is the final method which is also closely related to the Jaccard 
method, except for assigning more weight to the mutually existing characteristics. The 
calculation of the DICE coefficient is given in equation 3.16: 
2𝑎
2𝑎+𝑏+𝑐
     3.16 
The matching method is the most commonly used similarity measure for categorical data 
(Finch, 2005; Murtagh and Legendre, 2014). It results in the smallest distances among the firms 
and refined clustering of data by considering both similar and dissimilar attributes of the firms. 
Therefore, Ward‘s linkage algorithm with the matching method as similarity measure is adopted 
in this study for classification of the firms.
6
 
The use of hierarchical clustering using Ward‘s linkage algorithm and the matching 
method as a similarity measure begins by considering each firm as a separate cluster, and in 
subsequent stages each firm with similar characteristics is made part of another cluster (Everitt et 
al., 2011). This process ends when all the firms become part of one cluster. The decision on the 
meaningfulness of the number of clusters is made on the basis of: (1) homogeneity within the 
cluster; (2) heterogeneity between the clusters; and (3) a balanced distribution of firms in the 
clusters. Moreover, dendrogram is used to give a structural view of how firms are part of 
                                                          
6The Stata 14 version has been used to implement the hierarchical clustering methods using Ward‘s linkages among 




different clusters and lower down the dendogram how different clusters merge to form bigger 
clusters of similar firms. 
The sensitivity of the cluster analysis was tested by using different versions of similarity 
measures for categorical data including the matching method, the Jaccard method and the Russell 
method. The results were not significantly different, however, the outcome of the matching 
methods were more similar in terms of homogeneity within the group and heterogeneity between 
them.  
3.5.2 Discriminant Analysis 
Determining the differences between groups in data has been increasingly recognized as an 
important technique. Different selection parameters are employed to find patterns in the data on 
the basis of covariates. Researchers inspired by the seminal work of Fisher (1936) on 
discriminant analysis, initiated the work in this direction by starting from two group 
classification models. Rao (1948) extended the two-group classification approach of Fisher to 
multiple group classification. Others refined the idea of Fisher in the 1940s and introduced 
important extensions of this concept (Huberty and Olejnik, 2006; Kendall, 1957; Mclachlan, 
2004; Tatsuoka, 1969; Tatsuoka and Tiedeman, 1954; Webb and Copsey, 2011; William and 
Lohnes, 1962). 
The early application of discriminant analysis was limited to the field of medicine and 
biology, however, later methodological developments made it suitable for use in business, 
education and psychology (Rencher, 2002). Discriminant analysis is a multivariate inferential 
statistical technique that has been traditionally used for classification of observations from 
unknown groups to a set of groups decided in advance (Klecka, 1980). It has been used in studies 
to find whether the pre-decided groups in the data are statistically significantly different from 
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each other or not. This technique organizes data in the best way to minimize within group 
differences and maximize between group variations. 
 The three forms of discriminant analysis technique include linear discriminant analysis, 
canonical discriminant analysis (CDA) and quadratic discriminant analysis. CDA is the most 
general approach. CDA uses different combinations of the covariates to find the minimum 
variation within group and the maximum variation between the groups (Friedman, 1989). On the 
other hand, linear discriminant analysis uses distance between centroids of the groups, in place of 
using within group and between group variations. Quadratic discriminant analysis is the most 
complex technique. It uses quadratic methods to find groups with minimum misclassification 
(Han et al., 2012). 
CDA is used in this chapter as it is the most relevant to the objective of finding whether 
the five groups of firms on the basis of their response on components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem in Pakistan are significantly different from each other. Minimum within group 
differentiation and the maximum between groups differentiation will ensure that the components 
of the entrepreneurial ecosystem with similar effects are grouped in one entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. It is important to see whether the identified entrepreneurial ecosystems are 
significantly different from each other or not. Therefore, CDA will also ensure the identification 
of only statistically significantly different entrepreneurial ecosystems in Pakistan.  
The five groups identified by the cluster analysis were used to find the entrepreneurial 
ecosystems existing within Pakistan. These five groups are then used in the CDA to create a 
scatter matrix within and between the groups by reducing the mean difference within the groups. 
These between group matrices (Sb) and within group matrices (Sw) are then used for generating 




−1𝑆𝐵𝒘 = 𝑗𝒘      3.17 
 
In equation 3.17 the multiplication of the inverse of the within group scatter matrix, Sw
-1 
by the between group scatter matrix, SB ensures that firms within one group are similar to each 
and dissimilar to the firms in other groups. Here W is an eigenvector used for the weighted 
combination of a within and between groups scatter matrix, and j indicates that variation is 
maximized for between group differences and minimized for within group differences. 
The outcome of the CDA produces four discriminant functions on the basis of 
combinations of the components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. These discriminant functions 
are statistically significantly different from each other. The discriminant score for each 
discriminant function can be calculated using the following equation: 
𝐷𝑥𝑖 = ±𝑑1𝑖𝑎𝑓𝑖 ± 𝑑2𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖 ± 𝑑3𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑖 ± 𝑑4𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖 ± 𝑑5𝑖𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖 ± 𝑑6𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖 ± 𝑑7𝑖𝑤𝑘𝑖 ±
𝑑8𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖 ± 𝑑9𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑖         3.18 
Where 𝐷𝑥𝑖  is the discriminant score of each firm and the d1i, d2i…d9i are the discriminant 
coefficients (also called factor loadings) of the covariates in each discriminant function. 
The definitions and measurements of access to finance (af), government regulations (reg), 
infrastructure (infras), corruption (corr), political instability (pol), practice of informal sector 
(inf), the non-availaility of an educated workforce (wk), tax rate and administration (tax), and 
electricity (elec) are explained in Table 3.1. 
Finally, the factor loadings will be used to determine which component contributes 
significantly to which discriminant function. According to Comrey and Lee (1992), McLachlan 
(2004) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) factor loading of more than 0.4 indicates the 
statistically significant contribution of a factor to its functions. Therefore, this criterion will be 
used to determine the entrepreneurial ecosystem components contributing significantly to a 
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discriminant function. Since these discriminant functions are composed of different 
combinations of institutional and physical conditions, these can be called entrepreneurial 
ecosystems. 
The factor loadings of components of entrepreneurial ecosystems are then used as 
weights to calculate a discriminant score for each firm. These discriminant scores are the sum of 
the products of factor loadings with the observational values. This interactive and interdependent 
index, based on components of institutional framework conditions and physical conditions, 
shows the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. We then apply regression technique, to 
estimate the effect of the entrepreneurial ecosystem (based on index value for each firm) on the 
performance of SMEs. 
3.6 Summary 
The entrepreneurial ecosystems approach is deemed fit with the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of positivist philosophy. Thus, quantitative research design following positivist 
approach has been adopted in this thesis. The data on components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystems is obtained from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) database. It provides 
firm level response on components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs. 
We have used a variety of statistical techniques including multiple regression methods 
and matching methods for estimation of the weakest link in the entrepreneurial ecosystem of 
LMICs. Moreover, cluster analysis is used to find the natural pattern existing in the response of 
firms on components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. Later, canonical discriminant 
analysis has been used to find the composition of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan, and 
to develop an index based on the interactive and interdependent effect of the components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem.  
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CHAPTER 4 - ENTREPRENEURIAL ECOSYSTEMS AND THE 
PERFORMANCE OF SMES IN LOW-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
4.1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurship has been considered as a mechanism for channelling economic development 
and a significant amount of research has been conducted in the past decade on its role in national, 
regional and industrial growth. There is now a consensus amongst researchers and practitioners 
of development economics that a thriving private business sector is indispensable for the 
sustainability and economic growth of any country. The literature suggests that entrepreneurship 
has played a substantial role in the economic growth of Malaysia, India, Singapore, Korea, 
Thailand and China (Bruton et al., 2008). Moreover, the progress of these emerging markets has 
slowed down the economic growth of the developed economies and made it more uncertain for 
policymakers as to which ‗region‘ can drive growth in the future (Valliere and Peterson, 2009). 
In this unpredictable and dynamic global landscape international organizations, including 
the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the World 
Economic Forum and the United Nations Economic and Social Council, as well as numerous 
international stakeholders, have acknowledged the role of entrepreneurship in economic growth. 
Entrepreneurship is now central in public policy formulation and implementation (Kelley et al., 
2012). 
Researchers and policymakers are striving to develop a supportive framework for 
promoting entrepreneurial activity. The majority of entrepreneurs start with a small business, 
with few starting with medium sized businesses, and eventually progress to the next level. 
Therefore, SMEs are considered stepping stone for entrepreneurs. 
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As shown in Figure 4.1, SMEs exist in huge numbers across the globe. Moreover, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, they contribute significantly to employment growth, income generation, 
social welfare, innovation and economic development. SMEs are considered as vital change 
agents in the market due to their flexibility and innovative practices.  
 
Figure 4. 1: SME density across the World  
 
Source: Adopted from Kushnir et al. (2010) 
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SMEs in developing countries gain a labour cost advantage over large firms by using 
semi-skilled labour (Liedholm and Mead, 1987; Schmitz, 1995). This labour intensive nature of 
SMEs is an extremely lucrative benefit for developing countries with high unemployment levels, 
because it can immediately generate employment opportunities. In addition, large firms usually 
exist in metropolitan urban areas while SMEs benefit from the market niches in rural areas and 
suburban areas, especially in developing countries. Therefore, SMEs play a vital role in filling 
the employment gap in rural areas. 
Inspite of the importance of SMEs, the majority of them either exit from the market 
within a decade or remain small. It is argued that this entry-exit process ensures that only 
competitive businesses survive. Nevertheless, these high exit rates pose questions not only with 
respect to the contributions of SMEs but also towards the policy interventions and multi-billion 
US dollar aid allocated for their improvement. Therefore, it can be inferred that not all SMEs 
contribute significantly in an economy but only those which grow and perform better (Bruton et 
al., 2008; Mason and Brown, 2014). This is why the analysis of the performance of SMEs is a 
key factor. 
Different measures of performance of SMEs were explained in chapter 2 and shown in 
Figure 2.1. In this thesis, annual sales growth, annual employment growth and annual labour 
productivity growth have been used to measure the performance of SMEs. The performance 
analysis of SMEs will help in identifying those factors that impede, or facilitate, growth in 
entrepreneurial activity. Such an understanding will help governments and donor agencies to 
better understand the cross-country patterns and propose better SME support programmes. 
Therefore, the long-term sustainable growth objective of developing countries can thus be 
achieved not simply by all SMEs but by a higher proportion of the high performing SMEs. 
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The role of entrepreneurial ecosystems is important in ensuring the growth of SMEs 
through a supportive environment. As discussed in chapter 2, most of the previous research from 
an entrepreneurial ecosystems perspective has been carried out in high income (developed) 
countries while low and low-middle income countries have been ignored (Fosteret al., 2013). 
The business environment has always been dynamic and changing in every part of the world. 
The risks associated with change are manageable in developed countries, because these changes 
are usually quite foreseeable and these countries are adaptable. However, in LMICs these risks 
are augmented by poor access to finance, burdensome regulations, widespread corruption, poor 
infrastructure and political instability. 
Nevertheless, SME activity is increasing in LMICs. It is believed that the dynamics of the 
business environment in LMICs are entirely different from those in the developed world. The 
underdeveloped institutions of these LMICs have made their entrepreneurial ecosystems a 
constraint for firm performance, rather than making it supportive for firms of different sizes and 
ages.  
The measurement of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs is aimed at an assessment 
of the health of its individual components. According to a recent study by Taich et al. (2016), the 
identification of the weakest and strongest in the entrepreneurial ecosystem is important as a 
guide for policymakers, for instance, in deciding where to start their work for improvements in 
overall entrepreneurial ecosystem. Therefore, it is important to use a bottom-up approach to 
understand the existing entrepreneurial ecosystem before starting any reforms. 
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4.2 Research Questions 
Therefore, the general aim of this chapter is to explain how components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem of LMICs affect the performance of SMEs using data from WBES. The main research 
questions for this chapter are: 
 How the institutional framework and physical conditions affect the performance of firms 
of different sizes and ages? 
 How can the components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem be ranked to find the weak 
links in entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs? 
 Given the importance of corruption, what are its effects on the performance of SMEs? 
 
The main contributions of this chapter are: firstly, this study is an addition to the 
relatively scarce literature on the analysis of entrepreneurial ecosystems of LMICs. Moreover, 
none of the existing studies has empirically examined the effect of all components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem on firm performance in LMICs. The components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem are also ranked with respect to their statistical significance and the 
magnitude of their effects. Secondly, the findings will provide a basis for policymakers, 
development agencies and researchers to better understand the entrepreneurial ecosystem of 
LMICs in order to promote entrepreneurship. The ranking of components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem on the basis of their magnitude of effects on SMEs, will help in finding weak links 
and setting priorities for gradually improving the components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
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4.3 The Data and Descriptive Analysis 
The data for 44 LMICs listed by the World Bank on the basis of their gross national income per 
capita was obtained from the WBES database for the period 2006-14. The Egyptian Arab 
Republic, Morocco and the Syrian Arab Republic were dropped due to their non-global survey 
methodology. In each survey round, the sample is selected randomly. Panel data is available for 
only a few developed countries and transition economies, but not for the LMICs group. 
Therefore, in this study pooled cross sectional survey data for 41 LMICs has been used. There 
are 22,267 SMEs in the final. The details regarding sample distribution are given in Table 4.1. 
The performance of SMEs has been measured using annual sales growth, annual 
employment growth and annual labour productivity growth, in comparison to their sales and 
employment three years before. Data in the form of objective and subjective measurement of 
components of the institutional framework and physical conditions forming the entrepreneurial 
ecosystems is available in the database. The components of the institutional framework 
investigated here are government regulations, the taxation system and corruption, whereas access 
to finance, infrastructure, political stability, informal sector, and availability of an educated 
workforce are used as determinants of physical conditions. 
The subjective, perception-based, data on components of the entrepreneurial ecosystems 
has been geographically aggregated to the province level, excluding the response of an individual 
firm, within each country. This provincial level aggregation has enabled the assessment of the 
impact of the entrepreneurial ecosystem on the firms operating within the province. The 
measurement of firm performance indicators and components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem 




Table 4. 1: Descriptive Statistics of SMEs in Low-Middle Income Countries (2006-14)  
Variables Frequency Percent 
Firm Size 
Small(<20) 12,380 55.6 
Medium(20-99) 9,887 44.4 
Sector 
Services Sector 8940 40.15 
Manufacturing Sector 13327 59.85 
Legal Form 
Sole Proprietorship 5,791 26.03 
Share Holding Company 1,064 4.78 
Partnership 11,464 51.53 
Limited Partnership 2,306 10.37 
Other 1,621 7.29 
Ownership 
Domestic 20,928 94.01 
Foreign 1,334 5.99 
Exporter 
Non-exporter 20,679 93.09 
Exporter 1,535 6.91 
Firm Age 
(1-5 years) Young firms 8031 36.07 
(more than 5 years) Old Firms 14236 63.93 
Survey Year 2006 2,357 10.59 
 
2007 3,430 15.4 
 
2008 780 3.5 
 
2009 4,561 20.48 
 
2010 1,374 6.17 
 
2011 409 1.84 
 
2012 154 0.69 
 
2013 3,002 13.48 
 
2014 6,200 27.84 
 
Means and standard deviations (SD) of the firm performance indicators for the LMICs 
for the period 2006-14 are given below in Table 4.2. These countries present an interesting mix 
with firms in some countries exhibiting average annual sales growth as high as 26% in 
Swaziland and as low as -7% in Uzbekistan and India. The firms in Bhutan and Timor-Leste 
showed the highest increase in employment growth by 14%, whereas Uzbekistan, Ukraine, 
Philippines, Kyrgyz Republic and Lao PDR showed an increase of less than 1%. The average 
annual labour productivity growth has increased by 19% in Congo and decreased in 14 countries, 
including India, Paraguay, Yemen, Uzbekistan, Kosovo and Mauritania.  
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Table 4. 2: Country wise summary statistics of performance of firms 
 
 Sales Growth Employment Growth Labour Productivity Growth 
Country N Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Armenia 339 15.58 26.10 5.06 15.57 11.41 25.46 
Bhutan 194 16.15 37.28 14.13 25.16 3.12 40.22 
Bolivia 426 7.43 26.06 4.88 16.05 3.01 26.09 
Cabo Verde 59 1.02 57.29 3.07 16.82 -0.92 56.26 
Cameroon 248 15.35 23.94 2.97 15.70 12.49 24.89 
Congo 38 25.21 35.58 7.03 15.80 19.36 37.95 
Côte d'Ivoire 264 18.11 30.84 11.47 24.59 7.88 34.64 
Djibouti 54 3.80 16.22 6.39 12.53 -1.23 19.67 
El Salvador 555 5.63 23.28 2.31 15.46 3.30 24.38 
Georgia 357 17.24 33.21 7.63 20.90 11.54 32.55 
Ghana 823 9.79 25.57 6.12 16.22 3.97 27.96 
Guatemala 595 2.37 23.22 0.62 18.54 2.01 24.73 
Guyana 85 6.02 18.19 5.90 13.51 0.35 18.87 
Honduras 450 5.16 30.61 2.05 14.59 3.08 31.75 
India 6,200 -6.52 14.43 3.93 9.55 -10.35 15.69 
Indonesia 889 3.46 28.06 5.38 21.72 -1.25 31.21 
Kosovo 338 1.67 18.15 6.12 12.98 -4.09 20.69 
Kyrgyz Republic 291 4.77 21.61 0.27 14.11 4.47 21.91 
Lao PDR 442 6.94 30.85 0.10 18.94 6.59 30.18 
Lesotho 84 12.07 40.73 11.35 27.90 3.54 42.77 
Mauritania 186 4.55 11.86 8.26 9.90 -3.59 13.14 
Micronesia 48 2.00 43.77 6.84 21.29 -2.34 43.98 
Moldova 473 5.22 25.18 2.00 13.35 3.51 25.08 
Mongolia 523 14.48 19.15 6.52 15.19 8.65 20.03 
Nicaragua 545 3.29 28.27 3.77 14.48 -0.10 29.37 
Nigeria 1,592 12.57 12.23 11.01 10.01 1.77 14.53 
Pakistan 705 -0.69 16.34 2.11 7.71 -2.51 16.93 
Paraguay 495 -4.56 25.25 5.86 16.91 -9.44 26.72 
Philippines 725 8.80 30.03 -0.68 17.39 9.37 31.41 
Samoa 63 5.53 34.97 7.42 18.94 -0.82 36.62 
Senegal 385 7.89 9.67 8.63 11.36 -0.52 12.64 
Sri Lanka 409 10.87 20.76 2.21 13.84 8.93 22.35 
Swaziland 174 25.68 13.29 7.96 9.48 18.60 14.83 
Timor-Leste 70 19.51 31.78 14.03 31.91 14.09 34.86 
Ukraine 665 2.96 27.97 -1.15 16.28 4.30 26.46 
Uzbekistan 430 -6.61 39.31 -2.61 19.51 -4.13 38.77 
Vanuatu 69 17.78 25.71 12.57 20.26 5.05 23.85 
Vietnam 508 14.19 29.27 6.63 22.16 8.10 30.21 
West Bank and Gaza 197 6.29 17.60 6.39 14.39 0.21 19.88 
Yemen 441 -3.23 25.43 2.35 15.46 -5.45 25.33 
Zambia 833 13.16 26.38 5.27 14.18 8.50 27.85 
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The summary statistics of objective and subjective measures of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem of LMICs are given in Table 4.3. The mean values for access to finance and 
infrastructure are highest with respect to other components, whereas the non-availability of an 
educated workforce as a problem is reported by the lowest percentage of firms in the sample. 
Power outages are an important infrastructural shortcoming reported by the firms. The maximum 
value of power outages in a month is 240 which can be converted to 10 power outages per day if 
24 working days are assumed in a month.  
Table 4. 3: Summary statistics for all SMEs in LMICs 
 
Mean S.D Min Max 
Annual sales growth (%) 3.60 24.33 -99.90 99.98 
Annual employment growth (%) 4.49 15.04 -100.00 100.00 
Annual labour productivity growth (%) -0.56 25.11 -99.89 99.98 
Government regulations 10.71 7.44 0.00 70.00 
Tax rate and administration 9.30 9.10 0.00 52.46 
Corruption 13.17 10.85 0.00 75.61 
Access to finance 16.23 11.97 0.00 66.67 
Infrastructure 23.35 20.53 0.00 93.26 
Political instability 6.42 9.28 0.00 85.00 
Non-availability of an educated workforce 4.41 4.76 0.00 31.58 
Competition with informal sector 11.83 10.08 0.00 50.00 
Time spent in meeting government regulations 6.22 10.93 0.00 92.00 
Number of visits for meeting tax officials 1.87 3.46 0.00 85.00 
Security cost as percentage of sales 1.45 3.87 0.00 99.10 
Year operated before registration 0.81 4.34 0.00 31.00 
Working capital financing from bank 12.92 25.04 0.00 100.00 
Number of power outages in a month 10.04 17.51 0.00 240.00 
Value lost due to power outages 3.28 7.33 0.00 95.00 
Years of experience of top manager 15.62 10.15 0.00 40.00 
Total number of permanent employees 22.85 20.45 0.00 99.00 
 
In Table 4.4, the summary statistics of components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem are 
further divided with respect to the size and age of firms. There is a substantial difference in firms 
of different sizes and ages with respect to the most significant component of the entrepreneurial 
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ecosystem. The negative effects of access to finance were reported by 23% of small firms as 
compared to only 15% of medium sized firms. Similarly, infrastructural problems are reported 
by 35% of small firms, which is much higher than the figure reported by medium sized firms 
(25%). Also, there is a difference in the response of young and older firms in terms of 
recognizing any component as the most significant. These variations in responses of firms by 
different size and age suggest the need for further analysis, which we undertake in the regression 
analysis in the next section. 
Table 4. 4: The importance of different components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem as reported 
by firms of different sizes and ages 
Variables Small firms Medium sized firms Young firms Old firms 
Government regulations 10.57 13.84 10.93 12.61 
Tax rate and administration 9.04 11.81 8.95 10.99 
Corruption 13.70 17.05 12.84 16.52 
Access to finance 22.99 15.13 2.14 18.26 
Infrastructure 34.73 25.49 38.39 26.37 
Political Instability 6.78 6.97 6.22 7.23 
Non-availability of an Educated Workforce 3.64 5.86 4.52 4.67 
Competition with informal Sector 12.94 14.04 11.95 14.27 
     Note: Young firms are those less than or equal to 5 years of age, others are considered as old. 
 
4.4 A Statistical Analysis of the Effect of Institutional Framework and Physical 
Conditions on Firm Performance 
In this section, the research questions have been answered using the results of multiple 
regression methods and matching methods, and our findings are compared with those in the 
existing literature. The results of the multiple regression models are used to explain the effects of 
components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem (institutional framework and physical conditions) 
on the performance of SMEs in LMICs. Section 4.5 ranks those components based on their 
quantitative and statistical significance to allow us to discern which matter most for firms of 
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different sizes and ages. This identification of the weakest and the strongest links in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem will help policymakers to decide the starting point for improvements 
in the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs. According to the existing literature, the effect of 
corruption (the weakest link) on the performance of SMEs has been tested using matching 
methods, and results are explained in section 4.6. 
We start the analysis of the effects of elements of institutional framework and physical 
conditions by examining a correlation matrix of all the covariates. The aim is to check for 
collinearity among the predictors used in regression analysis. The results reported in Table 4.5 
show that a few variables are correlated but there is no issue of widespread bivariate collinearity 
among the predictors. Moreover, robust standard errors are used in regression estimation to avoid 
the problem of heteroscedasticity, rendering the regression estimates free of multi-collinearity 
and heteroskedasticity issues. 
The values of the R
2
 reported in Tables 4.6 and 4.7, range from 6% to 15%. These values 
of the R
2
 are relatively low, however, it has been ascertained in the literature that in spite of this, 
the theoretically argued relationship between predictors and response variables can be significant 
and reveal interesting findings. Thus, a meaningful relationship can possibly exist even when 
value of R
2
 is low. Moreover, the values of the F-tests reported in Table 4.6 and 4.7 show the 
goodness of fit of our models. Therefore, the results of the multiple regression analysis generate 




Table 4. 5: Correlation matrix of predictors used in regression estimation 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10% 
 
  AF Reg Inf Corr CIF Pol Tax WFE BankF Treg TaxA InfExp SC Elec TMExp size age 
Access to finance AF 1                 
Government regulations Reg -0.178 1                
Infrastructure Inf -0.132 -0.439** 1               
Corruption as Corr -0.338* 0.040 -0.263 1              
Competition with informal 
sector 
CIF -0.068 0.123 -0.467** -0.011 1             
Political instability Pol -0.022 -0.080 -0.333* -0.001 0.097 1            
Taxation system Tax -0.143 0.071 -0.156 0.016 -0.158 -0.187 1           
Workforce education WFE -0.074 0.113 -0.158 0.013 0.133 -0.021 0.100 1          
Working Capital Bank 
Financing (%) 
BankF -0.094 0.131 -0.077 0.120 0.015 -0.080 0.078 0.044 1         
Time spent in meeting govt 
regulations (hours) 
TReg -0.012 0.024 -0.105 0.001 0.113 0.106 -0.066 0.106 -0.009 1        
Number of visits for 
meeting tax officials 
TaxA 0.060 -0.031 0.082 -0.065 -0.092 0.032 -0.026 -0.016 -0.019 0.048 1       
Years operated without 
registration 
InfExp 0.051 -0.006 -0.045 -0.030 0.018 0.010 0.023 0.014 -0.024 0.012 -0.008 1      
Security Cost (% of sales) SC 0.000 -0.031 0.014 0.022 -0.008 0.029 -0.039 0.007 -0.008 0.066 0.040 0.000 1     
Number of power outages 
in a month 
Elect -0.106 -0.009 0.411** 0.080 -0.336* -0.109 -0.107 -0.196 0.067 -0.078 0.083 -0.036 -0.006 1    
Experience of top manager 
(years) 
TMExp -0.035 -0.022 -0.086 0.071 0.086 0.110 -0.028 0.033 0.017 0.076 -0.012 0.098 0.012 -0.037 1   
Firm size Size -0.076 0.118 -0.140 0.103 0.048 -0.024 0.089 0.082 0.075 0.040 0.005 0.011 -0.006 -0.023 0.035 1  
Age of firm Age -0.080 0.083 -0.142 0.130 0.054 0.044 0.073 0.014 0.069 0.019 -0.030 0.112 0.004 -0.027 0.359* 0.119 1 
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4.4.1 The Effect of Institutional Framework on Firm Performance 
The effect of the institutional framework arises through both formal and informal institutions. 
The elements of formal institutions are government regulations and the taxation system, whereas 
corruption is used as an indicator of informal institutions. The measurement of these variables is 
explained in Chapter 3, Table 3.4. 
It can be seen from Tables 4.6 and 4.7 that government regulations in LMICs have a 
statistically significant negative effect on the performance of firms of all sizes and ages. 
However, the magnitude of these effects on performance of medium sized firms is large relative 
to firms in the other size groups. A marginal increase in government regulations is expected to 
decrease the sales growth and labour productivity growth of medium sized firms by 0.37% and 
0.25% respectively. On the other hand, the age based classification shows that the magnitude of 
the negative effect of government regulations is substantially higher for young firms when 
compared with older firms. A marginal increase in government regulations is expected to 
decrease the sales growth, employment growth and labour productivity growth of young firms by 
0.45%, 0.19% and 0.27%, respectively. The higher magnitude of effect on young firms could be 
because it takes time and money to understand and follow government regulations. Moreover, in 
the early years, firms are closely monitored by the regulators, whereas later on they are either not 
closely observed, or they understand the requirements and follow them easily. 
Compliance with government regulations is difficult and probably costly for all SMEs. 
Since the sampling frame for this study consisted of only registered firms that have to spend time 
in meeting government regulations, compliance is not just a cost for the firms but it also opens 
different business opportunities as well. It can be seen from results in Table 4.6 that time spent in 
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meeting government regulations has a statistically significant positive effect on performance of 
SMEs. 
However, spending time in meeting government regulations has proved relatively more 
productive for medium sized and young firms. It can be inferred that an additional ten hours per 
week spent in meeting government regulations are expected to increase the sales growth and 
labour productivity growth of medium sized firms by 1.02% and 0.75% and labour productivity 
growth of young firms by 1.13%. Thus, compliance of government regulations is expected to 
create new business opportunities. This positive effect confirms the argument of Zinnes (2009) 
that compliance of government regulations is expected to create more business opportunities for 
firms because only firms complying with government regulations are considered eligible for 
government‘s financial support, training and development and business opportunity incentives. 
The findings of this study are in line with findings of other studies mentioned in literature, such 
as the work by De Jong and Van Witteloostuijn (2015), Griffith et al. (2010), and Carter et al. 
(2009). 
The results reported in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show that tax rates and administration has a 
statistically significant negative effect on the performance of medium sized and young firms 
only. A marginal increase in the tax rate is expected to decrease the sales growth and labour 
productivity growth of medium sized firms by 0.18% and 0.15% and young firms by 0.19% and 
0.12%, respectively. Johansson et al. (2010) found similar results for the effect of corporate tax 






Table 4. 6: A multiple regression model for the effect of components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystems on performance of SMEs 
 Sales Growth Employment Growth Labour Productivity Growth 












Government regulations -0.235*** -0.124** -0.366*** -0.117*** -0.107** -0.113** -0.123** -0.031 -0.248*** 
(0.040) (0.055) (0.059) (0.026) (0.036) (0.036) (0.042) (0.058) (0.062) 
Tax rate and 
administration 
-0.088** -0.002 -0.182*** -0.006 0.021 -0.021 -0.077** -0.017 -0.154*** 
(0.032) (0.046) (0.046) (0.021) (0.030) (0.029) (0.034) (0.049) (0.048) 
Corruption -0.207*** -0.174*** -0.234*** -0.118*** -0.061** -0.169*** -0.097** -0.125** -0.069* 
(0.029) (0.042) (0.042) (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.031) (0.044) (0.044) 
Access to finance -0.187*** -0.103** -0.288*** -0.024 0.011 -0.055* -0.161*** -0.112** -0.233*** 
(0.033) (0.046) (0.048) (0.021) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.049) (0.050) 
Infrastructure -0.088*** -0.017 -0.184*** -0.031 -0.006 -0.050 -0.056 -0.014 -0.127** 
(0.034) (0.045) (0.053) (0.022) (0.029) (0.033) (0.036) (0.047) (0.056) 
Political instability -0.242*** -0.240*** -0.235*** -0.134*** -0.144*** -0.104** -0.113** -0.106** -0.127** 
(0.038) (0.051) (0.058) (0.024) (0.033) (0.036) (0.040) (0.054) (0.061) 
Non-availability of an 
educated workforce  
-0.130** -0.050 -0.223** -0.070* -0.028 -0.128** -0.077 -0.038 -0.116 
(0.059) (0.081) (0.088) (0.038) (0.053) (0.054) (0.062) (0.086) (0.092) 
Competition with 
informal sector 
-0.154*** -0.083* -0.231*** -0.073*** -0.046 -0.078** -0.075** -0.038 -0.137** 
(0.035) (0.048) (0.051) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.051) (0.053) 
Working capital bank 
financing (%) 
-0.005 -0.001 -0.006 0.001 0.007 -0.002 -0.005 -0.009 -0.002 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) 
Time spent in meeting 
govt regulations (hours) 
0.080*** 0.063** 0.102*** 0.020** 0.007 0.034** 0.066*** 0.061** 0.075*** 
(0.015) (0.021) (0.022) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) 
Number of visits for 
meeting tax officials 
0.024 -0.027 0.103 -0.002 0.053 -0.072* 0.040 -0.033 0.150** 
(0.046) (0.063) (0.069) (0.030) (0.041) (0.042) (0.049) (0.067) (0.072) 
Years operated without 
registration 
0.056 0.080 0.049 -0.046** -0.029 -0.049* 0.089** 0.103* 0.083* 
(0.036) (0.055) (0.048) (0.023) (0.036) (0.030) (0.038) (0.058) (0.050) 
Security cost (% of 
sales) 
-0.207*** -0.211*** -0.194** -0.067** -0.121*** 0.010 -0.146*** -0.107* -0.191** 
(0.040) (0.052) (0.063) (0.026) (0.034) (0.039) (0.042) (0.055) (0.066) 
Number of power 
outages in a month 
-0.019* -0.020 -0.019 -0.012* -0.013 -0.010 -0.008 -0.010 -0.006 
0.011 0.015 0.016 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.016 0.017 
Old firms (age above 5 
years) 
-3.729*** -3.503*** -3.829*** -3.374*** -3.127*** -3.630*** -0.807** -0.952* -0.459 
(0.357) (0.480) (0.540) (0.228) (0.312) (0.333) (0.376) (0.508) (0.566) 
Constant 21.221*** 15.766 28.751*** 13.281*** 10.741*** 16.922*** 8.678** 6.176 12.017** 
(2.669) (3.708) (3.903) (1.703) (2.407) (2.408) (2.810) (3.922) (4.090) 
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.130 0.124 0.146 0.074 0.088 0.079 0.095 0.083 0.113 
Observations 22267 12380 9887 22267 12380 9887 22267 12380 9887 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%, Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
Dummy variable for firm age is used with young firms as reference category. Dummy variable for country is also used but the 




Table 4. 7: A multiple regression model for the effect of components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystems on the performance of young and old SMEs 
 
Sales Growth Employment Growth Labour Productivity Growth 
 
Young firms Old firms Young firms Old firms Young firms Old firms 
Government regulations -0.455*** -0.125** -0.191*** -0.086** -0.265*** -0.048 
(0.069) (0.049) (0.046) (0.030) (0.073) (0.052) 
Tax rate and administration -0.194*** -0.042 -0.071* 0.003 -0.119* -0.044 
(0.060) (0.039) (0.040) (0.024) (0.063) (0.040) 
Corruption -0.326*** -0.143*** -0.211*** -0.074*** -0.115** -0.081** 
(0.052) (0.036) (0.035) (0.022) (0.056) (0.037) 
Access to finance -0.325*** -0.124** -0.116** 0.011 -0.198** -0.140*** 
(0.060) (0.040) (0.041) (0.024) (0.064) (0.042) 
Infrastructure -0.223*** -0.037 -0.099** -0.010 -0.113* -0.032 
 (0.062) (0.040) (0.042) (0.025) (0.066) (0.042) 
Political instability -0.276*** -0.243*** -0.121** -0.149*** -0.148** -0.109** 
(0.067) (0.046) (0.046) (0.028) (0.072) (0.048) 
Non-availability of an educated 
workforce 
-0.310** -0.053 -0.142** -0.038 -0.178* -0.038 
(0.099) (0.074) (0.067) (0.045) (0.105) (0.078) 
Competition with informal sector -0.286*** -0.093** -0.114** -0.063** -0.155** -0.030 
(0.062) (0.042) (0.042) (0.025) (0.067) (0.044) 
Working capital bank financing (%) 0.015 -0.010 0.015* -0.003 0.002 -0.007 
(0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.013) (0.008) 
Time spent in meeting govt regulations 
(hours) 
0.078** 0.081*** -0.027 0.042*** 0.113*** 0.045** 
(0.028) (0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.030) (0.019) 
Number of visits for meeting tax 
officials 
-0.036 0.085* 0.016 -0.016 -0.012 0.094 
(0.071) (0.062) (0.048) (0.038) (0.076) (0.064) 
Years operated without registration 0.471 0.066** 0.670** -0.038* -0.231 0.096** 
(0.359) (0.036) (0.243) (0.022) (0.383) (0.038) 
Security Cost (% of sales) -0.174** -0.218*** -0.043 -0.075** -0.121 -0.155** 
(0.070) (0.048) (0.048) (0.030) (0.075) (0.051) 
Number of power outages in a month -0.036** -0.010 -0.006 -0.010 -0.030 0.001 
0.019 0.014 0.013 0.008 0.020 0.014 
Medium sized firms 0.996* 1.501*** 2.388*** 1.784*** -1.543** -0.093 
(0.577) (0.389) (0.391) (0.238) (0.615) (0.408) 
Constant 36.643*** 10.366*** 20.146*** 7.307*** 16.455*** 3.834 
(4.834) (3.196) (3.277) (1.953) (5.154) (3.348) 
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.138 0.110 0.067 0.057 0.092 0.099 
Observations 8031 14236 8031 14236 8031 14236 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%, Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
Dummy variable for firm size is used with small firms as a reference category. Dummy variable for country is also used but 




Thus, it can be inferred that formal institutions in LMICs have statistically significantly 
negative effects on the performance of SMEs. However, the magnitude of these effects is 
relatively higher for medium sized and young firms. Since the magnitude of effects is 
substantially higher for medium sized firms and young firms, this should be kept in mind when 
introducing any institutional reforms for SMEs. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, effective institutions reduce transaction costs for business and 
provide an enabling environment to existing and new ventures (Fritsch and Storey, 2014; 
Williams and Vorley, 2015). However, it is important for policymakers to look at both formal 
and informal institutional framework conditions to foster entrepreneurship. The results reported 
in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show that corruption as an indicator of informal institutions has a 
statistically significant negative effect on the performance of SMEs in LMICs. However, just 
like formal institutions, the medium sized and young firms will benefit more from a decrease in 
corruption. 
The estimated effects indicate that a unit decrease in corruption perception is expected to 
improve the sales growth and employment growth of medium sized firms by 0.23% and 0.17%, 
and young firms by 0.33% and 0.21%, respectively. Wu (2009) suggested that corrupt officials 
choose targets on the basis of their ability to pay bribes. Medium sized firms have greater 
capacity to pay bribes than small firms, which may explain why the magnitude of the effect is 
larger for these firms. Also, the amount and number of bribes to be paid is linked to networking 
with the relevant officials (Blagojević and Damijan, 2013; De Rosa et al., 2010), and old firms 
are expected to be relatively better connected than young firms. Therefore, it can be argued on 
the basis of these findings that, experience of firms in the market improves their understanding of 
the market dynamics and ties with relevant government officials. The maturity of a firm 
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enhances its ability to either negotiate the external challenges or adapt to the external 
environment.  
4.4.2 The Effect of Physical Conditions on Firm Performance 
The elements of physical conditions include access to finance, infrastructure, political stability, 
an educated workforce and the informal sector. The detailed definitions and measurement of 
these indicators is given in Chapter 3, Table 3.4. The results in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show that a 
lack of access to finance has a statistically significant negative effect on the performance of all 
types of SMEs. However, the magnitude of these negative effects is larger for medium sized and 
young firms. A marginal increase in the difficulty in obtaining bank financing is expected to 
decrease sales growth and labour productivity growth by 0.28% and 0.23% for medium sized 
firms and 0.32% and 0.19% for young firms. These results are similar to the findings of the 
studies discussed in the literature by Becket al. (2005b), Oliveira and Fortunato (2006), Aterido 
et al. (2007), and Ayyagari et al. (2008). 
According to Djankov et al. (2002b), small firms use informal sources, including friends 
and family members, to fulfil their financial requirements and avoid external financing. Since, 
the financial needs of medium sized firms are relatively higher than small firms and beyond the 
capacity of informal sources only, the performance of medium sized firms is more severely 
affected when external formal financing is either costly, or difficult to obtain. Moreover, it can 
be argued that the experience of a firm in the market saves it from the financial obstacles. The 
history of survival and success of old firms is used by the banks to lend money. It can be argued 
on the basis of findings that bank financing is costly for firms, and an increase in difficulty in 
borrowing is expected to have a negative effect on firm performance. Therefore, improvements 
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in financial markets to make financing cheaper and easier to obtain are expected to decrease the 
financial worries of all SMEs. 
Just like access to finance, infrastructure has a statistically significant negative effect on 
the performance of medium sized and young firms. It can be seen in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 that a 
unit increase in infrastructural problems is expected to decrease sales growth and labour 
productivity growth by 0.18% and 0.13% for medium sized firms and 0.22% and 0.11% for 
young firms. These findings are consistent with the studies of Scott et al. (2014), Moyo (2012) 
and Banerjee et al. (2012). 
However, the insignificant effect of infrastructure on performance of small and old firms 
seems counter-intuitive. It can be argued that the use and dependence of medium sized and 
young firms on the infrastructural facilities is relatively high, so their performance is negatively 
affected by poor quality of infrastructure. The investment in infrastructural support is non-
developmental for business. If the resources allocated to these infrastructural inefficiencies were 
used for training and development of employees, labour productivity could have been improved. 
On the other hand, an old firms‘ adaptability to the external environment minimizes the effect of 
these external infrastructural problems and the narrow scope of business of small firms allows 
them to operate with the available infrastructure. The development of both small and old firms 
however, depends on quality of infrastructure. 
The effect of political instability has been found to be statistically significantly negative 
and high in magnitude for performance of firms of all sizes and ages. A marginal increase in 
political instability is expected to decrease the sales growth, employment growth and labour 
productivity growth of all firms by 0.24%, 0.13% and 0.11%, respectively. The similar level of 
effect on productivity was found in studies by Klapper et al. (2013), Petracco and Schweiger 
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(2012), Cerra and Saxena (2008) and Ayyagari et al. (2008). It can be inferred on the basis of 
these findings that political instability increases the risk and uncertainty for SMEs. The hesitation 
in further investment, or a safety first attitude because of inconsistent government policies, can 
possibly be the reasons for a decrease in performance of firms. 
Similarly, a one percent increase in security cost as percentage of sales is expected to 
decrease sales growth, employment growth and labour productivity growth of all SMEs by 
0.21%, 0.07% and 0.15%, respectively. The cost incurred in protecting the business under 
conditions of insecurity is another non-productive investment for entrepreneurs, especially for 
owners of small firms. Collier and Duponchel (2013) found a similar negative effect of conflicts 
and violence on revenue growth of firms in Sierra Leone. The findings are opposite to those by 
Petracco and Schweiger (2012) who suggested that employment growth of small and medium 
and young and old firms remained unaffected by the conflicts in Georgia. However, that study 
was specific to the context of the Georgia-Russia conflict over South Ossetia. Therefore, they 
might not be comparable with other regions with a different type and intensity of security 
problems. 
The non-availability of an educated workforce has a statistically significant negative 
effect on the performance of medium and young firms only. The estimates reported in Tables 4.6 
and 4.7 show that non-availability of an educated workforce reduces sales growth, employment 
growth and labour productivity growth. Therefore, a marginal improvement in the availability of 
an educated workforce is expected to increase the sales growth of medium sized firm by 0.22% 
and young firms by 0.31%. The findings of a study by Doms et al. (2010) showed the positive 
effects of an educated workforce on firms‘ revenues and profitability. Also Banker et al. (2008) 
found that an educated workforce had a positive effect on the performance of IT firms in Taiwan. 
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The performance of both small and old firms is expected to remain unaffected by the 
non-availability of an educated workforce. The insignificant effect on the performance of small 
firms indicates their low demand for skilled and educated labour. On the other hand, medium 
sized firms are involved in relatively more complex technology and operations, therefore, the 
non-availability of an educated workforce can significantly negatively affect their performance. 
Moreover, it is a challenge for young firms to attract skilled labour, whereas mature firms are 
better able to attract and retain skilled workers by offering better terms and conditions. The 
findings of studies by Galindo-Rueda and Haskel (2005) and Collier et al. (2011) suggest that 
investment in human capital by firms and governments has statistically significant positive 
effects on firm performance and the overall economy; and will not only improve the rate of 
survival of firms, but will also improve their profitability and productivity. 
An increase in informal businesses takes away market share from formally registered 
businesses. Therefore, an increase in competition with the informal sector is expected to 
negatively affect the performance of existing firms. The results reported in Table 4.6 show a 
statistically significant negative effect of competition with the informal sector on the 
performance of SMEs. However, the magnitude of the negative effect is relatively higher for 
medium sized and young firms. It can be estimated that a marginal increase in competition with 
the informal sector will decrease sales growth and labour productivity growth of medium sized 
firms by 0.23% and 0.14% (see Table 4.6) and young firms by 0.29% and 0.16% (see Table 4.7), 
respectively.  These findings are in line with studies mentioned in the literature (Maloney, 2004; 
Williams and Kedir, 2017a). 
However, the informal sector has its cost and benefits. It gives valuable experience to 
new entrepreneurs, with a relatively low cost of compliance, but it also increases competition 
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with the formal economy. It can be seen in the results in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 that firms enjoy 
positive externalities from experience in the informal sector. A one year increase in the 
experience of firms in the informal economy is expected to increase the labour productivity 
growth of small firms by 0.10% and medium sized firms by 0.08% and employment growth of 
young firms by 0.67%. The positive effect of operating in the informal economy before formal 
registration could be the reason why a substantial number of firms in LMICs choose to remain 
informal. Williams et al. (2017) also suggested a similar positive effect of experience in the 
informal market. 
It can be inferred that firms in LMICs initially operate in the informal sector and, after 
gaining useful experience, register in formal economy. Moreover, young registered firms are 
negatively affected by the competition from firms in informal sector. Thus, it can be concluded 
that the informal sector has both positive and negative effects on the performance of SMEs. It 
provides important market experience and understanding to the firms looking towards 
registration in the formal economy, but at the same time these informal firms take advantage of 
their low compliance costs and significantly negatively affect the performance of registered 
young and medium sized firms. 
4.5 Weak Links in Entrepreneurial Ecosystems of LMICs 
After the analysis of the effects of elements of the institutional framework and physical 
conditions in the earlier section, this section explains which components are the weakest links in 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs. Both the institutional framework and physical 
conditions are equally important for the success of an entrepreneurial ecosystem. However, when 
it comes to setting priorities about what needs to be corrected immediately with most effect, then 
identification of weaker links in the system become more important. No study in the literature 
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has used all of the components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in one model to test their effect 
on the performance of SMEs in LMICs. Also, no study has ranked the entrepreneurial ecosystem 
components in terms of their effectiveness in enhancing the performance of firms of different 
sizes and ages. 
The results in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 are used to perform a comparative analysis of the effects 
of different components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem; all of which have a negative effect on 
the performance of SMEs. Therefore, the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs can be considered 
as a constraint on the performance of firms. However, the top three components are selected on 
the basis of the level of statistical significance and the magnitude of their effect on the 
performance of firms of different sizes and ages. This ranking suggests that corruption, 
government regulations and political instability are the most important components for the 
performance of SMEs in LMICs. Government regulation and corruption are part of the 
institutional framework and political instability is an element of physical conditions.  
The inefficient functioning of formal institutions and widespread corruption negatively 
affects entrepreneurial activity in a region (Vorley and Williams, 2016), and the poor condition 
of institutions in LMICs has been reported by a number of studies in the literature (Blagojević 
and Damijan, 2013; De Jong and Van Witteloostuijn, 2015; Fisman and Svensson, 2007; Wu, 
2009). Political instability is another important hindrance to success for SMEs. Uncertainty in 
political conditions results in inconsistent policies which weakens the institutions. The study by 
Klapper et al. (2013) suggested that political instability negatively affected the size of firms. 
Similarly, the studies by Cerra and Saxena (2008), Camacho and Rodriguez (2013) and Collier 
and Duponchel (2013) have found negative effects of different kinds of political instability (e.g. 
terrorist activities, conflict between two countries, civil war, government changes etc.) on firm 
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performance. Therefore, it can be concluded that performance of SMEs in LMICs can improve 
significantly if improvements in control over corruption, government regulation and political 
instability are ensured. 
However, analysis of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs shows that corruption is 
the most significant problem for firms of all sizes and ages. The problems in institutional 
frameworks may be the reason why firms get involved in corruption to ensure survival and 
growth in the market; weak institutions compel entrepreneurs to engage in corrupt practices for 
survival in the market. The response of entrepreneurs to deal with corruption varies from using 
different strategies to avoid corruption or accepting it as a cultural aspect and so become 
perpetrators of corruption. Therefore, it is important to introduce reforms to improve the 
performance of formal institutions; however, it is equally important to improve the interplay of 
formal and informal institutions (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2002; Tonoyan et al., 2010). Thus, 
corruption can be regarded as the weakest link in entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs and an 
improvement in control over corruption should be the first priority of LMICs in order to make 
their entrepreneurial ecosystem conducive for the performance of SMEs. 
4.6 Further Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on Firm Performance 
This section is aimed at investigating the effect of levels of corruption on the performance of 
SMEs in more depth. The effect of corruption on firm performance has been investigated by 
studies cited in Chapter 2, but no study has compared the performance of SMEs in the least 
corrupt and the most corrupt LMICs as determined by the perception of business 
owners/managers. Therefore, using propensity score matching we examine the effect of 
corruption on firm performance, which is a methodological contribution of this study. Firm 
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performance in the most corrupt countries is expected to be substantially lower than firm 
performance in the least corrupt countries.  
The perception of owners/managers of the firms regarding the effect of corruption on 
doing business is aggregated to province level for each country. The data is divided into 4 
quartiles with respect to levels of corruption. The level of corruption in the 1
st
 quartile ranges 
from 0.58% to 5.04% and in the 4th quartile it ranges from 18.84% to 39.22%. As shown in 
Table 4.8, firms in the 1
st
 quartile belong to the least corrupt countries and this is considered as a 
control group, whereas firms in 4
th
 quartile are from the most corrupt countries and considered as 
the treated group, with ‗high doses‘ of corruption assumed as the treatment. There are 5,481 
firms from 14 LMICs in the treated group and 9,006 firms from 10 LMICs in control group. It is 
expected that higher ‗doses‘ of corruption (treatment) would substantially reduce the 
performance of treated firms as compared to counterfactual firms (similar firms operating in the 
least corrupt countries). 
The summary statistics in the treated and control groups with respect to the covariates 
used in the propensity score estimation are given in Table 4.9. The mean values of covariates are 
balanced between the treated and control groups, except the percentage of working capital 
financing from bank. Therefore, firms in treated and control groups are expected to be similar on 
the basis of all other characteristics. 
The methodology has been explained in section 3.2 of Chapter 3. The process begins with 
using appropriate covariates to estimate propensity scores, via a probit model. These propensity 
scores are used for testing the important assumptions, including the balancing property, hidden 
bias and overlap and common support, before estimating the Average Treatment Effect on 
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Treated (ATT). These diagnostics ensure that the ATT estimates are unbiased and indicate only 
the effect of treatment on treated units. 
Table 4. 8: The percentage of firms reporting corruption as an obstacle to firm performance: 
Treated vs Control group countries 










Georgia 173 0.58 India 6200 18.84 
Lao PDR 288 0.69 Yemen 441 22.22 
Uzbekistan 170 1.18 Vanuatu 69 23.19 
Côte d'Ivoire 264 2.27 Lesotho 84 23.81 
Armenia 160 2.50 Moldova 234 24.36 
Ghana 823 2.55 Swaziland 174 25.29 
Senegal 385 3.12 Guatemala 595 25.71 
Mauritania 186 3.23 Honduras 450 28.89 
Vietnam 508 3.35 El Salvador 555 29.37 
Sri Lanka 409 3.91 Kosovo 204 39.22 
Micronesia 48 4.17 
   Nigeria 1592 4.21 
   West Bank and Gaza 197 4.57 
   Mongolia 278 5.04 
    
Table 4. 9: Summary statistics of SMEs in Treated and Control group 
 
Control group Treated group 
 
Mean S.D Min Max Mean S.D Min Max 
Percentage of working capital financing from bank 6.48 18.11 0 100 20.26 29.77 0 100 
Averagely weekly hours spent  by senior 
management in meeting government regulations 
5.30 8.46 0 90 4.49 9.03 0 90 
Average no of visit for meetings with tax officials 2.44 4.07 0 85 1.90 3.72 0 85 
Year operated before registration 1.01 4.96 0 31 0.57 3.14 0 31 
Security cost as percentage of sales 1.43 3.61 0 85.7 1.37 3.83 0 66.65 
No of power outages in a month 10.25 12.74 0 240 14.26 22.08 0 100 
Value lost due to power outage (% of sales) 4.88 8.57 0 95 2.81 6.55 0 80 
Years of experience of top manager 14.12 9.06 1 40 15.10 10.06 1 40 





The balancing property is tested through propensity scores (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; 
Diprete and Gangl, 2004). The low values of bias for the matched samples shows that treatment 
assignment is unbiased and the procedure for matching methods will be able to balance the 
samples on the covariates. The results of propensity scores are reported in Table 4.10. The low 
value of the percentage of bias in the matched treatment assignment shows that we have a 
balanced sample. Figure 4.2 confirms this finding. Thus, it can be inferred that assignment to 
treatment using propensity scores is independent of the outcome. Thus, the balancing property is 
satisfied and matching estimates on the basis of treatment assignment will be unbiased. 
 
Table 4. 10: A Probit model for propensity scores estimation and biasness in matched and 
unmatched samples (all firms and small and medium sized firms), separately 
 All firms Small firms Medium firms 
  Percentage Bias  Percentage Bias  Percentage Bias 
  UM M  UM M  UM M 




-9.3 -3.4 0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.7 -0.3 -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-21.7 -1.4 




-13.7 -1.6 -0.016*** 
(0.004) 
-15.5 -7.9 -0.004 
(0.004) 
-9.2 1.3 




-1.5 -3.5 0.011*** 
(0.004) 
4.2 -5.5 -0.006 
(0.005) 
-8.6 -1.7 




56.0 -2.5 0.013*** 
(0.001) 
49.0 -6.3 0.009*** 
(0.001) 
51.4 3.0 




-10.8 -1.8 -0.042*** 
(0.005) 
-7.7 -2.5 -0.047*** 
(0.005) 
-14.6 -2.1 




-19.8 1.6 -0.020*** 
(0.002) 
-25.8 1.9 -0.023*** 
(0.003) 
-22.0 1.4 
Experience of top manager -0.013*** 
(0.001) 
10.3 -5.4 -0.009*** 
(0.002) 
20.7 -6.2 0.002** 
(0.001) 
16.7 -4.1 
Age of firm 0.661*** 
(0.020) 
62.3 -0.9 0.635*** 
(0.027) 





14.4 0.0 0.114 
(0.090) 





-7.8 -1.6 0.251*** 
(0.086) 
0.9 -1.0 -0.396*** 
(0.073) 
-22.6 -2.6 
Legal form 0.088*** 
(0.008) 
22.1 3.6 0.080*** 
(0.012) 





  -1.765*** 
(0.071) 
  -0.399*** 
(0.062) 
  
Observations 14478 7904 6575 
log likelihood -8117.77 -4709.36 -3334.85 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%, Standard errors are in parenthesis 








Testing for the common support and overlap conditions is another important assumption 
with respect to matching methods. This assumption tests the positive probability of getting at 
least one comparable firm from the control group as counterfactual evidence for each firm in the 
treated group. The firms in the treated group which have no closely comparable counterfactual 
evidence in the control group are deemed off the common support region and are excluded from 
estimates of the ATT. Figure 4.3 shows that matched samples for both small and medium sized 
firms exhibit sufficient overlap for finding counterfactual evidence for the firms in the treated 
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Figure 4. 3: Testing the Overlap and common support condition before and after matching of 
small and medium sized firms 
 
 
Hidden bias is another important assumption to check before estimating the ATT. It 
confirms that all important covariates are included in the model for estimation of the propensity 
scores, and the estimates are robust with respect to unobserved heterogeneity. Gamma Γ is the 
odds ratio of receiving treatment for two firms similar in terms of covariates. According to 
Rosenbaum (2002), a Γ value below 2 is an acceptable range. The value of Γ=2, for two firms 
comparable on observed covariates, indicates that the likelihood of receiving treatment is double 
for one firm over the other. The results of the Rosenbaum bounds tests in the form of Gamma 
ratio Γ are given in Table 4.11. If the value is zero between the lower and upper bounds of 
Hodges-Lehman point estimates, for any gamma Γ value up to 2, it shows the existence of 











4.11 that the estimates for sales growth and labour productivity growth are free of any hidden 
bias. However, in the case of employment growth there is a chance of hidden bias in treatment 
assignment. Therefore, the results of ATT in terms of employment growth should be interpreted 
with caution. 
 
Table 4. 11: Hidden Bias estimation using Rosenbaum bounds (rbounds) 
 
Sales Growth Employment Growth Labour Productivity Growth 
Gamma (Γ) t̂+ t̂- t̂+ t̂- t̂+ t̂- 
1 -13.945 -13.945 -1.987 -1.987 -11.731 -11.731 
1.1 -14.999 -12.888 -2.703 -1.247 -12.938 -10.528 
1.2 -15.960 -11.920 -3.307 -0.595 -14.042 -9.427 
1.3 -16.843 -11.024 -3.838 0.000 -15.060 -8.416 
1.4 -17.667 -10.189 -4.414 0.190 -16.006 -7.479 
1.5 -18.436 -9.406 -4.876 0.794 -16.892 -6.606 
1.6 -19.160 -8.671 -5.414 1.263 -17.722 -5.789 
1.7 -19.843 -7.974 -5.793 1.722 -18.507 -5.018 
1.8 -20.494 -7.315 -6.200 2.157 -19.249 -4.293 
1.9 -21.113 -6.688 -6.662 2.564 -19.954 -3.604 
2 -21.703 -6.089 -6.960 2.941 -20.625 -2.948 
* gamma= log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
t̂+= upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
t̂-= lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
 
The matching estimates have met all the required diagnostics (balanced samples, overlap 
and common support and hidden bias) for the results to be unbiased. Therefore, results of the 
ATT presented in Table 4.12 are unbiased estimates of the effect of treatment on the treated 
firms. The results show that firm performance in highly corrupt countries has been significantly 
lower than that for similar firms in the least corrupt countries. The difference in performance is 
quantitatively much higher with respect to sales growth and labour productivity whereas the 
effect on employment growth is statistically significant but with a lower order of magnitude. 
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The sales growth of firms in the treated group is 14% lower than sales growth of similar 
firms in the least corrupt countries. Similarly, after controlling for all other differences, labour 
productivity growth of firms in the most corrupt countries is 12% lower than firms in least 
corrupt countries. Therefore, control over corruption is expected to substantially improve the 
performance of SMEs in LMICs. Corruption does, therefore, negatively affect entrepreneurial 
aspirations which results in undermining the contribution of entrepreneurship in the economy. 
Moreover, corruption engenders mistrust among entrepreneurs with respect to government 
procedures. They tend to avoid legal procedures whenever possible because of assuming them as 
means of corruption. Therefore, governments in LMICs need to look into the reasons of wide-
spread corruption for controlling its effect on entrepreneurial activity.  
The effect of corruption with respect to size and the age of firms has also been examined. 
The results show that the effect of corruption is higher in magnitude for medium sized firms in 
comparison to small firms.  The sales growth of medium sized firms in the treated group is 17% 
lower than similar firms in the control group, whereas the difference in performance of small 
firms was 13%. Similarly, there is a 14% difference in labour productivity growth of medium 
sized firms in the most corrupt and least corrupt countries.  
Thus, corruption affects the performance of medium sized firms to a greater extent. 
According to McChesney (1987), rent seeking government agents look for the bribe payment 
capacity of firms before making a demand, therefore, the relatively greater capacity of the 
medium sized firms makes them preferred target. Moreover, Kushnir et al. (2010) found that the 
majority of small firms in LMICs prefer to work in the informal economy, therefore, medium 




The analysis has further examined the role of a firm‘s age with respect to performance. 
The results of ATT in Table 4.12 show that sales growth and labour productivity growth of both 
young and old firms have been equally, negatively, affected by the level of corruption in a 
country. The sales growth of young firms in the treated group is expected to be 15% lower than 
similar firms in the control group. The results of the analysis of age based sub-samples are not 
substantially different from the outcomes for all firms. The market experience of a firm can be a 
source of competitive advantage but it cannot save the firm from the negative effects of 
widespread corruption. 
The different levels of effect of corruption on small, medium, young and old firms are 
expected to result in different responses amongst entrepreneurs. The findings of a study by 
Henrekson and Sanandaji (2011) suggested that entrepreneurs abide, evade or alter the 
institutional requirements. They are not only the recipients of institutional reforms but also 
perpetrators. Some entrepreneurs tend to hide a part of their business activity to avoid corrupt 
officials; others curtail their growth plans; whereas some become perpetrators of corruption and 
use it as a way forward to pursue their entrepreneurial ambitions under the conditions of 
pervasive corruption. 
It can be concluded that besides other problems, corruption is the most significant 
component of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs that substantially negatively affects the 
performance of SMEs. Moreover, it can be argued on the basis of widespread corruption in 
LMICs that corruption is an inescapable reality for entrepreneurs in LMICs. It has become part 
of everyday life of entrepreneurs and they cannot fully avoid it. The asymmetry in formal and 
informal institutions has made room for corruption and it became a fact of life and the survival of 
entrepreneurs depends on engaging in it. 
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Table 4. 12: Average treatment effect on treated for sample of all firms, small firms, medium sized firms, young firms and old firms 
  
All firms Small firms Medium sized firms 
  





(0.357) -2.962 11.651 
-14.614 








(0.733) -2.968 9.611 
-12.579 








(0.234) 2.667 7.649 
-4.981 








(0.490) 2.669 4.815 
-2.146 









(0.379) -5.465 4.428 
-9.893 








(0.781) -5.473 4.703 
-10.176 




On common support 
 
14477 




Off common support 
 
1 







Young firms Old firms 




(0.587) -4.239 9.703 
-13.942 
(0.474) 





(0.986) -4.236 9.039 
-13.275 
(0.952) 






(0.408) 2.836 4.504 
-1.668 
(0.294) 





(0.706) 2.837 3.961 
-1.124 
(0.608) 






(0.633) -7.007 5.450 
-12.457 
(0.501) 





(1.049) -7.004 5.514 
-12.519 
(1.003) 
    
On common support 5425 
  
9044 
    
Off common support 7 
  
2 
    
Standard Errors are in parenthesis. 
Nearest neighbour matching algorithm has been used. The results are robust for multiple neighbour (k=10) matching and kernel matching. 
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Therefore, improvement in control over corruption is expected to make the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem supportive for business activity and positively affect firm 
performance. Education could be used as one of the policy tools to improve the awareness of 
entrepreneurs about legal practices, so that they could challenge the corrupt practices of 
government officials. Moreover, education has the potential to change the perception of 
entrepreneurs about formal institutions and might therefore be expected to bring about a cultural 
shift. 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs has been analysed for: (i) its effect on 
the performance of SMEs; (ii) ranking the components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem with 
respect to magnitude of effect on small, medium, young and old firms to identify the weak links; 
(iii) investigating the effect of corruption on performance of firms of different sizes and ages in 
least corrupt and most corrupt LMICs. Inferences have been drawn using the results based on 
multiple regression methods and PSM methods. 
This study contributes by measuring the effect of all components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem of LMICs in one model. As mentioned in the literature review, earlier studies have 
used only one or few components and omitted others, which affected the quality of estimation. 
Therefore, the findings of this study are more efficient and accurate. The results of regression 
models show that all components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs negatively affect 
firm performance. However, the magnitude of these negative effects is different for firms of 
different sizes and ages. It has also been found that the elements of both the institutional 
framework and the physical conditions faced by firms have relatively higher negative effect on 
medium sized and young firms. 
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Moreover, this study also contributes to the body of knowledge by ranking the 
components with respect to their magnitude of effect on firm performance. Corruption, 
government regulations and political instability have been found to be the most constraining 
components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Nevertheless, with respect to magnitude of effect, 
corruption stands out as the most significant problem for all dimensions of performance and for 
small, medium, young and old firms. 
The effect of corruption on the performance of SMEs has been analysed further by using 
PSM methods. Use of matching methods for analysing the effect of corruption has been a 
methodological contribution of this study, as it has not been applied by any study in the relevant 
literature so far. The results of matching methods show that corruption has a significant and 
substantially higher negative effect on the sales growth and labour productivity growth of SMEs. 
Therefore, institutional improvements for control over corruption in LMICs can significantly 
improve firm performance.  
This chapter has empirically tested the effect of individual components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem on the performance of SMEs in LMICs. The formal and informal 
institutions and physical conditions vary drastically across geographically dispersed LMICs, 
therefore, measurement of entrepreneurial ecosystem as whole cannot be done in existing 
circumstances. However, in next chapter the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan will be 
examined as a whole and interactive effect of components of institutional framework and 
physical conditions on the performance of SMEs will be investigated. This will be a unique study 
of its kind and expected to provide guidance not only to policymakers in Pakistan but also to 
other countries having similar institutional framework and physical conditions and facing similar 
problems in entrepreneurial activity. 
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CHAPTER 5 – THE EFFECT OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ECOSYSTEMS 
ON PERFORMANCE OF SMES IN PAKISTAN 
5.1 Introduction 
Over seven decades, Pakistan has faced many ups and downs in terms of politics, security, 
culture and economics, however, the present challenges are new and demand immediate attention 
by the government. There is an urgent need to change the way economic progress has been 
conceptualized—previous policies have been reactive with a high reliance on foreign aid 
(Husain, 2009; Qayyum et al., 2008). This approach has not helped Pakistan to realize its true 
potential. In the modern era, economic growth cannot be sustained with a group of well-
conceived short sighted projects and reactive policies. 
The new global economic order is based on entrepreneurship and innovation (Auerswald, 
2015; Mason and Brown, 2014). The most recent regional examples of the successful 
implementation of entrepreneurship and innovation are China, Malaysia and Turkey (Bruton et 
al., 2008). The promotion of entrepreneurship and innovation-based reforms has significantly 
improved the economic outlook of these countries.  
In the modern age, entrepreneurship has been considered synonymous with economic 
growth and the private sector is considered indispensable, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Entrepreneurship and innovation-led economic growth require the development of markets, 
engaging youth, creating employment opportunities and improving governance (Auerswald et 
al., 2012; Stam, 2014; Wong et al., 2005). Therefore, to meet the demands of 21
st
 century 
challenges, government and business should collaborate to not only cater for the situation at hand 
but also to create economic conditions for managing the needs of the future. 
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The current economic and social challenges faced by Pakistan can only be managed if the 
private sector is provided with a supportive entrepreneurial ecosystem. The objective of any 
policy to promote entrepreneurship should not only be to create entrepreneurs in those areas 
where they do not already exist, but also to ensure that the regions with an entrepreneurial 
disposition should be provided with a supportive environment to engage them in entrepreneurial 
activities (Cavallo et al., 2018; Chemin, 2010; Haque, 2007). 
The objective of any new strategy to improve investment and growth in the private sector 
should be to create such an ecosystem which encourages competition, through entry of new 
SMEs with innovative products and services. This entrepreneurial ecosystem should challenge 
the status quo of existing large scale firms. Such an entrepreneurial ecosystem will help in 
rebuilding the trust of the business community and general public with the government.
7
 The 
creation of such a supportive entrepreneurial ecosystem requires the removal of the barriers to 
entrepreneurship and innovation in the market. This, in turn, will generate opportunities for the 
growing population with a higher percentage of young people. Entrepreneurship has the potential 
to ensure investment in those activities which can ensure long-term employment opportunities 
for this growing population. Thus, entrepreneurs should be supported in increasing their 
investment in growth oriented businesses. 
The entrepreneurial ecosystem not only encourages growth of existing businesses, but 
also disrupts the status quo through creative destruction. This creative destruction process 
requires a supportive business environment, which is not under the strict control of the 
government, but rather government interventions are needed to facilitate economic activity (Feld, 
                                                          
7
According to Qayyum et al, 2008, it is believed by entrepreneurs in Pakistan that the government tries to take hold 




2012). Moreover, the entrepreneurial ecosystem protects the incumbents from anti-competitive 
activities by promoting innovation and diversification.  
A study on the diagnostics of growth of the private business sector in Pakistan has been 
undertaken by a team of researchers from the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics and 
the National University of Science and Technology. The findings of this study showed that poor 
governance and poor functioning of the institutions are the main obstacles to the economic 
growth of Pakistan (Qayyum et al., 2008). Entrepreneurship in Pakistan is suffering seriously at 
the hands of government regulations, legislation and policies (Qayyum et al., 2008). This has 
never allowed a Schumpeterian kind of entrepreneurship—with the ability to innovate and 
disrupt the market—to evolve in Pakistan, with the ability to innovate and disrupt the market.  
The entrepreneurial ecosystems perspective supports the use of an ‗invisible hand model‘ 
and allows entrepreneurial activity to be self-regulatory and competitive. On the contrary, the 
government in Pakistan has tight control over business activity and the path to success of 
businesses lies in the hands of government. As a result, entrepreneurs try to establish good 
connections with key government officials to obtain favourable treatment. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the institutional framework and physical conditions, which form the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem of Pakistan, are not supportive for the entrepreneurs.  
Moreover, the policies of the government regarding the private sector have largely 
emphasized the performance of large scale industries, and small scale firms have usually been 
ignored (Ghani et al., 2011; Hussain, 2004; Qayyum et al., 2008). However, SMEs dominate in 
the economy, not only in terms of the number of businesses, but also in terms of their socio-
economic contributions. Small scale industry with potential for growth, which reflects the true 
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spirit of entrepreneurship, has largely been operating in the informal economy because, it is 
claimed, of the government‘s preference for large scale industry (Husain, 2009; Hussain, 2004). 
In Pakistan, the proportion of small firms is highest but their growth rate in comparison to 
medium sized firms and large firms is very low. The performance of small firms stagnates at a 
certain point and most of them fail to grow, or sometimes survive, after that stage (Aterido et al., 
2011; Ghani et al., 2011). It is extremely difficult for the owners of small firms to fulfil the 
requirements of formal financial institutions and obtain funding for expansion and development.  
Entrepreneurs usually start their small scale businesses with their own financing, because 
banks and other formal financial institutions provide funding for established businesses based on 
evidence of their success, to avoid the risk of default. Moreover, the regulatory burden and wide-
spread corruption also hinders the growth and expansion of small firms. A number of studies 
have pointed out that government regulation, access to finance and rent seeking behaviour of 
government servants are the main reasons behind the problem (Aterido et al., 2011; Beck et al., 
2008; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Ghani et al., 2011; Smallbone et al., 2010). 
Therefore, it is interesting to investigate how the entrepreneurial ecosystem is constructed 
in Pakistan and how elements of the institutional framework and physical conditions vary in their 
impact on SME performance. Moreover, since the entrepreneurial ecosystem of developed and 
developing countries is different, therefore the identification and measurement of entrepreneurial 
ecosystem of Pakistan is expected to improve our understanding about the entrepreneurial 




5.2 Research Questions 
This study intends to identify the composition of entrepreneurial ecosystem in Pakistan, and then 
test the interactive effect of components of this entrepreneurial ecosystem on the performance of 
SMEs. Thus, identification of the entrepreneurial ecosystem at a national level is the objective of 
this study. It is debatable as to why the national level has been chosen as the boundary for the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem in Pakistan. Regional boundaries are almost always arbitrary and 
likely to vary within and between different regions. However, measurement of the national level 
entrepreneurial ecosystem is suitable in the context of Pakistan as it follows the federal 
governmental system and much business activity is guided through policies at the national level. 
Moreover, since empirical research on the entrepreneurial ecosystems is in its early 
developmental phase, work focussing on all levels of aggregation can make valuable 
contributions. 
The main questions to be investigated in this chapter are: 
 How can we measure the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Pakistan?  
 What is the composition of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan and how do 
different components vary in terms of their role in forming the entrepreneurial ecosystem 
of Pakistan? 
 How does the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan as a whole affect the performance of 
firms? 
 
The contributions of this chapter include: (i) the identification of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem existing in Pakistan using a bottom-up approach. This is the first study to measure 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of any LMIC. Previous studies of LMICs have simply tested the 
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impact of a small number of individual components and ignored the effect of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystems as a whole on the performance of SMEs; (ii) the findings provide guidelines to 
policymakers in Pakistan and other developing countries with a similar institutional framework 
and physical conditions. These findings can be used by other similar LMICs to understand their 
entrepreneurial ecosystems and apply a similar bottom-up approach to make their entrepreneurial 
ecosystems more encouraging for entrepreneurs; (iii) the findings will also extend the scarce 
literature based on the entrepreneurial ecosystems of developing countries. This advancement in 
literature will help to improve our understanding of the entrepreneurial ecosystems approach. 
5.3 Descriptive Analysis 
The WBES database has been used for obtaining data about the components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem and firm performance (Enterprise Survey, 2006-14). The details about how the WBES 
has been conducted and how the quality of the data is ensured was explained in Chapter 3. The 
descriptive statistics given in Table 5.1 show the distribution of a sample of 2,049 SMEs of 
Pakistan surveyed in years 2007 and 2013. Most SMEs in Pakistan serve the local and national 
market with only 8% selling in the international market. Moreover, only 3.5% are owned by 
foreigners, the rest are domestically owned. It can be argued that foreign investment usually 
takes the form of joint ventures or collaborations with large domestic firms. As a result, there is a 
very low percentage of foreign owned SMEs in the sample. There is, however, a balanced 






















The summary statistics by size and age of firms are given in Table 5.2. The sales growth 
of small firms is higher as compared to medium sized firms, with figures being 15% and 8%, 
respectively. Bank financing has been 4% on average for the medium sized firms, which is not 
that encouraging, however, it is relatively higher than small firms with 1% financing from the 
banks. The higher mean values for number of power outages in a month and value lost due to 
power outages indicates the worst conditions of energy shortage. Moreover, the top managers of 
SMEs have on average 17 years of experience. 
 
 
Variables Frequency Percent 
Firm Size 
Small(<20) 1259 61.4 
Medium(20-99) 790 38.56 
Sector 
Services Sector 310 15.13 
Manufacturing Sector 1739 84.87 
Ownership 
Domestic 1977 96.49 
Foreign 72 3.51 
Geographical Market 
Local 1210 59.05 
National 673 32.85 
International 166 8.10 
Firm Age 
Young  (up to 5 Years)  881 43 
Old (more than 5 Years)  1168 57 
Year of Survey 
2007 1078 52.61 
2013 971 47.39 
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Table 5. 2: Summary statistics of SMEs by size and age  
 
Small firms Medium firms Young firms Old firms 
 
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Sales growth (%) 15.08 39.39 -100 100 7.76 40.53 -99.00 100 10.85 39.96 -99 100 13.31 39.99 -100 100 
Employment growth (%) 12.29 28.18 -87.88 100 12.91 29.46 -87.50 100 14.42 30.17 -87.88 100 11.10 27.41 -86.67 100 
Labour productivity 
growth (%) 
27.10 12.68 -98.92 100 29.51 46.40 -99.49 100 20.36 38.33 -99.49 100 29.80 22.70 -98.80 100 
Working capital bank 
financing (%) 
1.43 11.87 0 100 4.04 15.27 0 100 2.45 14.28 0 100 2.43 12.60 0 100 
Time spent in meeting 
government regulations 
2.01 6.94 0 100 3.46 9.46 0 100 2.05 7.15 0 60 2.96 8.62 0 100 
Average no of visits for 
meetings tax officials 
1.33 3.15 0 40 2.20 6.83 0 100 1.49 4.24 0 50 1.80 5.38 0 100 
No of power outages in a 
month 
78.68 88.11 5 160 83.91 91.67 10 169 79.99 89.61 9 165 81.23 89.47 5 169 
Value lost due to power 
outage (% of sales) 
18.33 18.47 0 90 19.29 17.70 0 90 18.90 18.56 0 90 18.55 17.88 0 90 
Years of experience of 
top manager 




The summary statistics of firm performance with respect to city and province are 
shown in Table 5.3. There are variations in firm performance across different cities of 
Pakistan. The firms in Islamabad have exhibited better performance than other cities. On the 
contrary, firms in Peshawar city, which is part of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, have 
recorded the worst performance in these years. Apart from other reasons related to the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, this poor performance of firms in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa could be 
due to the war-like situation in this province. In this province, the Pakistan military is 
continuously engaged in operations against rebel groups, including the Taliban. 
 
Table 5. 3: Summary statistics of performance of SMEs with respect to city and province  
 Sales growth (%) Employment growth (%) Labour productivity growth (%) 
 
 
Mean S.D Min Max Mean S.D Min Max Mean S.D Min Max 
Cities 
Karachi 14.86 38.53 -100 100 13.97 30.50 -87.50 100 17.09 38.65 -98.69 100 
Lahore 14.14 47.88 -99 100 6.15 24.02 -87.88 100 15.73 36.18 -99.49 100 
Sialkot 3.18 38.79 -97.60 100 7.53 33.14 -80.00 100 14.21 39.58 -97.60 100 
Faisalabad 14.47 28.12 -93.89 100 13.98 30.45 -86.67 100 13.97 20.51 -93.29 100 
Gujranwala 9.03 37.32 -92.65 100 7.53 25.86 -79.80 100 6.69 24.88 -95.59 100 
Islamabad 13.61 35.17 -88.97 100 18.09 30.36 -85.11 100 20.43 45.82 -96.37 100 
Hyderabad 14.98 45.34 -92.65 100 15.33 22.04 -20.00 100 14.04 23.36 -91.65 100 
Quetta 17.21 37.80 -90 100 18.44 31.20 -36.36 100 15.13 34.77 -96. 100 
Peshawar -2.46 32.09 -97.89 100 17.60 27.69 -60.00 100 -9.26 31.43 -98.31 100 
Multan 14.20 50.57 -90 100 10.66 22.95 -28.57 100 12.91 23.32 -90 100 
Provinces 
Punjab 14.42 41.76 -99 100 9.16 28.04 -87.88 100 16.32 36.96 -99.49 100 
Sind 14.90 40.41 -100 100 14.33 28.45 -87.5 100 19.18 32.86 -98.69 100 
KPK -2.46 32.09 -97.89 100 17.60 27.69 -60 100 -9.26 29.43 -98.31 100 
Baluchistan 17.21 37.80 -90 100 18.44 31.20 -36.36 100 15.13 27.77 -96 100 
 
These descriptive statistics indicate the need for further analysis of the reasons for 
variations in firm performance of different regions. Moreover, if there is similarity in the 
perception of firms about the entrepreneurial ecosystem then how does that perception affect 
their performance? Therefore, in the next section a detailed analysis has been carried out to 
find out the answers to the research questions mentioned in section 5.2. 
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5.4 Statistical Analysis 
In Chapter 4, the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs was analysed to assess the effect of the 
institutional framework and the physical conditions on the performance of SMEs across 
countries. The data limitations allowed for the analysis of the effect of individual components 
only. However, we were able to rank the components with respect to the magnitude of their 
effects on SME performance, as well as their statistical significance. Corruption was 
identified as the weakest link in the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs and matching 
methods were used to further estimate the effect of corruption on the performance of least 
corrupt and most corrupt LMICs. 
In this chapter, the analysis focuses on Pakistan. We assess the significance and 
relative contributions of different components of the institutional framework and physical 
conditions, and investigate their interaction effects. This approach facilitates an in-depth 
analysis the composition of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. Here, the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan has been measured as a set of interdependent 
components. Moreover, the effect of the entrepreneurial ecosystem as a whole on the 
performance of SMEs is also explained and discussed in detail in the following sections. 
5.4.1 Step 1- The Identification of the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem of Pakistan 
The identification of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan is undertaken by using cluster 
analysis and Canonical Discriminant Analysis (CDA). In cluster analysis, the hierarchical 
clustering approach is used to find naturally existing groups of firms on the basis of their 
responses on the elements of the institutional framework and the physical conditions in 
Pakistan. The hierarchical clustering method assumes each firm is a separate cluster in the first stage 
and then groups similar firms in different clusters and, ultimately, ends at all the firms grouped in one 
cluster. The optimal number of meaningful clusters of firms in this chapter is decided on the 
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Dendrogram for cluster cluster analysis
basis of the dendrogram. The dendrogram in Figure 5.1 shows that a balanced distribution of 
firms can be achieved if data is divided into five groups. It is not possible using Stata 14 to 
properly display all 2,049 firms in the dendrogram to exhibit the clustering process, therefore, 
the grouping process of the last 100 groups is shown in Figure 5.1.It can be inferred from the 
dendrogram that five is the optimal number of clusters, in so far as the clusters look balanced 
but different from each other on the basis of each firm‘s response on the components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. 
 
Figure 5. 1: A Dendrogram of a cluster Analysis of the components of the entrepreneurial 






The distribution of firms in the five clusters is shown in Table 5.4. It can be seen that 
all clusters are well balanced with respect to the number of firms in each cluster. The sample 
characteristics of five clusters identified through the cluster analysis are given in Table 5.5. It 
can be inferred that firms are evenly distributed across five clusters on the basis of these firm-
level characteristics. Thus, clusters are well balanced and expected to provide unbiased 
estimates for further analysis. 
Table 5. 4: Distribution of firms in groups identified by the Cluster Analysis 
Clusters Frequency Percentage 
1 349 17.03 
2 411 20.06 
3 430 20.99 
4 324 15.81 
5 535 26.11 
 
Table 5. 5: Characteristics of groups identified through cluster analysis 
 
These clusters are further explained in Table 5.6 with respect to the response of firms 
on components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. The comparison of clusters 
shows the inter-cluster heterogeneity and intra-cluster homogeneity. The firms in all clusters 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
Variables No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
Firm 
Size 
Small(<20) 192 55.01 245 59.61 265 61.63 204 62.96 353 65.98 
Medium(20-99) 157 44.99 166 40.39 165 38.37 120 37.04 182 34.02 
Sector 
Manufacturing  312 89.4 334 81.27 363 84.42 253 78.09 477 89.16 
Services 37 10.6 77 18.73 67 15.58 71 21.91 58 10.84 
Ownership 
Domestic 341 97.71 397 96.59 416 96.74 309 95.37 514 96.07 
Foreign 8 2.29 14 3.41 14 3.26 15 4.63 21 3.93 
Firm 
Age 
Young (≥5 years) 138 39.54 183 44.53 189 43.95 129 39.81 242 45.23 
Old(<5 years) 211 60.46 228 55.47 241 56.05 195 60.19 293 54.77 
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are highly critical of all three elements of the institutional framework (government 
regulations, taxation system and corruption), and of the infrastructure and political instability 
among the physical conditions. However, inter-cluster comparison shows that firms in cluster 
1 are the most critical and firms in cluster 5 are the least critical of components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. Since these clusters are balanced and homogenous 
within, and heterogeneous between, these will be used in our canonical discriminant analysis 
to identify the composition of the entrepreneurial ecosystem functional in Pakistan with 
respect to the contribution and significance of each component. 
Table 5. 6: Mean values of city level aggregates of firms’ response on components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem with respect to clusters identified using the Cluster Analysis 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
Government regulations 50.24 44.69 37.57 39.35 33.35 
Tax rates and administration 50.08 48.06 49.35 45.73 43.70 
Corruption 69.16 66.19 63.71 65.52 54.40 
Access to finance 23.07 20.10 18.30 16.40 14.25 
Infrastructure 46.72 40.65 37.18 41.11 33.19 
Electricity 77.97 78.57 78.67 64.71 81.45 
Political instability 51.52 47.73 51.06 45.74 34.86 
The non-availability of an educated workforce  19.85 16.03 10.75 11.86 10.92 
Competition with informal sector 19.31 16.00 16.97 15.36 14.38 
Observations 349 411 430 324 535 
 
5.4.2 Step 2-Further Measurement of the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem of Pakistan 
Building on the above, Canonical Discriminant Analysis is used to investigate whether these 
groups are statistically significantly different from each other. The results of CDA reported in 
Table 5.7 show that four functions generated on the basis of groups identified through the 
cluster analysis are statistically significantly different from each other. The coefficients of the 
canonical correlations for the four functions are 0.385, 0.318, 0.269 and 0.136 respectively. 
Moreover, the Eigen values and the proportion of variance explained by these functions 
indicate that all four functions contribute statistically significantly in explaining the variations 
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in data. The F-test statistics are significant at a 5% level of error; therefore, it can be inferred 
that all these four functions are statistically significant and differences in the groups cannot 
be explained truly if any one of them is ignored.  
 









1 0.385 0.174 0.454 0.000 
2 0.318 0.113 0.294 0.000 
3 0.269 0.078 0.203 0.000 
4 0.136 0.019 0.049 0.000 
 
The contribution of components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in explaining each 
of these distinct discriminant functions is explained through their factor loadings given in 
Table 5.8. The factor loadings show the contribution of each covariate in the discriminant 
function (Mclachlan, 2004; Rencher, 2002). The sign of each covariate is considered while 
interpreting their individual contributions, however, when ranking the covariate with respect 
to magnitude of contribution, then only their absolute value is used. Thus, the absolute value 
of each component shows its contribution in explaining variations in the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. 
The factor loadings are just like beta weights in regression (Huberty and Olejnik, 
2006; Rencher and Christensen, 2012) and indicate the relative contribution of each variable 
in the classification of a discriminant function (Mclachlan, 2004). The higher the value of 
factor loading, the higher will be the magnitude of contribution of any component to the 
discriminant function. Since the functions given in Table 5.8 have been generated using 
groups identified through the cluster analysis, and clusters were decided on the basis of 
responses of firms on components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, the discriminant 
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functions indicate the entrepreneurial ecosystems of Pakistan. Thus, the composition of 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan can be decided on the basis of factor loadings. 
 
Table 5. 8: Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients 
Covariates function1 function2 function3 function4 
Government regulations -0.688 -0.159 1.094 2.424 
Tax rates and administration 0.016 -0.095 -0.235 -0.745 
Corruption 0.055 -0.026 -0.168 -0.351 
Access to finance 0.035 -0.062 0.052 -0.075 
Infrastructure 0.054 -0.203 -0.223 -1.454 
Political instability -0.289 0.080 -0.965 0.636 
The non-availability of an educated workforce  -0.177 -0.157 -0.044 -1.013 
Competition with informal sector 0.085 -0.068 -0.144 -0.617 
Electricity 0.580 -0.831 -0.257 -0.056 
 
According to Comrey and Lee (1992), McLachlan (2004) and Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007) factor loading of more than 0.4 indicates the statistically significant contribution of a 
factor to its functions. Therefore, using this criterion, it can be inferred that seven out of nine 
components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan are contributing statistically 
significantly in explaining discriminant function 4. It can be inferred on the basis of factor 
loadings in Table 5.8 that function 4 represents the composition of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem of Pakistan, which is a combination of both the institutional framework and the 
physical conditions. However, access to finance with factor loading -0.075 and electricity 
with factor loading of -0.056 are the least important factors in this entrepreneurial ecosystem.  
Out of the institutional framework conditions, government regulations are 
contributing positively to the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. In contrast, the taxation 
system and corruption (informal institutions) contribute negatively to the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. Taxation with a factor loading of -0.745 is the weakest factor in the institutional 
framework conditions. Thus, improving the taxation system should be the priority for 
policymakers. Moreover, corruption as an indicator of informal institutions is also feeding 
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negatively to the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. Thus, as found in Chapter 3, 
corruption is a significant problem in the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan, just like 
other LMICs. An improvement in control over corruption is expected to make the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem more encouraging for entrepreneurs in Pakistan.  
On the other hand, all components of physical conditions, except political instability, 
contribute negatively to the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Infrastructural conditions with a 
factor loading of -1.454 and the non-availability of an educated workforce with a factor 
loading of -1.013 are the weakest components in the physical conditions part of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. On the basis of the negative signs of most of the 
components and the negative aggregate values of factor loadings of the components, it can be 
argued that most of the components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan are 
negatively affecting the system. The composition of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of 
Pakistan with respect to relative contribution of each element of the institutional framework 
and the physical conditions is shown in Figure 5.2. 






The entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan is identified by using the natural patterns 
existing in the responses of the firms on the components of the institutional framework and 
physical conditions. The next section explains how this entrepreneurial ecosystem in Pakistan 
as a whole affects the performance of incumbent SMEs. 
5.4.3 Step 3-The Effect of the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem on Firm Performance 
Most of the research on entrepreneurial ecosystems involved theoretical contributions of 
different models designed to model such systems. These models have theoretically 
established the links of different components (Feld, 2012; Isenberg, 2011; Stam, 2014; 
Stangler and Bell-Masterson, 2015) but little effort has been directed at quantitative 
measurement of how these components lead towards the analysis of existing entrepreneurial 
ecosystems. According to Cavallo et al. (2018), several studies have tried to empirically 
investigate the entrepreneurial ecosystems, yet little is agreed upon. The systematic and 
interactive nature of this concept makes it challenging to measure. It is debatable which 
methods can best measure this interdependent nature of components of entrepreneurial 
ecosystem (Acs et al., 2014; Spigel, 2017; Stam and Bosma, 2015). 
Taich et al. (2016) used factor analysis to measure the entrepreneurial ecosystem 
model developed by Bell-Masterson and Stangler (2015) and empirically evaluated which 
components contribute to the measurement of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. On the basis of 
findings from a factor analysis, the entrepreneurial ecosystem was measured and its effect as 
a system was tested through regression analysis. The use of factor analysis was justified on 
the basis of the argument that the composition of entrepreneurial ecosystems can vary across 
different regions. Moreover, the bottom-up approach also supports the identification of 
existing entrepreneurial ecosystem before estimating its effect on the entrepreneurial activity. 
A similar approach has been used in this study to first identify the composition of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan, and then measure its interactive effect on performance 
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of SMEs. Cluster analysis and CDA are used following the bottom-up approach to find the 
configuration of the existing entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. 
However, similar to other linear estimation techniques like regression, there are two 
important limitations of using CDA. Firstly, the stability of the values of the discriminant 
function coefficients depends on the number of covariates in the model and sample size. 
Large sample sizes and fewer variables are more likely to produce stable coefficient 
estimates. Thus, a sample of 100 observations with 2 covariates is expected to produce more 
stable estimates, as compared to the same sample size with 20 covariates. In consequence, 
larger datasets are expected to produce more stable estimates. The ratio of sample size to 
covariates in this study is large enough to produce reliable estimates. 
Secondly, the magnitude of the contribution of covariates may change substantially if 
some covariates are excluded, or more variables are added in the model. It can be inferred 
that the importance of each variable in this case is relative to the model specified. A change 
in a model is expected to change the contribution and relative importance of covariates. 
However, this limitation is an advantage in this case when we want to measure an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem as an interaction of elements of the institutional framework and 
physical conditions. We want the contributions of components (covariates) to change with a 
change in the set of components. This reflects that components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem are dependent on each other and a change in one component will affect the whole 
system. Thus, CDA can be used to measure the interactive nature of mutual effect of 
components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem on each other. 
It can thus be inferred that factor loadings in CDA show a multivariate context, as the 
interactive effect of components rather than producing univariate index. Thus, factor loadings 
estimated through CDA show the contribution of each individual component to the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem in the presence of other components. Therefore, systematic nature 
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of the effect of components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan is justified by using 
the factor loadings to make a multiplicative and additive index rather than just using simple 
regression methods.  
The factor loadings given in Table 5.8 show the relative vitality of each component in 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem and are used like beta weights in a multiple regression 
(Huberty and Olejnik, 2006; Rencher and Christensen, 2012). These factor loadings are used 
to calculate discriminant scores for each firm in dataset. After using the factor loadings of 
statistically significant contributors in function 4 which represents the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem of Pakistan, equation 3.20 can be written as follows. 
 
𝐷𝑖 = 2.424 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖 − 0.745 ∗ 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖 − 0.351 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖 − 1.454 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑖 + 0.636 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖 − 0.617 ∗
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖 − 1.013 ∗ 𝑤𝑘𝑖         5.1 
 
Here Di is the discriminant score of each firm after taking into account the weighted 
effect of each component of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. The weighted effect of each 
component of the entrepreneurial ecosystem is dependent on the model specification. 
Therefore, the addition or removal of any component from the model may change the 
weighted effect of components. Thus, it can be inferred that the weighted effect of each 
component is estimated taking into account the effect of other components included in the 
model. Hence, interactive nature of the effect is used to estimate these factor loadings. 
The discriminant scores are the sum of products of discriminant coefficients with the 
observational values. Therefore, discriminant scores computed using the factor loadings (with 
signs) will result in an index value for each firm with respect to its response on components 
of entrepreneurial ecosystem. These index values represent the collective effect of the 
institutional and physical conditions for each firm. The index thus generated in this way 
would show the interactive effect of components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan 
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for each firm and this can be further used for estimating the effect of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem as a whole on the performance of incumbent firms.  
The regression estimates, based on these index values, reported in Table 5.9, show the 
interactive and interdependent nature of effect of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan 
on the performance of firms. Robust standard errors are estimated to account for the problems 
of heteroscedasticity. The statistically significant value of the F-test shows the goodness of fit 
of the model. The values of the R
2
 are low, however the statistically significant negative 
effect of the entrepreneurial ecosystem on the performance of firms in Pakistan is worth 
interpreting because of the theoretical link between the entrepreneurial ecosystem and firm 
performance. 
Table 5.9 shows that the health of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan is not in a 
good state, and it constrains the performance of firms of different sizes and ages. The 
magnitude of the effect is relatively higher on sales growth and labour productivity growth. A 
further 1% deterioration in the health of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan as a whole 
is expected to decrease the sales growth and labour productivity growth of all SMEs by 
0.25% and 0.47%, respectively. However, medium sized firms will be relatively more 
severely affected by this marginal decline in the health of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of 
Pakistan as their sales growth will decrease by 0.30% and labour productivity growth by 
0.74%. Similarly, the comparison of young and old firms shows that sales growth and 
employment growth young firms is relatively more highly negative affected by the poor 
health of the existing entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. As reported in Table 5.9, a 
marginal decline in the health of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan will result in 





Table 5. 9: Estimation of the effect of the health of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan 
on the performance SMEs 
 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%, Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
Young firm have age less than 5 years, others are old 
 
Thus, the systematic effect of elements of the institutional framework and physical 
conditions shows that the health of entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan is in poor state and 
it has a statistically significant negative effect on firm performance. The component parts are 
negatively poised in both the institutional framework and the physical conditions. Thus, 
immediate attention is required for improvements in individual components and 
entrepreneurial ecosystem as a whole for making it encouraging and supportive for the 
performance of incumbent firms. 
 Sales growth Employment growth Labour productivity growth 
















Ecosystem of Pakistan 
-0.25*** -0.21*** -0.30*** -0.01* -0.02* -0.06** -0.47** -0.70*** -0.74* 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.44) (0.37) (0.64) 
Constant 8.63*** 11.98*** 3.76*** 12.74*** 12.06*** 13.72*** 12.55*** 5.37*** 6.58*** 
(1.21) (1.55) (1.91) (0.84) (1.24) (1.45) (1.67) (1.41) (2.31) 
R
2
 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.09 
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 2049 1259 790 2049 1259 790 2049 1259 790 
 Young firms Old firms Young firms Old firms Young firms Old firms 
Entrepreneurial 
Ecosystem of Pakistan 
-0.44*** -0.13* -0.038* -0.01 -0.78* -0.50** 
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.68) (0.37) 
Constant 4.39*** 11.39*** 14.97*** 11.11** 9.67** 7.08*** 
(1.89) (1.57) (1.55) (1.20) (2.58) (10.35) 
R
2
 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.10 
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




In this chapter, the composition of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan has been 
identified by using data from WBES database. The scope of the chapter was limited to the 
measurement of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan as an interactive set of components 
and estimation of the interactive effect of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan as a 
whole on the performance of SMEs. The analysis of how and why different components of 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem affect each other, and how feedback loop works, will be 
considered in future research when such data is available. 
The cluster analysis, CDA and regression analysis were used to find answers to the 
research questions. The interactive nature of existence of the entrepreneurial ecosystem has 
been examined though the cluster analysis and canonical discriminant analysis. This is the 
first study of its kind to measure the entrepreneurial ecosystem of any LMIC and estimate its 
effect as a system on the performance of SMEs within it. The identification of composition of 
existing entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan is based on the bottom-up approach widely 
recommended in the literature. This approach helps in the diagnosis of the health of the 
existing system before introducing any reforms. 
The interdependent composition of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan shows 
that taxation system is statistically the most significantly negative component among the 
institutional framework conditions. An improvement in the tax rate and administration is 
expected to have a significantly positive effect on the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. 
Moreover, factor loadings of components of physical conditions show that infrastructure has 
the highest negative contribution to the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. This approach 
of looking at the interdependent effect of components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of 
Pakistan has also helped in determining the health of existing entrepreneurial ecosystem. The 
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overall assessment shows the weak health of the system and its negative effect on the 
entrepreneurial performance. 
Later, an index was been developed to estimate the interactive effect of elements of 
the institutional framework and physical conditions on the performance of SMEs. The 
findings show that the existing entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan is a constraint on the 
performance of SMEs. It is important to mention here that this type of research should not be 
used to rank the entrepreneurial ecosystems of different geographical distributions. The 
entrepreneurial ecosystem effective in one region cannot necessarily be equally effective in 
another region with different regional characteristics. Therefore, these comparisons and 
rankings will narrow down the wider focus of this approach and possibly sabotage the early 
working development of looking at the bottom-up approach. 
Moreover, the theoretical underpinnings of this approach allows for different 
entrepreneurial ecosystems with their own merits and demerits to nurture and establish at 
different places (Cortright and Mayer, 2004; Taich et al., 2016). The policymakers can use 
findings of this research while deciding their preferences for improvements in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. The specific policy recommendations for both 





CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The entrepreneurial ecosystems approach has gained in popularity with academics and 
practitioners alike in the last decade. The research into entrepreneurial ecosystems has been 
very diverse. Initially, research on entrepreneurial ecosystems lacked a central focus. Thus, 
some authors focused on increasing the extent of entrepreneurship through larger numbers of 
entrepreneurs, firms, self-employment or even employment opportunities. Others authors 
tried to match specific types to firms with different ecosystems. Whilst all of these objectives 
are important and provide some direction for economic policy, their reliance on a very 
limited number of input measures provides little guidance as to the impact such ecosystems 
have on output. At the other end of the spectrum, lies research that has taken an all-
encompassing approach. Unfortunately, the multiplicity of components considered in this line 
of research meant that it was very difficult to extract the salient features that policymakers 
should have been giving their attention to. 
Where policies were in place they tended to be geared towards providing more funds 
for research and development, often at universities, providing funds for start-ups and 
improving the proportion of skilled workers in the workforce. However, these are all inputs 
into the entrepreneurial ecosystem and the missing part is the connectivity of institutions, 
entrepreneurs and these physical conditions. In this thesis, empirical analyses were conducted 
to measure the impact of components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Low-Middle 
Income Countries on the performance of SMEs. The work also explores the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem of Pakistan, followed by an estimation of its impact on firm performance. From a 
theoretical perspective, this approach is still relatively under-researched meaning that the 
measurement of the components of the entrepreneurial ecosystems is somewhat unclear 
(Stam, 2015; Stam and Bosma, 2015). This study is a step in the direction of expanding this 
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approach, specifically in terms of the measurement of entrepreneurial ecosystems in LMIC 
with specific focus on Pakistan. 
Following a quantitative research methodology, the broader framework of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems is first divided into input and output measures. The output of an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem is measured in terms of its effect on various facets of the 
performance of SMEs—annual sales growth, employment growth and labour productivity 
growth. The institutional framework and physical conditions are inputs in the system and 
expected to affect the output of entrepreneurial ecosystem. These input and output indicators 
are measured using the World Bank Enterprise Survey data, which provides quantitative data 
on firm performance and firm level perceptions of components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem.  
A bottom-up approach has been adopted to understand the entrepreneurial ecosystem, 
because it is important to understand how the existing entrepreneurial ecosystem is 
functioning before suggesting what it should be. It will help policymakers including funding 
agencies, chambers of commerce and local governments, as well as entrepreneurs, to analyse 
their entrepreneurial ecosystem. It will then help them to decide what should be the common 
strategy to improve the weak links in the system. The use of bottom-up approach has enabled 
us to paint a picture of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs in general and Pakistan in 
particular. 
The particular emphasis of the two empirical studies was finding the individual and 
collaborative effect of components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem on the performance of 
young and old SMEs. With some exceptions, the findings have largely been consistent with 
the literature, and a detailed explanation has been given in the data analysis section of the 
relevant chapters. The empirical analysis undertaken in this thesis is one of its significant 
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contributions because previous literature on entrepreneurial ecosystems is more theoretical in 
nature. Moreover, none of the studies has yet measured the entrepreneurial ecosystem in 
LMICs, although a few attempts have been made for developed countries, which present 
different opportunities and challenges to the entrepreneurs. Also, the institutional frameworks 
and physical conditions are entirely different in developed countries. 
Thus, currently it is unknown as to how a LMIC should improve its entrepreneurial 
ecosystem? What should be the immediate concern for a LMIC to improve its entrepreneurial 
ecosystem? The answer to the later question is in the bottlenecks approach. From a public 
policy point of view, the bottlenecks in the entrepreneurial ecosystem affect the efficiency of 
the system. The first aim of policymaking should be to improve the weakest component in the 
system. The improvement in the entrepreneurial ecosystem also depends on the number of 
bottlenecks existing in it. The largest improvement in entrepreneurial ecosystem is expected 
if there exists only one weak component and it is subsequently corrected. 
The analysis in Chapter 4, of the effect of components of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, of LMICs on firm performance has enabled us to understand the health of their 
ecosystems, which is found to be a constraint on the performance of their SMEs. Corruption 
as an indicator of informal institutions has been found to have the largest negative effect. 
Other than corruption, unstable political conditions and cumbersome regulatory procedures 
are the most significant problems for firms of all sizes and ages in LMICs. 
Moreover, the demands of small, medium, young and old firms have also been found 
to be different from each other. Thus, a policy of ‗one size fits all‘ is not going to be 
effective. Therefore, policymakers should develop separate policies, using the bottom-up 
approach, for the progress of each of these categories of firms. Moreover, the studies in the 
literature have also mentioned the poor state of the institutional framework and physical 
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conditions as a common characteristic of all the LMICs. Therefore, aid given by the 
development agencies and efforts for the improvement in the performance of SMEs should be 
centred on institutional development rather than giving short-term benefits to different 
sectors. Procedural efficiency should be improved to provide quick solutions for regulatory 
issues related to the entrepreneurs. Moreover, the lending terms and conditions of banks 
should be favourable for SMEs, especially small firms, if the objective of sustainable growth 
and expansion is to be achieved. 
However, only the components-based analysis of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of 
LMICs had been possible because of significant variations in the institutional framework and 
physical conditions as well as limited data available for this large group of countries. 
Therefore, a holistic view of the entrepreneurial ecosystem has been obtained through 
analysis of data for Pakistan. The use of cluster analysis and canonical discriminant analysis 
has enabled us to identify the composition of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan. The 
weighted effect of components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem was used to account for the 
relative importance of each component, and an index was developed for estimating the 
systematic and interactive effect of the entrepreneurial ecosystem on the performance of 
firms. The inclusion, or exclusion, of any components is expected to change relative 
contribution of other components because of the interdependence of components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
The identification and measurement of systematic collective effects of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem on entrepreneurial performance has been a new contribution in the 
scarce literature on entrepreneurial ecosystems of developing countries. The findings show 
that the poor health of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan is a constraint on the 
performance of SMEs. There is an urgent need to take corrective actions for improvements in 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem for subsequent improvement in the performance of SMEs.  
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However, it can be concluded that after identification of the ways to measure 
entrepreneurial ecosystems, policymakers would be able to compare their entrepreneurial 
ecosystems with comparable similar countries. Also, they can identify the strong and weak 
points in their system and look for the opportunities that can be availed if the weak links are 
improved. 
There are a few points of discussion on the basis of this research. At first, the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems are a complicated mix and can vary from region to region and 
time to time. The connection of entrepreneurs and institutional frameworks and physical 
conditions is important. The research in this direction is in an early phase of development, yet 
it promises to contribute significantly to the development of regional economic policies in the 
future. Beyond this, the stakeholders of the ecosystems domain should focus on the 
availability of more sophisticated data, which is expected to better explain the connectivity in 
different layers of an entrepreneurial ecosystem framework. 
These components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem are not a definite set. We believe 
that these components measure the health of any entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs. We 
also understand that some components like connectivity of entrepreneurs, and research and 
development by universities might have been missed in this composition, nonetheless 
quantitative research in this direction has merely started and this study will pave the way to 
develop a causal relationship. However, the evaluation of entrepreneurial ecosystems using 
this approach gives some basic guidance about where it stands and what potential actions are 
expected to take it into the right direction. 
The rest of the chapter has been structured as follows. Section 6.1, explains the policy 
recommendations for LMICs and Pakistan and section 6.2 explains future research directions 
on the basis of the findings of these empirical studies. 
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6.1 Policy Recommendations 
The best possible data available on components of entrepreneurial ecosystems in LMICs has 
been used in this study. However, these findings are just guidelines on the roadmap towards 
the strong and weak points in the entrepreneurial ecosystems of these countries. After 
assessment of the health of the components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs, 
different courses of action are suggested for both entrepreneurs and policymakers.  
We understand that radical improvements in the entrepreneurial ecosystems are not 
pragmatic. Therefore, gradual improvements in the existing institutional framework and 
physical conditions are suggested. However, these recommendations are starting points for 
the debate about working on the bottlenecks in the existing entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
Policymakers should set a time frame for themselves and prioritize different improvements in 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem for making it encouraging for entry, survival and growth of 
SMEs.  
The specific policy recommendations, with respect to improvements in institutional 
framework and physical conditions, are given below for both entrepreneur and policymakers 
in LMICs and Pakistan: 
6.1.1 Institutional Framework 
Improvements in the institutional framework can significantly improve the ease in doing 
business for entrepreneurs. There is need to improve and synchronise both formal and 
informal institutions of LMICs for making the entrepreneurial ecosystem supportive for 
entry, survival and growth of entrepreneurs. How policymakers and entrepreneurs can 
contribute in their own domain, to achieve the goal of a supportive entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, has been explained below? 
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What can Policymakers do?  
Policymakers are important stakeholders in the entrepreneurial ecosystems approach. They 
are responsible for reforms in formal institutions and synchronization in formal and informal 
institutions. Therefore, the following ways are suggested for policymakers to improve the 
institutional framework in the entrepreneurial ecosystems of LMICs and Pakistan. 
 Government regulations in LMICs in general and Pakistan in particular are 
discouraging entrepreneurs from entering the market as formal businesses. Therefore, 
a reduction in the cost of business registration (a non-productive investment for 
business) and regulatory burdens for starting a business venture is recommended for 
ensuring a supportive entrepreneurial ecosystem. In addition, work on capacity 
building of government servants to create and implement business supportive policies. 
Such reforms will make it easy for entrepreneurs to comply government regulations. 
 Allow competitive market forces to follow self-regulatory mechanism for ascertaining 
the survival of only productive entrepreneurs. The government should use invisible 
hand model to control anti-competitive practices and let competition in the market and 
awareness of customers to decide which companies remain in the market and which 
ones leave. 
 Control over corruption should be the first priority of policymakers in LMICs. 
Substantial improvements in the performance of SMEs are expected as a result of a 
decrease in corruption, and this is expected to be disproportionately beneficial for 
young and medium sized firms. Government regulations are used by public officials 
for rent seeking. Thus, improvements in the regulatory environment will have a dual 
effect. It will not only make it easier for entrepreneurs to start business, but will also 
reduce the opportunities for corruption by public servants. 
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 Taxation system of LMICS is highly complicated and it is difficult to truly understand 
and comply with the requirements. Thus, policymakers should not only make it more 
simple but also spread awareness about how to comply with taxation requirement. 
Moreover, tax incentives should be provided to the firms investing in education 
programs and promoting entrepreneurial events at different levels. Highlight such 
events on media for awareness among public and for motivation of nascent 
entrepreneurs. 
 One policy for all SMEs will not be effective. The distinct and important needs of 
small, medium, young and old firms should be treated differently. Thus, policies 
should be developed and implemented after appropriate customization on the basis of 
needs and requirements of each type. 
What can Entrepreneurs do? 
The entrepreneurs are important part of the entrepreneurial ecosystems approach. They are 
not only the recipients in the entrepreneurial ecosystem, but they are also feeders into that 
system. The feedback loop mechanism ensures that input from entrepreneurs is used to 
inform reforms of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Entrepreneurs in LMICs can contribute to 
improvements of the institutional framework in following ways: 
 Collaborate with other business people to host entrepreneurial social events where 
entrepreneurs could learn from each other and share the successful practices and how 
entrepreneurs can do value addition in the society. Moreover, stay in touch on social 
media platforms to improve awareness of nascent entrepreneurs about how to go 
through the formal business processes. This awareness will mitigate the fear of 
potential entrepreneurs about how to deal will business rules and regulations. 
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 Foster research and development culture in the market by encouraging and supporting 
the people around you, who are interested in setting up their own ventures based on 
new product or service ideas. Liaise with your entrepreneurial association and 
government in an effort to mentor or promote the best practices of interaction between 
different stakeholders in entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
 To ensure productive entrepreneurial contribution in the market identify and exploit 
the unique or under-served opportunities in the market with potential for growth in 
future. Also, set challenging and ambitious goals for expansion and growth of your 
entrepreneurial venture. This will promote innovation in the market and disrupt the 
status quo. 
6.1.2 Physical Conditions 
The variations in entrepreneurial ecosystems across different regional spaces happen to be 
because of both institutional framework and physical conditions. The physical conditions 
play an important role in making any entrepreneurial ecosystem attractive for entrepreneurs. 
Therefore, different remedial actions can be suggested, at whichever level the ecosystem is 
measured, for improvements in this direction and both policymakers and entrepreneurs have 
their distinct roles to play. The recommendations for policymakers and entrepreneurs are 
explained below: 
What can Policymakers do?  
Policymakers are not only responsible for institutional reforms but also improvements in the 
physical conditions largely depend on the reforms agenda adopted by the policymakers. 
Therefore, the following ways are suggested for policymakers to improve the physical 
conditions of the entrepreneurial ecosystems of LMICs and Pakistan. 
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 Eliminate barriers to getting funds for starting new business. The financial institutions 
are inefficient and their terms and conditions are not favourable for SMEs. Obtaining 
equity financing should be easy for businesses and sources of external financing 
should be bound by the government to provide loan to SMEs on suitable terms and 
conditions. Moreover, micro financing schemes can be useful to facilitate small 
businesses in getting short-term loans. 
 Strictly follow the laws for child labour and through distance learning, at least, 
provide free access to education for all. Moreover, start business education modules at 
secondary education level to improve the understanding of students about value 
addition by entrepreneurs in the society. In addition, improve the quality of education 
in the technical and vocational institutes for improvement in the skill level of 
industrial workforce. 
 The access to tertiary education should be improved so that larger set of population 
could get benefit from it. Moreover, the quality of scientific institutions should be 
improved for the increased supply of qualified scientists and engineers for the 
industrial sector. Also, tax credits to the general public should be offered for investing 
in education. 
 Use social safety nets to encourage people initiating an entrepreneurial venture. This 
should be used for protecting entrepreneurs from the damages of a failed 
entrepreneurial effort. Moreover, create business incubation centres in different 
underdeveloped regions to facilitate nascent entrepreneurs in start-up and early 
settlement phase in business.  
 Foster academia-industry collaborations for creation of new technologies and 
innovation in the existing technologies. Appreciate the local technologists and 
encourage local technology development by providing tax reliefs for preferred 
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industries. Moreover, start collecting and disseminating data on the entrepreneurial 
activity and its effect on economy at local and national level. 
 Improve the consistency in government policies and there should be no conflict of 
interest among institutions. Consistent government policies will help in reducing the 
uncertainty surrounding the business environment. The investment decisions of the 
entrepreneurs rely heavily on the political stability of a region.  
 Though the experience in the informal economy has a positive effect on the 
performance of registered SMEs in LMICs, yet the enormous number of businesses 
operating in the informal economy should be motivated to register formally by 
sharing attractive benefits of registration. 
 The provision of uninterrupted electricity to all businesses, especially SMEs should be 
ensured to overcome this biggest infrastructural obstacle to productivity of firms in 
Pakistan. 
 The micro-level data collection on all components of the entrepreneurial ecosystem 
should be ensured for policy oriented studies. 
What can Entrepreneurs Do? 
Whatever physical conditions are available, entrepreneurs can play a key role in utilization of 
existing resources. The optimum utilization of existing resources can create more 
opportunities for entrepreneurs and they can also push policymakers through feedback loop 
mechanism for immediate improvements in certain physical conditions. Therefore, following 
ways of contribution by entrepreneurs can be recommended for improvements in the physical 
conditions: 
 Collaborate with the business community to provide seed funding to the nascent 
entrepreneurs with innovative business ideas and willing to take risk. Control the risk 
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of implementing new business ideas by doing a pilot test to validate the possibility of 
success of your idea. Also, identify the dependence of success of your idea on 
external factors beyond your control. Keep in mind that success of any idea is linked 
with the skill set of the entrepreneurs. 
 Always keep looking for new technologies and improvements in existing technology 
for improving the process and product efficiency of your business. Moreover, explore 
international markets and exploit trade affiliations of countries to expand the market 
for your products and services.  
 Invest in continuity of both formal and informal education of your employees and 
provide training and development facilities to your employees for learning new 
technologies and trends. Also, invest in apprenticeship programs to improve the skill 
set of your future workforce. 
 Stay connected with the entrepreneurs in your area and ask peers how they developed 
the skill level of their workforce. Moreover, with the help of network of entrepreneurs 
try to sponsor industry related skill building programs. 
6.2 Future Research Directions 
There is need to dig deeper into the existing entrepreneurial ecosystem problems to look for 
the possible solutions. Further research at different levels is required to investigate this area 
with potential for improvement in entrepreneurship and subsequent economic growth. The 
contribution of this thesis is (i) the measurement of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan 
as an interdependent set of components, and (ii) identification of weak links in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of LMICs. However, there is a long way to go in understanding the 
complicated nature of the interactive effects between different components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. Further research should be undertaken to better measure the 
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components through improved quality of data. Different units of analysis (countries, regions, 
provinces, districts, cities, industrial clusters, etc.) should be used to identify and measure the 
composition and functioning of various types of entrepreneurial ecosystems. The future 
research directions recommended on the basis of this study are given below: 
 The concept of entrepreneurial ecosystems is in an evolutionary phase and needs 
further empirical studies to establish the causal relationship between components and 
outcomes of their effect on firm performance. Moreover, more studies on developing 
countries are needed for comparisons. 
 The impact of the entrepreneurial ecosystem of Pakistan at national level has been 
empirically investigated in this study. However, different effects for different 
industrial sectors are also expected. Therefore, future research should be directed at 
looking for the types of entrepreneurial ecosystems for different industrial sectors. 
 Different regions could be hosts to different types of industrial sectors, therefore, 
depending upon the availability of data, future research should be aimed at finding 
entrepreneurial ecosystems at further micro-level (province, city, cluster of 
businesses) for improving the understanding of stakeholders of this approach. This 
will also help in evaluating the entrepreneurial potential of different regions for 
different industrial sectors on the basis of their regional characteristics. 
 Depending upon the availability of data, future research should use longitudinal data 
to track the ups and downs in businesses cycle within a manageable time frame for 
properly understanding the development of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, especially 
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